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This dissertation explores innovations in index-based risk transfer products (IBRTPs) 
as a means to address an important insurance market failure that leaves many poor and 
vulnerable populations exposed to considerable uninsured risk. IBRTPs can address 
problems of covariate risk, asymmetric information and high transaction costs that 
have precluded the emergence of formal insurance market in low-income areas, where 
uninsured risk remains a leading cause of persistent poverty.  
 A brief introductory chapter situates this dissertation in the broader, emergent 
literature on IBRTPs. The second chapter explains how the strong relation between 
widespread human suffering and weather shocks creates an opportunity to develop 
famine indexed weather derivatives to finance improved emergency response to 
humanitarian crises.  
The third chapter explains how these instruments might be designed and used 
by operational agencies for famine prevention in response to slow-onset disasters. It 
uses household data to develop a famine index based on child anthropometric data that 
is strongly related to rainfall variability and other exogenous measures that are reliably 
available at low cost; that index can be used to trigger payments to improve the 
timeliness and cost-effectiveness of humanitarian response.  
 The fourth chapter develops commercially viable index based livestock 
insurance (IBLI) to protect livestock assets for northern Kenyan pastoralists. The 
underlying herd mortality index is constructed off a statistical model that relates 
 longitudinal household-level herd mortality data to remotely sensed vegetation index 
data. The resulting index performs well out of sample. Pricing and risk exposure 
analysis also demonstrate the commercial potential of the product, which has been 
taken up by financial institutions in Kenya for marketing in early 2010. 
 The fifth chapter explores the household-level performance of IBLI. It uses 
simulations parameterized based on household panel data, risk preference estimates 
elicited in field experiments and remote sensing vegetation data to explore how well 
IBLI performs in preserving household wealth in this setting characterized by 
bifurcated livestock growth dynamics characteristic of poverty traps. Willingness to 
pay and aggregate demand for the contract are also estimated. This analysis shows that 
bifurcation in livestock herd dynamics leads to nonlinear insurance valuation 
regardless of risk preferences.  
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The central theme of development economics has always been how to eliminate 
poverty. Despite striking improvement in standards of living and a sharp fall in the 
global poverty rate over the past two or three decades, one third of the world still lives 
on $1.25 a day or less (Chen and Ravallion 2008). The problem is especially acute and 
persistent in sub-Saharan Africa. The persistence of extreme poverty, and its 
prevalence among particular groups defined by geography, caste, ethnicity or other 
attributes, has motivated widespread recent in “poverty traps” (Baulch and Hoddinott 
2000; Sachs 2005; Barrett, Carter and Little 2007).  
 The economics literature has suggested several mechanisms by which poverty 
traps might emerge (Barrett and Swallow 2006; Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoff 2006; 
Carter and Barrett 2006; Azariadis and Stachurski 2007). Central to this literature is 
the hypothesized existence of multiple dynamic equilibria of well-being, at least one 
of which lies below a standard poverty line. Such settings are characterized by at least 
one critical threshold above which one is expected to be able to accumulate toward a 
satisfactory equilibrium standard of living, and below which one is expected to slide 
into a low-level poverty equilibrium. Various factors that seem to impede the poor’s 
capacity to surmount the critical threshold all revolve around some combination of 
market imperfections that generate exclusionary mechanisms (e.g., credit and 
insurance rationing), resulting in the separation of subpopulations into distinct groups 
with different prospects.  
 This dissertation is motivated by the salience of uninsured risk as a common 
driver behind the existence of poverty traps, especially the covariate risk associated 
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with extreme weather events – e.g., cyclones, droughts, floods, hurricanes, etc. – that 
devastate poor communities’ productive assets with distressing frequency. Formal 
markets routinely fail to provide adequate insurance for such covariate risk in poor and 
infrastructure-deficit areas. And informal mutual insurance networks are structurally 
ill-suited to insure against covariate risk. This dissertation takes as its point of 
departure the importance of developing effective covariate risk management 
instruments as part of a strategy for reducing persistent poverty.  
Weather-related disasters disproportionately affect the rural poor because their 
livelihoods tend to rely on agriculture, they have little self-insurance capacity, less 
reliable physical and institutional infrastructure to support external response, and weak 
access to credit or insurance for responding to shocks with financial instruments. 
Overall, people in low-income countries are four times more likely to die due to 
natural disasters (Gaiha and Thapa 2006). At the household level, evidence from 
drought in Ethiopia and Hurricane Mitch in Honduras indicates that poorer households 
feel the medium-term adverse effects more acutely and for a longer period than do 
better-off households (Carter et al. 2007). Furthermore, changing weather patterns 
appear likely to further increase the frequency and intensity of adverse weather events 
in the low-income tropics (Munich Re, 2006; IPCC 2007). 
The combination of ex post losses due to adverse climate shocks and the 
likewise-substantial, albeit less-obvious opportunity cost of inefficient ex ante climate 
risk management likely play an important role in perpetuating extreme poverty. The 
most obvious mechanism is when adverse climate shocks knock a household beneath a 
critical threshold thereby setting them on a downward trajectory into destitution from 
which they do not recover (Dercon 1998; McPeak and Barrett 2001; Dercon 2005; 
Carter and Barrett 2006; Krishna 2006). People’s response to shocks can likewise trap 
them in poverty. Poor households commonly liquidate assets to cope with the 
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immediate consequence of shocks, which often drops people into irreversible 
destitution (Krishna 2006). Other poor households, recognizing the long-term risks of 
asset liquidation in the presence of poverty traps try to protect critical assets, which 
may require some combination of reduced food consumption, foregone health care, or 
withdrawal of children from school (Morduch 1995; Foster 1995; Zimmerman and 
Carter 2003; Barrett et al. 2006; Hoddinott 2006; Kazianga and Udry 2006). The 
resulting health and educational deficiencies can reduce human capital, further 
trapping the household in poverty intergenerationally (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; 
Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001; Thomas et al. 2004; Dercon and Hoddinott 2005). 
Recognizing these prospective consequences of shocks, people may go 
extraordinary lengths to manage risk exposure ex ante. The poor, who are generally 
more risk averse, generally appear more likely to select low-risk, low-return asset and 
livelihood strategies that reduce the risk of severe suffering but limit their growth 
potential, investment incentives and adoption of improved technologies (Feder, Just 
and Zilberman 1985; Eswaran and Kotwal 1989, 1990; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
1993; Morduch 1995; Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis 2000; Dercon 2005; Elbers et al. 
2007). Such precautionary actions reinforce inherited patterns of chronic poverty. And 
because risk exposure leaves lenders vulnerable to default by borrowers, uninsured 
risk commonly limits access to credit, especially for the poor who lack collateral to 
guarantee loan repayment (Besley 1995). The combination of conservative portfolio 
choice induced by risk aversion that is strongly associated with poverty and credit 
market exclusion because risk exposure dampens lenders’ willingness to lend helps 
perpetuate poverty. 
A dearth of financial market instruments compounds the problems of 
ineffective and inefficient ex ante and ex post strategies to manage risk and cope with 
shocks, respectively. Of course, if financial markets permit people to insure against 
 4 
shocks ex ante or to borrow ex post so as to achieve quasi-insurance through ex post 
loan repayment, these adverse effects of risk should be attenuated or eliminated and 
risk need not contribute to the existence of poverty traps. Unfortunately, credit and 
insurance are routinely undersupplied in low-income areas. Poor households often lack 
access to formal financial markets that can facilitate consumption smoothing.1  
The main causes leading toward formal financial failures are covariate risk, 
asymmetric information, and high transaction costs. First, spatially-correlated 
catastrophic losses, e.g., from weather-related disasters, can exceed the reserves of an 
insurer or lender, leaving unsuspecting policyholders or depositors unprotected.2 
Second, the existence of asymmetric information problems tends to expose 
lenders/insurers with losses that exceed the projections used to establish lending and 
premium rates due to classical problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.  Third, 
the transaction costs of financial contracting in rural areas are much higher than in 
urban areas due to limited transportation, communication, legal infrastructure 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986) and the necessary information systems to control 
adverse selection and moral hazard. These high lending costs, combined with the 
small scale of intended borrowing by poor households, naturally leads to credit 
rationing that excludes the poor in equilibrium (Carter 1988). 
Due to the limited availability of formal financial markets, people tend to rely 
heavily on a wide variety of informal risk transfer mechanisms to smooth consumption 
in rural areas (Besley 1995). These mechanisms vary from socially-constructed 
reciprocity obligations within family, village, religious community, or occupation 
                                                 
1 While microfinance has shown significant promise in some settings, the success has been limited in 
rural areas and for farming activities that require longer-term loans than is customary for microfinance 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2005). 
2 Such covariate risk exposure explains why crop insurance policies are generally available only in 
countries where governments take on much of the catastrophic risk exposure faced by insurers 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Miranda and Glauber 1997). 
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(Coate and Ravallion 1993; Townsend 1994, 1995; Grimard 1997; Fafchamps and 
Lund 2003) to semi-formal microfinance, rotating savings and credit, or state-
contingent loan arrangements (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990; Udry 1994). These informal 
mechanisms, however, tend to fail in the presence of large covariate risks 
(Rosenzweig 1988; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Townsend 1994; Dercon 
1996). There is also evidence that access to these informal mechanisms is positively 
related to existing wealth (Jalan and Ravallion 1999; Santos and Barrett 2006; 
Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett 2009). 
The increasing recognition of the considerable uninsured covariate risk 
exposure faced by the poor and its reinforcing impact on persistent poverty have 
sparked considerable interest in and experimentation with index based risk transfer 
products (IBRTPs) as a market-based means to transfer covariate climate risk. IBRTPs 
are financial instruments that make payments based on realizations of an underlying – 
transparent and objectively measured – index. For IBRTPs to be useful in transferring 
risk, the keys are a well-defined spatiotemporal coverage and a well-established index 
that is highly correlated with the aggregate losses being transferred and based on data 
sources not easily manipulable by either the insured or the insurer.3 IBRTPs can take 
on any number of forms including insurance policies, option contracts, catastrophic 
bonds, etc. IBRTPs with indices based on cumulative rainfall, temperature, area 
average yield, satellite imagery and others have recently been developed to address 
covariate losses, especially those caused by natural disasters in low-income countries. 
Target users range from micro-level, retail clients (nomadic herders, small farmers) to 
meso- and macro-level institutional clients (e.g., cooperatives, microfinance 
                                                 
3 For example, an IBRTP that protects against crop losses would be based on an index that is presumed 
to be highly correlated with farm-level yields. 
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institutions, governments, humanitarian organizations). These experiences are recently 
reviewed by Barrett et al. (2008) and Skees and Collier (2008).4   
By design, IBRTPs can obviate several of the problems that bedevil financial 
contracting in low-income rural areas and can thereby help reduce financial markets 
failures that contribute to persistent poverty. Since realizations of the index are 
exogenous to policyholders, IBRTPs are not subject to the asymmetric information 
problems that plague traditional financial products. Thus, moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems should be considerably less than with traditional insurance 
products. Transaction costs are also typically much lower since the financial service 
provider does not have to verify farm-level expected yields or conduct farm-level loss 
assessment. Lastly, properly securitizing climate risk into a well-defined index opens 
up possibilities to transfer major covariate risk from low-income countries to 
international reinsurance, weather and financial markets at commercially viable costs. 
Although these financial innovations alone cannot solve the problem of chronic 
poverty, IBRTPs open up a range of intriguing new possibilities (Barrett et al. 2008; 
Barnett et al. 2008). 
Opportunities offered by IBRTPs, however, come at the cost of basis risk, 
which refers to the imperfect correlation between an insured’s potential loss 
experience and the behavior of the underlying index on which the index insurance 
payout is based. A contract holder may experience the type of losses insured against 
but fail to receive a payout if the overall index is not triggered. Conversely, while the 
                                                 
4 Perhaps the best known examples of IBRTPs implemented in developing countries are: rainfall 
insurance to protect Mexico’s national natural disasters social fund, FONDEN, from catastrophic 
drought (Alderman and Haque 2007); area mortality-based livestock insurance for herders in Mongolia 
(Mahul and Skees 2007); rainfall insurance for protecting farmers and microfinance institutions from 
drought and flood in India (Hess 2003; Gine et al. 2007); rainfall insurance linked to input loans to 
groundnut and maize farmers in Malawi (Hess and Syroka 2005; Osgood et al. 2007); and drought 
insurance to protect the World Food Programme (WFP)’s exposure to drought in Ethiopia (WFP 2005). 
At least 20 distinct IBRTPs have also been developed or proposed in other developing countries as of 
today. 
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aggregate experience may result in a triggered contract, some insured individuals may 
not have experienced losses yet still receive payouts. Thus, if an IBRTP is to be 
effective, the underlying index must be highly correlated with the loss being 
transferred over a relatively large geographic area. There must exist sufficient high-
quality historical data representing the risk faced by the target population in order to 
establish this correlation and to estimate the probability distribution of the index. Most 
of the IBRTPs developed to date rely on weather data or crop growth models due to 
the limited availability of spatially and temporally rich household data in the targeted 
rural areas. The link to households’ direct experience of risk is necessarily of uncertain 
strength, which raises important questions about whether IBRTPs indeed effectively 
reduce the poor’s uninsured risk exposure sufficiently to justify their cost and to alter 
the dynamics of poverty among target populations.  
This dissertation offers novel advances in applying the now-familiar 
quantitative design of IBRTPs to rich household data in an environment know to be 
characterized by threshold-based poverty traps. Because risk is especially pernicious 
in such settings, IBRTPs would seem to hold unusual promise. The four main chapters 
develop innovative IBRTPs that build the necessary indexes off of longitudinal 
household data statistically fit to data remotely sensed from satellite-based platforms, 
and then test the performance of the resulting IBRTP contracts against other 
household-level panel data and by simulating household performance with and 
without IBRTPs based on those data and risk preference parameters estimated among 
the same population using field experiments.   
The arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of northern Kenya are the geographic 
focus of this study. Increasingly frequent and severe drought is a pervasive hazard that 
routinely causes great loss of livestock, the main asset the three million pastoralist 
households in the region hold, and severe and widespread malnutrition. Past empirical 
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studies consistently find strong evidence of poverty traps in this pastoral region 
manifests in the form of bifurcations in livestock accumulation (McPeak and Barrett 
2001; Lybbert et al. 2004; Barrett et al. 2006). Indeed, Santos and Barrett (2007) find 
that uninsured drought risk is a fundamental cause of the existence of multiple 
equilibria and associated poverty traps in the region. The strong link between drought 
risk and persistent poverty makes northern Kenya an ideal setting for studying whether 
IBRTPs might be useful in combating poverty traps. 
The following chapters focus in turn on two distinct, complementary types of 
IBRTPs. These target different clients aiming to reduce poverty among northern 
Kenyan pastoralists. The first two chapters focus on instruments that could enhance 
provision of emergency response by governments, donors or humanitarian 
organizations to avert famine. The last two chapters focus on retail-level instruments 
designed to insure the livestock-based wealth of pastoralists. Our emphasis of these 
instruments on asset risk management resolves an important mismatch in the current 
literature and practice, where most insurance instruments globally are for assets, yet 
most IBRTPs in developing countries are focused on insurance. Asset risk 
management instruments, on the other hand, complicate the problem relative to 
income risk management instruments, which further deviates our methodology in 
development and evaluation from the existing literature in many interesting and 
innovative aspects. 
The second chapter, which appeared in the American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics (Vol. 89, No. 5, December 2007), introduces the idea that the strong 
relation between widespread human suffering and weather shocks creates important 
opportunities for IBRTPs to help humanitarian organizations and governments 
respond more promptly and cost-effectively to humanitarian crises caused by drought, 
which ultimately could protect lives as well as livelihoods of the affected populations. 
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It proposes a conceptual framework for famine indexed weather derivatives (FIWDs) 
– weather derivatives indexed to forecasts of prevalence and severity of child 
undernutrition – and shows how FIWDs can be designed and used to enhance effective 
emergency response to slow-onset disasters. Using historical data on rainfall, food aid 
deliveries and of the international humanitarian funding appeals process, this paper 
demonstrates the potential economic and humanitarian value of FIWDs as a financial 
tool for managing humanitarian organizations’ drought risk.  
The third chapter, which appeared in the Agricultural Finance Review (Vol. 
68, No. 1, Spring 2008), develops the design details of the proposed FIWDs for the 
specific cases of famine index insurance and famine catastrophe bonds. The proposed 
framework is then applied empirically to northern Kenya using household survey data 
collected monthly in three of the country’s poorest districts, where food aid is routine 
but unpopular with donors and recipients both as a highly imperfect means of coping 
with drought. The chapter’s main innovation is to demonstrate how a parametric and 
objectively measured famine index that could trigger FIWD payments can be 
constructed based on the strong statistical relationship between child malnutrition and 
rainfall. It is also shows how the FIWD could be used to layer catastrophic famine 
risk, thereby creating a complement to existing financial facilities in a most cost 
effective way.  
The fourth chapter describes a novel effort at developing a commercially 
viable index based livestock insurance (IBLI) to protect northern Kenyan pastoralists 
from considerable livestock asset risk. It describes in detail the design of an IBLI 
contract based on remotely sensed measures of vegetative cover on rangelands. Those 
data exhibit the properties one wants for an IBRTP: precise, objectively verifiable, 
available at low cost in near-real time, not manipulable by either party to the contract, 
and, most importantly, strongly correlated with herd mortality. The key innovation is 
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to construct, for the first time, an IBRTP based on a predicted asset loss index 
conditional on the observed intensity of deviation of vegetation index from normal. 
The resulting index performs very well out of sample, both when tested against other 
household-level longitudinal herd mortality data from the same region and period, and 
when compared qualitatively with community level drought experiences over the past 
27 years. The historical, remotely sensed data on rangeland vegetation are then used to 
price the IBLI contract and analyze the potential risk exposure of the underwriter. That 
analysis establishes the reinsurance potential of the IBLI contract in international 
markets. The chapter concludes by discussing a few key operational challenges for 
upcoming commercial implementation of the IBLI contract in northern Kenya. 
By addressing the core covariate asset risk of the vulnerable pastoralists, IBLI 
could offer substantial economic and social returns in the pastoral communities of 
northern Kenya. To the extent that the likelihood of severe herd mortality induces 
ineffective behavior responses and so reduces incentives to invest in herds and related 
productive activities of the risk averse households, insuring livestock against 
catastrophic loss would address the high risk of investment in such environments. By 
thus stabilizing asset accumulation this should improve incentives for households to 
build their asset base and climb out of poverty, thereby enhancing economic growth. 
And as IBLI insures the assets that secure pastoralists’ loans, it could crowd in 
demand and supply for much needed credit, which could further enhance asset 
accumulation. More importantly, IBLI could protect the vulnerable but presently non 
poor households from sliding into poverty trap following covariate herd losses, from 
which they do not recover. Therefore, expected pro-poor role of IBLI is particularly 
salient in the presence of bifurcations in livestock dynamic leading to a poverty trap in 
this setting. 
 11 
The final chapter thus addresses the next critical set of questions: does IBLI 
affect the wealth dynamics of the target population? If so, will they be willing to 
purchase it at commercially sustainable rates? And how will these valuations vary 
across different subpopulations? The success of the product will depend on the 
existence of adequate demand to make IBLI commercially viable and to establish for 
national government or development agencies, who might buy IBLI on behalf of poor 
clients, that it is cost-effective as an instrument for reducing persistent poverty. 
The fifth chapter explores these performance issues through simulation 
analysis. It parameterizes the simulation analysis using household panel data, 
combined with risk preference estimates elicited in field experiments and historical 
remote sensing vegetation index data to see how well the IBLI performs in preserving 
household wealth in a poverty trap economy characterized by bifurcated livestock 
growth dynamics. This allows exploration of basis risk that has been largely ignored in 
the empirical literature on IBRTPs in developing countries, as well as resulting inter-
household variation in valuation of the IBLI contract. This technique enables us to 
explore variation of households’ willingness to pay and aggregate demand for the 
IBLI product.  
The simulated performance of IBLI contract varies greatly across households 
and locations with differences in basis risk and in the insured’s herd size relative to the 
bifurcated herd threshold, which determines if and how IBLI alters wealth dynamics. 
The bifurcation in livestock dynamics leads to nonlinear insurance valuation among 
pastoralists within the key asset range regardless of their risk preferences. The product 
performs best among the vulnerable pastoral group, from whom IBLI prevents a 
catastrophic herd collapse. The estimated aggregate demand for the commercially 
viable contract is highly price elastic. And because willingness to pay among the most 
vulnerable pastoralists – those who tend to benefit most from IBLI – is, on average, 
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lower than the commercial premium rates, the chapter concludes by illustrating the 
potential use of subsidized IBLI to underpin a public safety net properly targeted 
based on easily observed characteristics such as herd size. This shows promise as a 
cost effective poverty reduction instrument.5  
Overall, the IBRTPs developed in this dissertation show considerable promise 
as effective new risk management instruments to aid populations facing poverty traps 
of the sort observed in northern Kenya. By addressing serious problems of covariate 
risk, asymmetric information and high transaction costs that have precluded the 
emergence of commercial insurance in these areas to date, these products offer a novel 
opportunity to use financial risk transfer mechanisms to address a key driver of 
persistent poverty. The potential applicability of the IBRTP ideas developed here 
extends well beyond the northern Kenyan context. Because extended time series of 
remotely sensed data are available worldwide at high quality and low cost, wherever 
there also exist longitudinal household-level data on an insurable interest, similar 
types of products can also be designed and tested using the methodologies developed 
in this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Barrett et al. (2008) show that an asset safety net akin to this sort of insurance offers superior 
economic growth and poverty reduction outcomes relative to budget neutral regular cash transfers in the 
presence of poverty traps. 
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CHAPTER 2 
USING WEATHER INDEX INSURANCE TO IMPROVE 
DROUGHT RESPONSE FOR FAMINE PREVENTION*  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There is a strong link between weather and the welfare of poor populations. Low-
frequency, short-term, but catastrophic weather shocks can trigger destructive coping 
responses to disaster—e.g., withdrawal of children from school, distress sale of assets, 
refugee migration, crime—and severe human suffering. Moreover, these adverse 
impacts often persist as children’s physical growth falters, and household productivity, 
asset accumulation and income growth are dampened (Dercon and Krishnan 2000; 
Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001; Hoddinott 2006). The prospect of such shocks may also 
induce underinvestment in assets at risk, limiting poor households’ ability to grow 
their way out of poverty over time (Carter and Barrett 2006). 
The problem originates with the difficulty poor households face in insuring 
covariate risk. While informal social insurance arrangements and flexible credit 
contracts often provide the poor with significant insurance against household-specific, 
idiosyncratic risk, when entire communities or social networks confront the same 
biophysical shock, their capacity to buffer members’ welfare may be insufficient to 
prevent severe and widespread human suffering. The magnitude and intensity of such 
suffering sometimes merits the label “famine” (Howe and Devereux 2004). External 
(domestic and international) relief organizations and governments commonly step in 
                                                 
* This chapter is reproduced with permission from Chantarat, S., C.B. Barrett, A.G. Mude, and C.G. 
Turvey. 2007. “Using Weather Index Insurance to Improve Drought Response for Famine Prevention.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89(5): 1262-1268.   
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to provide emergency assistance in the wake of catastrophic covariate shocks such as 
drought, especially when the specter of famine looms. Operational agencies and the 
donor community are thereby financially exposed to catastrophic weather risks in 
developing countries via their humanitarian commitment to emergency response.   
 In addition to their potential for other purposes (Barnett, Barrett and Skees 
2006; Alderman and Haque 2007), recent innovations in index insurance show 
promise as a means to facilitate improved emergency response to weather-related 
catastrophic shocks that threaten famine. Just as improved early warning systems and 
emergency needs assessment practices have used timely monitoring and analysis of 
vulnerable areas to significantly improve humanitarian response in recent decades 
(Barrett and Maxwell 2005), so too can weather index insurance facilitate further 
improvement by addressing several key remaining weaknesses in global famine 
prevention efforts. This paper briefly outlines how donors and operational agencies 
might use weather index insurance for famine prevention, enumerates key prospective 
benefits from such products, and then illustrates the possibilities with an application to 
the arid lands of northern Kenya, an area of recurring severe droughts that elicit 
massive international humanitarian responses. 
  
2.2 How to Use Weather Index Insurance for Famine Prevention 
 
Weather index insurance pays claims based on realizations of a weather index that is 
highly correlated with an outcome variable of interest. The insurance policy specifies 
an event or threshold at which payments are triggered and a payment schedule as 
either a lump sum or a function of index values beyond that threshold. The pricing of 
the product is based on the underlying payment schedule and the probability of 
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realizations of the index that might trigger indemnity payments. Those probabilities 
are typically derived from historical rainfall records (Turvey 2001).   
In slightly more formal terms, the key to designing a weather index insurance 
product is the existence of some observable relationship, ε+= ),( XWfy , where y is 
some outcome variable of interest, W represents one or more weather variable of 
interest (e.g., rainfall), X are other covariates that condition changes in y and that may 
be correlated with W, )(⋅f  is a general function, and ε  is a standard mean zero 
disturbance term. One will typically use time series observations on the variables to 
estimate some parametric relation that may involve multiple lags of the independent 
variables, polynomials in those lags to allow for nonlinearities, etc. The key is that the 
specified relationship explains much of the variation in y and successfully forecasts 
out-of-sample.  
Assuming )(⋅f  is invertible, and given a threshold level of y at which one 
wants to trigger a response, y , and observable X, one can specify and estimate a 
version of the previous equation and then recover a trigger level for W, *W (Turvey 
2001) at which yXWfE =)],([ . Thus .),( *1 WXyf =−  It is also possible to estimate 
the pure reduced form relation ψ+= )(Why  and similarly derive a threshold value 
for the weather index Wˆ  if one cannot observe X or if the cost of making such 
observations exceeds the marginal gains in predictive accuracy. The value of the pure 
reduced form is that the forecasted human impact conditional on observed weather 
)(Wh  depends solely on observed weather, and thus it is objective, verifiable and 
independent from human manipulation. Therefore, ),( XWf  and )(Wh  offer two 
alternative forms for a parametric index that proxies the risk associated with observed 
weather events.  
 Most commonly, the outcome variable reflects economic losses. In the present 
case, however, we are interested in measures of severe, widespread human suffering, 
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i.e., of famine. The dependent variable we use is the proportion of children aged 6-59 
months in a community who suffer a mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) z-score ≤ 
-2.  As a measure of wasting, MUAC reflects short-term fluctuations in nutritional 
stress and is typically easier and less costly to collect than weight-for-height, the most 
commonly used anthropometric measure of wasting. Furthermore, several studies have 
found MUAC a far better predictor of child mortality than weight-for-height (Alam et 
al. 1989; Vella et al. 1994). We follow Howe and Devereux’s (2004) definition of 
famine as a condition where 20% or more of children in a specified area are severely 
wasted (z ≤-2).  
Historically, “most famines in poor economies are associated with the impact 
of extreme weather … [and] the worst famines have been the product of back-to-back 
shortfalls of the staple crop” (Ó Gráda 2007, p.7). While weather shocks are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to induce famine, there is a strong historical correlation that 
can potentially be exploited. Our preliminary work with detailed data from three 
districts in northern Kenya finds a strong historical relationship between community-
level MUAC indicators—in particular, the proportion of a community’s children with 
MUAC z-score≤-2—and lagged rainfall indicators, with considerable out-of-sample 
forecast accuracy (Mude et al. forthcoming). This offers a promising platform on 
which to build weather insurance for drought response. 
 
2.3 The Potential Gains of Weather Index Insurance for Drought 
Response  
 
There have been a number of recent experiments with weather index insurance 
programs for protection against disasters. The best known example is the Mexican 
public reinsurance program, Agroasemex, which has marketed weather index 
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insurance policies to state governments to insure against drought, and which has links 
to the national natural disasters social fund, FONDEN (Alderman and Haque 2007).  
Weather insurance offers several different, potentially major improvements to 
the global response to climate-related, slow-onset emergencies such as drought. First, 
insurance by its nature enables the insured to smooth its stream of payments. Rather 
than incurring irregular, massive expenses for emergency response, one pays a far 
smaller amount regularly in the form of insurance premia, but receives large indemnity 
payments when resources are needed. Given liquidity constraints and the value to 
expenditure smoothing, such smoothing should be advantageous to operational 
agencies and donors if such insurance can be reasonably priced in the market.   
Second, the irregularity of need for famine prevention resources underscores 
the value of insurance for low-probability, high-impact events as part of an effective 
risk layering strategy. Communities can easily absorb modest variability in rainfall. In 
our setting, pastoralists in northern Kenya have developed highly adaptive livelihood 
strategies over many centuries of coping with volatile rainfall patterns. So a layer of 
individual and community-level self-insurance is feasible. Bigger covariate shocks 
commonly demand some outside interventions. Agencies and donors can readily 
handle small-scale crises within their usual budgets and operational mandates. The 
problem emerges when rare, widespread and devastating shocks occur and 
probabilistically threaten famine. With insurance in place to provide resources 
necessary for such low frequency but potentially catastrophic weather events, other 
actors can focus better on insuring the range of commonplace risks over which they 
possess comparative advantage.  
Third, index insurance would permit an improved and immediate link between 
emergency response and recipient need. With most emergency response still based on 
the provision of food aid that remains tied to procurement, processing and shipment 
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from donor countries, drought response for famine prevention remains doubly tied: to 
food as the primary form of response and to donor countries as the primary source of 
that food. Indeed, a common quip in Ethiopia is that the availability of food aid 
depends not on whether it rains locally, but on whether it rains in North America. Put 
differently, the supply of food aid—which is a complex function of donor country 
harvests and farm support policies, global prices, freight costs, geopolitics, etc.—
remains as important a determinant of food aid deliveries as is the need of at-risk 
populations. This is partly reflected in Figure 2.1, which plots rainfall realizations in 
the three northern Kenya districts we study (Marsabit, Samburu, Turkana) against the 
value of World Food Programme (WFP) food aid deliveries into Kenya.6 Over the 
period 1991-2006, this relationship was quite weak (r2=0.061 on the best fit, single log 
specification), and the difference between maximal and minimal annual food aid flows 
over the period vary by only $31 million even though rainfall volumes in the best year 
were more than 250% greater than those in the driest year. Current food aid programs 
are not responsive enough to drought shocks, at least partly due to supply-side 
obstacles that could be reduced via the proposed weather index insurance, which links 
cash payouts entirely to predicted humanitarian need. 
Fourth, timely and adequate funding are huge obstacles to effective response to 
slow-onset disasters such as drought. The United Nations’ Consolidated Appeal 
Process (CAP) attempts to coordinate global cooperation in emergency response. On 
average, however, funds raised via CAP amounted to only 56% of requirements by the 
end of October in 2003-6 (OCHA). WFP Emergency Operations (EMOP) covers the 
majority of the humanitarian response, especially related to food security and famine 
                                                 
6 The food aid figures, obtained from WFP annual reports, reflect deliveries into the whole of Kenya, 
not just the northern three districts we study. Unfortunately, we could not obtain district-level 
disaggregated figures. However, these three districts were among the leading recipients of food aid 
within the country over this period, thus we are confident that the basic patterns are satisfactorily 
reflected in these data. 
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Note: Cumulative annual rainfall data are averaged across the three districts. Long-term mean 
represents the mean cumulative annual rainfall, 1961-2006. S.D. represents the standard deviation. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Cumulative Annual Rainfall and Food Aid Expenditures in Kenya, 
1991-2006 
 
prevention. While WFP’s experience is better than that of the CAP, it too suffers 
significant shortfalls and delays. On average, only 70% of EMOP funding needs were 
provided by donors in 2001-2006, ranging from 57% in 2005 to 79% in 2004, and 
each year, only an average of 36% of EMOP needs were confirmed for donors’ 
contributions by the beginning of June for early intervention with as low as 22% need 
fulfillment in mid 2004 (WFP). Moreover, donor contributions take months to arrive. 
For example, the median response time for U.S. emergency food aid is just under five 
months from the filing of a formal request (a “call forward”) to port delivery (Barrett 
and Maxwell 2005). Delays are costly, even deadly. As an emergency progresses, unit 
costs per beneficiary increase sharply as more expensive, processed commodities 
become increasingly needed for therapeutic feeding, donors pay premia for faster 
transport (including airlift), and populations migrate to camps where broader support 
costs (e.g., shelter, water, medical care) become essential. Moreover, late arriving 
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assistance often fails to protect the livelihoods of affected populations, who often must 
deplete their productive asset stocks or migrate in response to the shock, which in turn 
makes them more vulnerable to future shocks. 
In spite of significant improvements in early warning systems, supply chain 
management and other key response functions, operational agency interventions 
continue to lag behind global media reporting on disasters. The 2004-5 Niger 
emergency provides a disturbing example. After a November 2004 international 
appeal by the Government of Niger and the United Nations, WFP's initial food 
deliveries in February 2005 cost $7 per beneficiary. But global response was anemic. 
In June 2005, the Niger situation was relabeled an "emergency," and graphic global 
media coverage in July-August led to a sizeable, but slow global response. The cost 
per beneficiary for WFP's August deliveries—i.e., the same delivery organization, but 
with badly delayed response—had risen to $23, more than three times the cost six 
months earlier, due to far greater need for supplemental and therapeutic foods instead 
of cheaper, bulk commodities, and the need for airlift and other quicker, but more 
expensive logistics. By enabling rapid payout when the trigger is reached rather than 
merely starting an appeals process likely to drag on for months and be only partly 
filled, weather insurance can substantially reduce drought response costs and provide 
greater asset protection to affected peoples.   
 Finally, because index insurance is based on the realization of a specific-event 
outcome that cannot be influenced by insurers or policy holders (e.g., the amount and 
distribution of rainfall over a season), it has a relatively simple and transparent 
structure. This makes such products easier to understand and consequently to design, 
develop, and trade, potentially opening up new sources of finance for emergency 
drought response and famine prevention. The apparent success of pilot programs 
conducted in India, Malawi, Mexico, Mongolia and various other countries has 
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established the feasibility and affordability of such products (World Bank 2005). 
Weather insurance contracts underwritten by domestic insurers and reinsured or 
underwritten directly by international investors can provide a new and cost-effective 
means to transfer low-probability, high-consequence covariate weather risks to global 
markets where those risks can be easily pooled and diversified as part of global 
portfolios. If rainfall volumes provide a strong predictive signal of imminent famine, 
and thus of looming financing needs for emergency drought response, the opportunity 
exists to design weather insurance to facilitate more effective aid response. This 
opportunity should be seized.  
 
2.4 Rainfall and Famine in Kenya: The Potential of Weather Index 
Insurance 
 
The arid areas of northern Kenya are largely populated by marginalized pastoral and 
agro-pastoral populations that traditionally rely on extensive livestock production for 
their livelihood. We focus on three districts—Turkana, Samburu and Marsabit—not 
only because they are the three districts rated most vulnerable to food insecurity, but 
also because they share similar socioeconomic characteristics, climate patterns, natural 
resource endowments, and livelihood portfolios, which allows us to apply similar 
concepts and tools to drought response across this vast area.  
 The unpredictability of rainfall heavily affects livelihood returns and welfare 
dynamics in pastoral communities. To observe such dynamics, Mude et al. 
(forthcoming) generated community-level summary statistics of repeated cross-
sectional household data collected monthly in 45 communities in these three districts 
from 2000-2005 by the Government of Kenya’s Arid Lands Resources Management 
Project (ALRMP), which resides within the Office of the President, underscoring the 
importance of drought response in these regions. The key dependent variable is the 
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proportion of children aged 6-59 months in each community with recorded MUAC z-
score ≤ -2.  
Mude et al. (forthcoming) matched the ALRMP data with forage availability 
data from the USAID Global Livestock CRSP Livestock Early Warning System 
(LEWS) and Livestock Information Network and Knowledge System (LINKS) 
project, and with METEOSAT-based rainfall series, 1961-2006, from 21 
geographically distinct sites in these three districts. While floods occur and cause 
major losses, the primary weather-related risk in these districts is severe drought. 
Rainfall is generally bimodal, characterized by long rains that fall from March through 
May and short rains from October through December. Rainfall is also highly 
correlated across space in these districts. Table 2.1 displays the bivariate correlation 
coefficients of mean district-level cumulative seasonal rainfall, 1961-2006, with the 
long rains on the lower diagonal and the short rains on the upper diagonal.  The high 
correlations among these series—all are statistically significantly different from zero 
at the one percent level—signal limited weather risk pooling potential in northern 
Kenya, hence the need for outside assistance when severe droughts strike.  
 
Table 2.1 District-Level Seasonal Rainfall Correlations, 1961-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pastoralists rely on both rains for water and pasture for their animals, as well as 
occasional dryland cropping. In a normal year, water availability suffices to ensure 
District Turkana Marsabit Samburu
Turkana   0.60 0.90 
Marsabit 0.71   0.72 
Samburu 0.86 0.87   
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adequate yields of milk, meat and blood, most of which is consumed within pastoral 
households, with the rest sold in order to purchase grains and non-food necessities. 
Localized rain failures may happen, but migratory herders can commonly adapt to 
spatiotemporal variability in forage and water availability.  But when the rains fail 
across a wide area, especially if short and long rains both fail in succession, 
catastrophic herd losses often occur and bring with them severe human deprivation 
manifest in, among other indicators, more prevalent severe child wasting. 
 Figure 2.2 plots mean monthly rainfall volumes across these three districts 
along with the percentage of the 21 sites in which the short and/or long rains failed, 
where “failure” reflects cumulative rainfall more than one standard deviation below its  
long-term, site-specific mean. Three major recent droughts had dire humanitarian 
consequences: 1997/8, 2000/1 and 2005/6.  Aggregate rainfall was low in all of these 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Monthly rainfall data are averaged across the three districts. 
 
Figure 2.2 Historical Monthly Rainfall and Percent of Sites with Failed Rains,  
1991-2006 
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years, and the drought conditions were spatially widespread and continued across 
multiple seasons. Mude et al. (forthcoming) show that drought episodes are strongly 
associated with dramatic herd losses due to mortality, lower livestock lactation rates 
and a sharply higher prevalence of severe child wasting. Intriguingly, they also find 
that forecasts of severe wasting prevalence generated from a relatively simple model 
based on a small set of variables that ALRMP regularly monitors yields highly 
accurate out-of-sample forecasts with a lead of three months. Rainfall is the key 
explanatory variable. It seems that observed rainfall patterns may be useful in 
predicting and insuring against famine.   
 In this setting, designing weather index insurance to facilitate financing of 
drought-related humanitarian response appears attractive. We conceptualize two ways 
in which weather insurance can be effectively designed to serve this goal. The first is a 
simple put option based on cumulative long rains (March-May) and /or cumulative 
short rains (October-December)—appropriately weighted across rainfall sites—as a 
weather index. This might pay out some pre-determined sum per mm shortfall of 
seasonal cumulative rainfall relative to a contractually established threshold at the end 
of the contract term for each season. To take into account the intensity of droughts in 
cases of severe rainfall deficit, the option payout could be a convex function of the 
seasonal cumulative rain shortfall. Payout could be even simpler, a lump sum payment 
at the end of the contract term if seasonal cumulative rainfall fell below the threshold. 
As historical data show that seasonal rain shortfalls are strongly associated with the 
emergence of famine conditions, even such simple insurance seems to offer a 
reasonable hedging tool for organizations committed to humanitarian drought 
response. The simple nature of such contracts can potentially increase reinsurance 
opportunities and thus lower the prospective price of such insurance in international 
markets. As local droughts within districts can effectively be handled by traditional 
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means, it might also be more cost effective to write a single contract for the whole area 
rather than for each district separately.  
 The second weather index insurance design exploits the apparent ability to 
forecast famine based on rainfall several months ahead. Specifically, one could use a 
validated forecasting model to establish the rainfall level below which the expected 
future prevalence of child wasting equals or exceeds 20%, thereby triggering 
indemnity payments under the insurance contract. The model would be specified in the 
contract and new forecasts generated in near-real-time based on the arrival of weather 
data. The weather index evolves continuously and can therefore better capture not only 
the impact of shortfalls in rainfall quantity but also the timing and distribution within a 
season as well. The forecast model can readily incorporate monthly or seasonal 
dummy variables and location-specific dummies, in short, any other covariates that 
affect the dependent variable of interest that can be objectively verified and can not be 
manipulated by parties to the contract. The non-standard nature of this contract might 
make it somewhat harder to price and sell in financial markets. Weather-based famine 
index insurance of this sort could complement existing appeals-based systems based 
more on realizations of human suffering, thereby facilitating faster, lower-cost 
intervention based more directly on anticipated need and less on supply-side 
conditions in food aid donor countries. 
 The famine insurance we envision, especially the second variant, differs in a 
few key ways from the well-publicized drought insurance contract that WFP took out 
for Ethiopia with AXA Re in 2006. First, that contract did not use any weather stations 
from the country’s pastoral regions, on which we focus. Second, the weather risks 
were quantified in terms of expected income loss by at-risk populations based on 
estimates of the elasticity of crop production to rainfall at different stages of crop 
growth. Crop- and area-specific estimates were aggregated, mapped to income via 
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price estimates, and then converted into a livelihood loss index. Our design is to tie 
rainfall directly to a human outcome of interest rather than to indirect measures and to 
use the commonplace superiority of reduced form forecasting over those based on 
structural models. Third, the 2006 Ethiopia drought insurance contract covered the 
entire agricultural season, consisting of two rainy seasons, from March to October, and 
triggered payment by the end of the contract (in October) when data gathered 
throughout the contract period indicated that rainfall was significantly below historic 
averages, pointing to the likelihood of widespread crop failure. The product we 
envision would pay out at any time within the contract period once the model predicts 
a prevalence of severe child wasting that meets or exceeds the pre-specified trigger 
level. Thus, if the seasonal rains failed badly and widely, this might trigger indemnity 
payments well before the end of the contract so as to allow more effective and lower 
cost intervention. In parallel work, we explore the theoretical framework for pricing 
such contracts (Chantarat et al. 2008).  
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 CHAPTER 3 
IMPROVING HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO SLOW-
ONSET DISASTERS USING FAMINE INDEXED 
WEATHER DERIVATIVES*  
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
Climate variability and extreme weather events are among the main risks affecting the 
livelihoods and well-being of poor populations. In sub-Saharan Africa, around 140 
million people are exposed to the constant threat of famine induced by natural 
disasters such as droughts and floods. The capacities of communities, social networks 
or families to buffer members’ welfare are, however, insufficient to prevent 
widespread hunger and severe human suffering when covariate shocks hit. Due to 
limited insurance against covariate weather risks, short duration but highly 
catastrophic shocks can have serious long-term consequences for children’s growth, 
household productivity, asset accumulation and income growth (Dercon and Krishnan 
2000; Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001; Dercon and Hoddinott 2005; Hoddinott 2006).  
 Governments, external relief organizations and players in the international aid 
community commonly step in as insurance providers of last resort for vulnerable 
populations, providing emergency response to humanitarian crises in the wake of 
extreme weather shocks. Their commitment to humanitarian relief exposes operational 
agencies and donors financially to catastrophic weather risks in developing countries 
worldwide. As the frequency and intensity of natural disasters and food emergencies 
                                                 
* This chapter is reproduced with permission from Chantarat, S., C.G. Turvey, A.G. Mude and C.B. 
Barrett. 2008. “Improving Humanitarian Response to Slow-Onset Disasters using Famine Indexed 
Weather Derivatives.” Agricultural Finance Review 68(1): 169-195. 
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have increased in recent decades (Munich Re 2006), so has the number of people 
needing humanitarian assistance, requiring more resources from external agencies and 
donors. With limited available funds to support emergencies, rigorous tools for 
efficient planning and prioritization of interventions and resource allocation become 
crucial to enhance the humanitarian and economic value of emergency operations. 
 Recent innovations in weather derivatives7 and the booming market for 
transferring covariate weather risks provide considerable promise to mitigate weather-
related catastrophic shocks that threaten humanitarian crises. Improved early warning 
systems and emergency needs assessment practices have used timely monitoring and 
analysis of situations in vulnerable areas to significantly improve humanitarian 
response in recent decades (Barrett and Maxwell 2005). 
 The goal of this paper is to show how weather derivatives can be designed and 
used by governments and operational agencies to improve humanitarian response to 
slow-onset disasters, especially drought. The contracts we propose, “famine indexed 
weather derivatives (FIWDs)”, comprise two main characteristics. First, the weather 
variables used to trigger contract payouts need to be indexed to some indicators of 
forecasted prevalence and severity of food insecurity conditions in the targeted areas, 
and second, the timing and frequency of the cash payouts need to facilitate potential 
early interventions.  
 We motivate this idea by briefly reviewing current innovations in the weather 
derivatives market and its potential in developing countries. The rationale for FIWDs 
and the contracts’ main characteristics are then described. We then provide a general 
framework for two distinct contract structures – weather index insurance and a famine 
catastrophe bond – and explain how developing country governments and 
                                                 
7 We refer to weather derivatives loosely as financial contracts that derive values from weather 
variables. In this context, weather derivatives may thus refer to weather index insurance offered by 
reinsurers, weather indices or weather related contracts traded in the exchange.  
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international organizations might combine these derivative products with other 
funding opportunities – e.g., contingent grant or debt from international development 
banks – to enhance catastrophic risk transfer opportunities and to obtain cost-effective 
catastrophic risk financing (Hess et al. 2006; Syroka and Wilcox 2006; Hess and 
Syroka 2005). Finally, we illustrate the possibilities with an application to the arid 
lands of northern Kenya, an area that suffers recurring, severe droughts that often 
require a massive international humanitarian response to avert famine.  
 
3.2   Weather Derivatives and Their Potential in Developing Countries 
 
A weather derivative is a type of parametric contingent claim contract whose payoff 
schedule depends on a measure of meteorological outcomes – such as inches of 
rainfall – at a certain location during the contract period (CME 2002). The weather 
derivative contract specifies a specific event or threshold that triggers payments and a 
payment schedule as either a lump sum payment or a function of index values beyond 
that threshold. A variety of derivatives can be issued on well-specified weather 
variables or a single- or multiple-specific weather event (Turvey 2001; Dischel 2002). 
The most common types of contracts are put and call options – mostly seen in the 
form of weather indexed insurance, – swaps and collars.  
If weather variables are highly correlated with covariate economic loss, 
derivatives on appropriate weather variables can be used to effectively hedge against 
such loss. The contracts can be written on various weather risks, and traded like 
financial assets. The weather derivatives market thus provides opportunities for 
covariate weather risks to be transferred and managed either as part of a diversified 
global weather risk portfolio – weather risks in Kenya, for example,  are potentially 
uncorrelated with those in other geographic areas – or as part of a diversified capital 
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market portfolio (Froot 1999; Hommel and Ritter 2005). The weather derivatives 
market has grown dramatically, to the notional value of USD 19.2 billion in 2006/7, 
from USD 2.5 billion in 2001/2.8 To date, the market has expanded to cover weather 
risks outside U.S., Europe and Japan.  
Among the popular products, catastrophe (cat) bonds are weather derivatives 
that have primarily been issued by reinsurance companies to facilitate transfer of the 
risk of highly catastrophic events with very low annual loss probabilities (mostly less 
than 1 percent per annum) to capital markets. Cat bonds are typically high-yield 
derivatives with the return conditional on well-defined weather conditions indicating 
the occurrence of a catastrophic event.  
From the perspective of the investor, cat bonds yield above-market rates 
(typically 3-5% spread over LIBOR (Bantwal and Kunreuther 2000; Banks 2004) 
encompassing various compensating premiums9, while offering diversification. There 
is thus an increasing appetite for these products in the market. Hedge funds, 
institutional money managers, commercial banks, pension funds and insurance 
companies are regularly investing in cat bonds. The market to date is concentrated in 
reinsurance of U.S. hurricane and Japanese earthquake risk, but has been extended 
beyond natural perils providing risk coverage against epidemics and man-made 
disasters.  
The total market size grew to almost US$ 5 billion in 2005 (Guy Carpenter 
2006), and it is expected to continue trending upward as the cost of issuing declines 
with the development of more standardized bond structures and as the investor base 
                                                 
8 The survey has been conducted yearly by the Weather Risk Management Association (WRMA) and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. For further detail see http://www.wrma.org. 
9 Apart from the risk premium on comparably rated corporate bonds, premiums are needed to 
compensate for ambiguity about probability of the rare catastrophic events, costs of the learning curve 
for a complex product and market, and loss aversion which results in overvaluation of loss probability 
(Bantwal and Kunreuther 2000; Banks 2004; Nell and Richter 2004). 
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expands and becomes more knowledgeable (Bowers 2004). Recently, there has been 
an attempt to design cat bonds to securitize systemic risks in agriculture (Vedenov, 
Epperson and Barnett 2006). Cat bonds – or at least the principles that underpin then - 
might serve as a means to transfer highly catastrophic but low probability weather 
risks from developing countries to the global capital market (Hofman and Brukoff 
2006).  
The weather risk market also facilitates reinsurance opportunities. For 
example, Indian weather risks are currently reinsured in the weather derivatives 
market, allowing local insurance companies to sell weather insurance against drought 
to small farmers since 2002. The Mexican public reinsurance company Agroasemex 
has similarly provided weather index insurance to state governments to protect farmers 
against drought in most of the dry-land areas since 2001. Weather insurance contracts 
are also currently sold in Malawi, Tanzania and Thailand as part of pilot programs.10  
 The market also facilitates transfer of highly catastrophic weather risks that 
can trigger emergency needs by governments, donors or international humanitarian 
organizations (Hess et al. 2005; Alderman and Haque 2007). The United Nations 
World Food Programme (WFP) successfully took out US$ 930,000 in drought 
insurance from an international reinsurer, AXA Re, for Ethiopia’s 2006 agricultural 
season covering 17 million people at risk of livelihood loss (WFP 2005). In December 
2007 the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that it was expanding "the first 
humanitarian insurance policy" in Ethiopia, hoping to raise US$230 million in 
insurance and contingency funds to cover 6.7 million people if there is a drought 
comparable to the one in 2002/2003 (IRIN Africa 2007).  In addition, the Mexican 
government issued a US$160 million cat bond to insure their National Fund for 
                                                 
10 Various weather index insurance products are currently being developed in Bangladesh, Honduras, 
Kazakhstan, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Vietnam and several of the Caribbean islands (Barnett 
and Mahul 2007). 
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Natural Disasters (FONDEN) against the risk of a major earthquake in 2006 (Hofman 
and Brukoff 2006; Guy Carpenter 2006). Similar products currently being explored 
include a Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility aimed at allowing Caribbean 
countries to pool and transfer natural disaster risks to the capital market (World Bank 
2006), and multinational insurance pools for the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) that can facilitate transferring catastrophic weather risk as part of 
a regional strategy to obtain reinsurance cost reduction (Hess and Syroka 2005). The 
World Bank is also currently establishing a new reinsurance vehicle, the Global Index 
Insurance Facility (GIIF), as a risk-taking entity to originate, intermediate and 
underwrite indexable weather, disaster and commodity price risks in developing 
countries (World Bank 2006).  
 
3.3   Using Weather Derivatives to Improve Emergency Response to      
        Drought  
 
3.3.1 Rationale  
 
While weather shocks are neither necessary nor sufficient to induce widespread 
humanitarian crises, there is a strong historical correlation (Dilley et al. 2005; Ó Gráda 
2007) that can potentially be exploited. The effectiveness of humanitarian response to 
weather-induced crises depends not only on the quantity of aid provided but when and 
how assistance is provided. Timely delivery of food, medicine and other essential 
supplies is crucial to effective emergency response. 
 Since slow-onset disasters such as droughts exhibit predictable patterns, 
drought-induced humanitarian crises may be somewhat predictable. When seasonal 
rains fail to arrive, agricultural production generally deteriorates, leading to increasing 
food shortages and prices, depressed rural livelihoods and acute food insecurity. 
Progress has been made by local governments and operational agencies – e.g., United 
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Nations agencies such as WFP and FAO – in developing credible emergency need 
assessments and reasonably accurate early warning systems11 that can identify where 
and when to intervene, and at what scale. However, resources are limited in part by a 
general lack of timely and reliable funding to respond to emergency needs. At present, 
the main mechanism for financing emergency operations is through the appeal 
process, where early warning systems trigger a field emergency needs assessment that 
leads to an international appeal for appropriate funding. The main problem with this 
approach is that donor funding is unreliable and often quite delayed with actual 
humanitarian delivery taking as long as four to eight months (Morris 2005; Haile 
2005). Delays are costly. As an emergency progresses, unit costs per beneficiary 
increase sharply as more expensive, processed commodities become increasingly 
needed for therapeutic feeding, donors pay premia for faster transport (including 
airlift), and populations migrate to camps where broader support costs (e.g., shelter, 
water, medical care) become essential, etc. In the 2004-5 Niger emergency, for 
example, the cost for WFP’s deliveries had increased from $7 to $23 per beneficiary 
due to six-month delayed response.  
  
3.3.2 Famine-Indexed Weather Derivatives   
 
The most crucial attribute of weather derivatives for any humanitarian response 
system is the capacity to make immediate cash payouts for timely emergency 
intervention. The key to designing weather derivatives to improve emergency response 
to slow-onset disasters such as droughts is a well-established correlation between the 
specific event weather variable (s) and estimated humanitarian needs, and an 
                                                 
11 Programs such as the Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), WFP’s Vulnerability 
Analysis and Mapping (VAM), the Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity (SENAC) 
project and USAID’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS-NET) currently collaborate and 
facilitate early warning, and emergency need assessment capacity. 
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appropriate contractual payout structure. Humanitarian crises often result from 
successive drought episodes, late arrival of the main rains, or discontinuous rainfall 
patterns within the season, occurring in spatially widespread locations. Therefore, 
though simple rainfall volume matters so does the temporal and spatial distribution of 
rainfall within seasons. Therefore, an appropriate weather derivative contract to 
properly hedge against widespread suffering should take into account these rainfall 
variables and events. Such patterns can be clearly observed in the case of arid pastoral 
areas of northern Kenya, discussed in more detail in our illustration in section 5. Mude 
et al. (forthcoming) show that drought episodes are strongly associated with sharply 
higher prevalence of severe child wasting.12 
 Formally, weather variables and other weather-related covariates (W) – rainfall 
volume, distribution, multiple rainfall events, etc. – may be indexed to some indicator 
of severe and widespread human suffering from food crises (F) by an established 
empirical forecasting model 
 
                                           ε+= )(WfF                                     (3.1) 
 
where )(⋅f  is a general function and ε is a standard mean zero disturbance term. The 
value of this pure reduced form estimation is that the forecasted human impact 
conditional on observed weather depends solely on observed weather and immutable 
or exogenous covariates (e.g., location or seasonal dummy variables). It is objective, 
verifiable and extremely difficult to manipulate. Therefore, )(Wf  can serve as a 
parametric “famine index” that forecasts the risk of widespread, severe undernutrition 
associated with observed weather events. New forecasts may be generated in near-
                                                 
12 Among the covariates used in Mude et al. (2006)’s forecasting model are various autoregressive lags 
of prevalence of severe child wasting, herd dynamics, food aid and forage availability, some of which 
are not objectively measured. Thus, they may be prone to moral hazard if directly used as triggers for 
derivative contracts. To develop it further as triggers for weather derivative contracts, slight 
modifications are needed to ensure that the covariates used are transparent and free from tampering.  
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real-time based on the arrival of new weather data, so the famine index can evolve 
over time throughout the contract coverage. This may therefore better capture not only 
the impact of shortfalls in rainfall quantity in a specific time or season but also the 
timing and distribution of rainfall within a season or across seasons. Finally, assuming 
)(⋅f is invertible, one can recover an extreme weather trigger *W  corresponding to an 
appropriate critical threshold of forecasted degree of human suffering, *F , that triggers 
emergency response intervention such that )( *1* FfW −= (Turvey 2001). 
   
3.3.3 Establishing Appropriate Contractual Payout Structures   
 
Since timely financing for effective early intervention is a goal, weather derivative 
contracts based on the forecast based famine index, )(Wf , should trigger indemnity 
payouts as soon as the famine index meets or exceeds the pre-specified thresholds, or 
allow multiple triggered payouts within the contract term, rather than paying out only 
at the end of the contract term. Response delays can be costly and even deadly. Thus, 
if the seasonal rains failed badly and widely the contract might trigger indemnity 
payments well before the end of the contract so as to allow more effective and lower 
cost intervention. In the following section, we provide a general framework for such 
contracts that can be designed and used to improve emergency response to drought.  
 
3.4   Structure and General Framework   
 
Generally, contingent debt or grant facilities offered by the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions on concessionary terms to developing countries 
affected by either natural or manmade disasters may be used to support countries’ 
early intervention in response to drought. The catastrophic layer of drought risk, where 
such facilities are no longer available or suitable to accommodate the emergency need, 
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can then be managed through global financial market mechanisms. For this purpose 
weather index insurance or catastrophe bonds may facilitate transfer of extreme 
drought-induced famine risk to market players willing to accept the risk at some cost. 
We now consider these two forms of famine indexed weather derivatives, which can 
complement other available financing facilities to hedge against various layers of 
drought-induced famine risk. 
   
3.4.1 Weather Index Insurance    
 
Weather index insurance can allow governments and/or international aid agencies to 
transfer drought-induced famine risk to international insurers or reinsurers, most likely 
with the donor community funding the insurance premium ex-ante. A well-designed 
contract can be beneficial to both beneficiary and donors alike. On the one hand, if the 
insurance is triggered, the indemnity payout will be released to a government and/or 
nongovernmental operational agencies to finance effective emergency response. On 
the other hand, pre-financing humanitarian aid allows donors to hedge against the risk 
of volatile demand for overseas development assistance (Skees 2002; Syroka and 
Wilcox 2006). 
 We refer to ),( *WWTΠ  as the total payoff at the terminal period T of famine 
indexed insurance contract13 covering a vulnerable period [ ]T,0  and based on the 
observed specific weather event )(W , the famine index function, )(Wf , and a pre-
specified anthropometric trigger *F . It is *F that determines the index trigger 
)( *1* FfW −= . Depending on the nature of drought risk and financial exposure of 
organizations in the affected countries, various index and payout structures can be 
considered.  
                                                 
13 Alternatively the insurance payoff can also be structured in terms of direct famine index f(W) relative 
to the anthropometric famine trigger F* . And thus the payoff ]0),)(([)),(( **' FWfCMaxFWfgT −= . 
 37 
Famine indexed insurance can be in the form of a simple put option, 
establishing payout at the end of the contract T. Thus, 
 
                                ( ) ( )0),(, ** TT WWCMaxWW −=Π                   (3.2) 
 
where )(⋅C  is some function that maps the severity of weather shortfalls relative to the 
extreme weather threshold to the associated funds required for immediate 
humanitarian assistance. For example )(⋅C  might be defined by xTWW )( * − , where 
1≥x , captures the intensity of the famine index relative to the weather event 
especially if the extent of potential suffering is non-linearly related to precipitation 
shortfalls. The required funds can be estimated from past emergency operations or can 
be based on the drought contingency planning system a developing country might 
already have in place.  
 To ensure timely funding, weather-linked famine insurance can also be 
designed to make a payout at any first time t within the vulnerable period coverage, 
[ ]T,0 , if the weather index W  reaches the threshold *W . The payoff at terminal period 
T can be written as 
 
                          ( ) ( ) TWWtttTrT WWCeWW ≤− ⋅−=Π *,*)(* 1)(,                   (3.3) 
 
where r is a required rate of return, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be 
deterministic14; A1  is an indicator function of an event A ; ),(
*WWt  is the first 
passage time of W  to reach the threshold *W , and TWWt ≤),( *1  = 1 is an indicator 
function designed to capture a trigger at any period t within [ ]T,0  and 0 otherwise. 
The insurance coverage [ ]T,0  can be chosen so that it covers the entire period each 
                                                 
14 A stochastic required rate of return may be applied as it captures interest rate risk under a variety of 
assumptions (Heath et al. 1992) and other related risks due to factors other than a catastrophic event. 
The adjusted discount rate with stochastic required rate of return can be represented by ∫= t dssrtr 0 )()( . 
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year when people are vulnerable to extreme weather – e.g., the whole rainfall season. 
Finally, the function )(⋅C  in this digital, down-and-in option may simply represent a 
lump sum of required funding released to finance baseline early intervention to the 
forecasted drought event triggered. 
 Famine indexed insurance can also be designed to cover multiple drought 
events (usually multiple years (N) with one event in a vulnerable period [ ]T,0  each 
year) and thus to establish multiple triggered payouts at any year n within the N years 
coverage. The total payoff realized at the end of the contract at year N can be 
represented by  
 
                              ( ) ),(, *
1
)(*
nn
N
n
nNr
N WWeWW Π=Π ∑
=
−                   (3.4) 
 
where ),( *nn WWΠ  represents insurance payoff at terminal date of any year n within 
the N years coverage.15 For example, ]0),([),( ** nnnn WWCMaxWW −=Π  if a yearly 
contract is a simple put option. Moreover, a cap of nΠ  can be applied to limit the 
insurer’s maximum loss each year, thereby potentially increasing market supply. The 
total payoff at the end of this contract is 
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)(*                  (3.5) 
 
Furthermore, *nW  and nΠ  are subscripted, indicating that the trigger and the cap can 
change over time. If the trigger and the cap are the same in all periods then (3.4) and 
(3.5) can be converted to simple annuities.  
                                                 
15 Since the coverage period of [0,T] is fixed across years, for simplicity, the yearly contract can be 
designed such that the terminal coverage period T is also the terminal period of a year. Hence, the 
period between the end of year 1 and the start of the contract, 101 =−TT year and the period between 
the end of contract and the end of any year n, nNTT nN −=−  years. Therefore, subscript T is dropped 
from the yearly terminal payoff ),( *nn WWΠ  of any year n.  
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 The actuarially fair premium for the insurance contract is calculated by taking 
the expectation of the insurance payoff with respect to the underlying distribution or 
process of weather variable, W, and discounting the term with appropriate discount 
rate.16  Hence, the actuarially fair premium for a famine indexed insurance covering N 
years of drought events (with one event in a vulnerable period [ ]T,0  each year) can be 
written as  
 
                                Premium  =  ( )),( *WWEe NrN Π− ω                   (3.6) 
 
where ωE  indicates expectation at the beginning of the contract with respect to a state 
variable ω  that pertains to some catastrophic weather risk governed by the underlying 
distribution of weather variable, W.  To this fair rate, a loading factor 1>m  is usually 
added to capture the insurer’s attitude toward ambiguity of the underlying weather, 
their opinion about weather forecast and their aversion toward catastrophic risks. 
   
3.4.2 Catastrophe Bonds: Famine Bonds    
 
While weather index insurance contracts can facilitate the transfer of drought risks to 
international insurers or reinsurers, the extreme layer of the catastrophic weather risks 
may not feasibly and/or cost effectively be absorbed by a single or a small number of 
insurers or reinsurers. Extreme drought risks that cannot be absorbed through the 
reinsurance market using weather index insurance can potentially be securitized and 
transferred to the capital market in the form of catastrophe (cat) bonds – or simply 
“famine bonds” in this setting.  
Catastrophe bonds are typically engineered as follows. The hedger (e.g., 
governments, agencies) pays a premium in exchange for a pre-specified coverage if an 
                                                 
16 If a stochastic discount rate is considered, the premium will have to be calculated based on the joint 
distribution of weather variable W and the appropriate term structure of interest rate. 
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extreme weather event occurs; investors purchase cat bonds for cash. The premium 
plus cash proceeds are directed to a special purpose company, generally an investment 
bank, which then invests in risk-free assets (e.g., treasury bonds) and issues cat bonds 
to investors. Investors then hold cat bonds whose cash flows – principal and/or coupon 
– are contingent on the risk occurrence. If the covered event takes place during the 
coverage period, the special purpose company compensates the hedger and there is full 
or partial forgiveness of the repayment of principal and/or interest to investors. 
Otherwise, the investors receive their principal plus interest, which incorporates the 
associated risk premium.  
Conceptually, governments or international organizations can initiate the 
issuance of zero coupon or coupon catastrophe bonds, for which principal and/or 
interest payments to bondholders are conditional on the occurrence of extreme drought 
induced famine identified by the constructed famine index relative to a specified 
threshold. For government or humanitarian agencies, famine bonds simply offer an 
insurance function just like weather index insurance for the highly catastrophic layer 
of drought risk by releasing immediate cash payment for emergency operations once 
the famine index is triggered. Thus, government and operational agencies finance 
famine bonds similarly to paying index insurance premiums. They can appeal to the 
donor community for premium contributions in advance – i.e., in the form of the 
disaster pre-financing (Goes and Skees 2003). 
Generally, the price of a famine cat bond issued at time 0 with the face value P, 
annual coupon payments c and time to maturity of N years, at which bondholder 
agrees to forfeit a fraction of the principal payment P by the total insurance payoff 
),( *nn WWΠ  at maturity, can be written as 
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where P<Π . A famine bond can therefore be structured as a coupon bond that is 
embedded with a short position on a weather-linked option based on a trigger 
established by the famine index – specifically famine indexed insurance. Equation 
(3.7) is a multi-year bond issue that deducts from principal the indemnity in each year 
compounded to year N at the continuous compounding rate r and subject to a cap Π  
that cannot exceed principal. Like typical bonds, famine bonds are valued by taking 
the discounted expectation of the coupon and principal payments under the underlying 
distribution of the weather index and the required rate of return on investment.17 
Alternatively if the coupon 0c =  the bond will be issued as a discount bond, and if 
1N = , a 1-year bond.  
The main advantage of securitizing and managing famine risk using cat bonds 
over index insurance is the potential to avoid default or credit risk with respect to 
catastrophe reinsurance. The threat of widespread catastrophic losses imposes a 
significant insolvency risk for reinsurance companies and thus for their capacity to 
compensate such losses. In contrast, cat bonds permit division and distribution of 
highly catastrophic risk among many investors in the capital market and so may allow 
greater diffusion of the extreme weather risk. Moreover, funds invested in a cat bond 
are collected ex ante, which implies that such credit/default risk is minimized to the 
default risk connected with the investments made by the special purpose vehicle. 
                                                 
17 A stochastic rate ∫= t dssrtr
0
)()(  may be used as the adjusted required return representing interest rate 
risk under a variety of assumptions (Heath et al. 1992) and other related risks due to factors other than a 
catastrophic event, which can be incorporated into the bond pricing by setting the discount rate 
)(tr equal to the rate of return required by investors in general bonds of comparable risk. 
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Comparing the premium costs between the two requires further investigation of 
market capacity and opportunity. 
 Empirical pricing of the weather index insurance and famine bonds based on 
the framework provided above can be done in various ways, depending largely on 
assumptions, model specifications and the methodology used to derive or calibrate the 
empirical distribution of the famine index, )(Wf , and the term structure of interest 
rates. A variety of such models applied to credit instruments are presented in Turvey 
and Chantarat (2006) and Turvey (2008). It is arguable that various option valuation 
models (e.g., the Black-Scholes 1973) widely used in finance are inappropriate in this 
context. The extreme weather events characterized in the constructed index tend not to 
follow geometric Brownian motion – thus violating the underlying assumption of the 
models – as weather patterns tend to be autocorrelated, mean-reverting and exhibit 
seasonal trends (Dischel 1998; Martin et al. 2001; Richards et al. 2004; see Turvey 
2005 for an exception). Moreover, because a weather index does not have a traded 
underlying asset; unlike a financial index, there is no spot market or price for weather 
events; applying the principle of risk-neutral valuation or a replicating portfolio to the 
value of weather options is thus inappropriate (Davis 2001; Martin et al 2001; Hull 
2002).  
 Weather derivatives are frequently priced using actuarial methods (Turvey 
2001, 2005). This approach to empirical pricing of index insurance and cat bonds may 
involve two general steps: (i) estimating the distribution of the weather index and thus 
the probabilities of triggering the payout, and (ii) incorporating the estimated 
probability distribution and the required rate of return into the actuarially fair pricing 
framework provided above. We illustrate these concepts by pricing the illustrative 
famine indexed weather derivatives for northern Kenya using comparable historical 
burn rate – which assumes that variability of past weather reflects the expected 
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variability of future weather and therefore uses the observed historical distribution of 
the weather variable in calculating actuarially fair prices – and Monte Carlo simulation 
– which simulates the probability distribution of the weather variable using a 
sufficiently long time series of available weather data and an assumed structure of 
randomness as the main inputs. Further explorations are needed to allow for price 
discovery of these innovative weather derivatives in the market.  
   
3.4.3 Incorporating FIWDs to Enhance Effective Drought Risk Financing     
 
The famine index could be used to layer drought-induced famine risks such that 
financial tools and facilities appropriate for each layer can be applied cooperatively. 
One possible example – considered also in Hess et al. (2006) and Hess and Syroka 
(2005) – combines international development banks’ debt/grant facilities, index based 
risk transfer products and the traditional donor appeals process in drought emergency 
response financing.  
 Beyond the nation’s self-retention layer – i.e., interventions in response to 
frequent, local and low-loss drought events can be managed using national resources –  
a famine index could be used as a trigger for the release of contingent grants and/or 
debt with fixed and pre-established terms to governments or operational agencies for 
early intervention in emergency response.18 Combinations of weather index insurance 
and catastrophe bonds can then be used to transfer the catastrophic layer of drought 
risks beyond the capacities of the institutional grants/debt facilities.  
 All in all, a risk manager’s decision on an effective risk layering strategy as 
well as optimal risk allocation arrangements among available strategies and 
instruments within each layer of risk becomes a problem of minimizing risk financing 
                                                 
18 The debt triggered may further be attached with the index insurance (Turvey and Chantarat 2006) so 
that the debt repayment is contingent upon the occurrence of disaster (i.e., when WW >*  ). 
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costs – financially and economically – with respect to resource availability and market 
prices for FIWDs. But timely and predictable payouts from FIWDs now replace 
delayed and unreliable humanitarian aid in response to severe drought events when 
FIWDs are used to complement traditional donor appeal processes. 
  
3.5   Potential for Famine Indexed Weather Derivatives in Northern Kenya   
 
The arid areas of northern Kenya are largely populated by marginalized pastoral and 
agro-pastoral populations that traditionally rely on extensive livestock production for 
their livelihood, thus particularly vulnerable to covariate shocks in the form of drought 
and flood. To address the vulnerability of its populations and to improve their ability 
to manage risks, the Government of Kenya’s Arid Lands Resources Management 
Project (ALRMP) has been funded by the World Bank since 1996 aiming to develop 
and implement a community based drought management system. A community-based 
early warning system based on monthly household and environmental surveys that 
collect detailed information on livelihoods, livestock production, prices and the 
nutritional status of children is currently used to signal various stages of drought and 
food insecurity situation and thus to help government and operational agencies 
manage droughts.  
 In the context of FIWD design, these survey-based variables may not all be 
suitable as a direct index to hedge against famine risk as they may be manipulable by 
prospective beneficiaries. However, since drought episodes are strongly associated 
with sharply higher food insecurity in the pastoral communities (WFP 2001-2006), the 
predictive relationship between rainfall variables associated with extreme rainfall 
events and available food insecurity indicators such as nutritional status of children, 
levels of exogenous food availability (e.g., existing food aid pipeline commitments), 
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real prices of key staple crops, etc., could be used in a parametric famine index for 
various derivative contracts.  
 For illustrative purposes, the relationship between rainfall variability and the 
directly observed proxy of prevalence and severity of child undernutrition is used to 
develop a famine index for FIWDs for the study areas.19 Specifically, we obtained 
sample readings of the mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) for children aged 6-59 
months in each of 44 communities in 3 arid districts – Turkana, Samburu and Marsabit 
– for which a sufficient continuous monthly observations from 2000-2005 were 
available.20 These three districts are rated most vulnerable to food insecurity and thus 
their populations are among the majority of Kenyan populations to receive yearly food 
assistance, making these areas very suitable as an illustrated case for our study.21 
 As a measure of wasting, MUAC reflects short-term fluctuations in nutritional 
stress and is typically easier and less costly to collect than weight-for-height, the most 
commonly used and most documented anthropometric measure of wasting. 
Furthermore, several studies have found MUAC to be a far better predictor of child 
mortality than weight for height (Alam et al. 1989; Vella et al. 1994). We calculate the 
proportion of children in each community with a MUAC z-score of -2 or lower22 and 
use it as a proxy for widespread acute food insecurity. This coincides with other 
measures used among operational agencies and in anthropometric research in various 
                                                 
19 Other factors such as domestic and international policies or other economic factors may influence 
pricing variables and so their capacities to truly reflect the needs of the affected population. 
20 Theoretically thirty households are randomly selected per community and they are revisited each 
month. But the incompleteness due to poor data organization and storage of this repeated cross-
sectional household data described in detail in Mude et al. (Forthcoming), a subset of data, for which a 
sufficient number of continuous observations were available, are suitably chosen for the analysis of 
community-level impact of covariate shocks. 
21 These three pastoral districts also share similar socioeconomic characteristics, climate patterns, 
natural resource endowments, and livelihood portfolios according to the WFP’s Vulnerability Analysis 
and Mapping (VAM) pilot study on chronic vulnerability to food insecurity (2001), allowing the 
application of similar concepts and tools to drought response across this vast area. 
22  MUAC data are standardized using international recognized the 1978 CDC/WHO growth chart. The 
threshold z≤-2 is consistent with the benchmark often employed by emergency relief agencies to define 
famine (World Food Programme 2000; Howe and Devereux 2004). 
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disciplines, for example Howe and Devereux’s (2004)’s definition of “famine” as a 
condition where 20% or more of children in a specified area are severely wasted (i.e., 
with z-score of an anthropometric measure of malnutrition ≤-2) and “severe famine” 
when 40% or more of children in a specified area are severely wasted. This MUAC 
measure of the prevalence of severe child wasting can be used to quantify the level of 
drought-induced famine risks and thus to establish appropriate thresholds that trigger 
weather derivative payout for emergency response.  
 We then match these data with the 1961-2006 rainfall series, comprised of 
1961-1996 CHARM historical rainfall data estimated from the historical satellite 
imagery (Funk et al. 2003) and 1996-2006 METEOSAT-based daily rainfall estimates.  
   
3.5.1 Rainfall Variability and Food Insecurity in Northern Kenya     
 
These pastoral areas are generally characterized by bimodal rainfall with short rains 
falling October-December, followed by a short dry period (January-February) and 
long rains in March-May followed by a long dry season from June-September. This 
pattern is shown in Figure 3.1, which plots kernel density estimation of yearly rainfall 
patterns in the three northern Kenyan districts we study. Pastoralists rely on both rains 
for water and pasture for their animals, as well as occasional dryland cropping. Dry 
seasons are typically hunger periods in these pastoral communities.  
 In a normal year, water availability suffices to ensure adequate yields of milk, 
meat and blood, most of which is consumed within pastoral households, with the rest 
sold in order to purchase grains and non-food necessities. Localized rain failures may 
happen, but migratory herders can commonly adapt to spatiotemporal variability in 
forage and water availability. But when the rains fail across a wide area, especially if 
short and long rains both fail in succession, catastrophic herd losses often occur and 
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Figure 3.1 Kernel Density Estimation of Yearly Rainfall Pattern in Three Pastoral 
Districts of Northern Kenya, 1961-2006 
 
major recent droughts with dire humanitarian consequences – 1997/8, 2000/1 and 
2005/6 – were all years in which not only was aggregate rainfall low, but it was also 
spatially widespread and continued across multiple seasons. Moreover, evidence of the 
effect of variability in seasonal rainfall on the prevalence and severity of malnourished 
children can be clearly observed in the following dry season, as in Figure 3.2, which 
plots the dynamics of rainfall and nutritional status characterized by the proportion of 
severely wasted children in a community from 2000-2005 in these three districts we 
study the impact of 2000’s failed long rains resulted in a larger proportion of 
malnourished children in the following long dry season, whereas the localized failure 
of the 2003 short rains resulted in a temporary peak in proportion of malnourished 
children in the following short dry season at the start of 2004.  
 Kenya’s current drought response system is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Seasonal 
rain forecasts are conducted two months before the start of the seasonal rains with the  
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Figure 3.2 Kernel Density Estimations of Monthly Rainfall and Proportion of Severely Wasted Children, 2000-2005 
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goal to produce early warning to help herders improve their livelihood decisions as 
well as to facilitate drought response planning among agencies. Approximately two-
month-long seasonal rain assessments then take place after the end of the seasonal 
rains. These result in estimates of the affected populations and the associated funding 
needs, information which is then used in the donor funding appeals. It usually takes at 
least 5 months from the end of each rainy season until the newly programmed 
humanitarian aid is actually delivered. Consequently aid delivery under the current 
response system might fail to preserve livelihoods or even the lives of some affected 
populations.  
   
3.5.2 Predictive Relationship between Rainfall and Humanitarian Needs      
 
To illustrate how FIWDs can be designed to hedge against drought induced famine 
risks in northern Kenya, we explore the predictive relationship between seasonal rains 
and the prevalence of severely wasted children in each subsequent dry season. For 
illustrative purposes, we use the cumulative long rains (mm, from March to May) and 
short rains (mm, from October to December) to characterize seasonal rains in each 
community. The area average of each of these two seasonal rains is constructed by 
weighted averaging across 44 communities using communities’ mean proportion of 
severely wasted children as weights. These weighted long rains and short rains 
represent overall exposure to drought risk in these northern Kenya communities. This 
area average is the appropriate measure to use to hedge against drought-induced risk 
since localized droughts can be managed by transferring resources from unaffected 
areas and so only catastrophic droughts that affect most of the areas need to be 
transferred.23 
                                                 
23 Correlations coefficients of seasonal rains across these 44 communities vary from 0.16-0.98 for long 
rains and 0.33-0.99 for short rains. 
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Figure 3.3 Kenya’s Current Drought Emergency Response System 
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 Table 3.1 reports sample district- and overall (basket weighted)-level statistics 
of the proportion (%) of severely wasted children averaged over short dry (January-
February) and long dry (June-September) periods, cumulative long rains (mm), 
cumulative short rains (mm), monthly average normalized vegetative index (NDVI) – 
a measure of forage availability for herds – and percentage of communities 
experiencing failed long rains or short rains, where “failure” reflects cumulative 
seasonal rainfall more than one standard deviation below the community-specific 
long-term mean.24 On average, the proportion of severely wasted children is higher in 
the long dry period than in the short dry period. Marsabit experienced the highest 
proportion of wasted children despite its more favorable rainfall. Turkana is typically 
the most arid district with the lowest mean cumulative short rain and the lowest 
monthly NDVI. Years when one hundred percent of communities faced failed long 
rains are observed in all three districts. A high percentage of communities with failed 
short rains are also observed. On average, 26% of children are severely wasted during 
long dry seasons and 21% during short dry periods, with the mean cumulative long 
rain and short rain volumes 218 mm and 136 mm, respectively.  
 Taking the observed rainfall volume, temporal and spatial effects of rainfall 
into account, we use two consecutive preceding seasonal rains in predicting the 
prevalence of severely wasted children in each of the two dry seasons. Seemingly 
unrelated regression is applied in fitting these two relationships using six years of 44- 
community-basket weighted variables available from the 2000-2005 ALRMP data. 
                                                 
24 Proportion of severely wasted children (% MUACZ<-2) statistics are from 2000-2005, rainfall 
statistics are from 1961-2006 and normalized vegetative index (NDVI) statistics are from 1990-2005. 
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District Statistics Short Dry Long Dry Long Rain Short Rain Failed Failed NDVI
(% MUAC (% MUAC (mm) (mm) Long Rain Short Rain
z<-2) z<-2) (%) (%)
Marsabit Mean 0.20 0.29 223 162 14 15 0.32
9 communities S.D. 0.11 0.04 86 70 30 27 0.15
Minimum 0.00 0.24 53 8 0 0 0.09
Maximum 0.31 0.35 454 327 100 100 0.69
Samburu Mean 0.16 0.22 214 144 15 15 0.29
14 communities S.D. 0.07 0.11 84 68 27 27 0.12
Minimum 0.09 0.07 62 12 0 0 0.05
Maximum 0.26 0.38 417 313 100 93 0.64
Turkana Mean 0.25 0.26 217 119 16 10 0.22
21 communities S.D. 0.09 0.12 59 66 26 17 0.12
Minimum 0.14 0.10 78 20 0 0 0.05
Maximum 0.34 0.46 317 395 100 67 0.62
All (weighted) Mean 0.21 0.26 218 136 15 13 0.26
44 communities S.D. 0.09 0.10 69 62 25 21 0.14
Minimum 0.00 0.07 66 15 0 0 0.05
Maximum 0.34 0.46 371 344 100 82 0.69
 
 
Table 3.1 Sample Statistics of Weather and Proportion of Severely Wasted Children 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 44 Communities are weighted using their mean proportion of children with MUAC z<-2 in dry seasons. 
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The estimated forecasting model of basket weighted proportion of severely wasted 
children in the long dry season was25 
                                               
  ttLDtttLD AIDSRLRF ε+−−−= − )ln(
)07.0(
224.0)ln(
)35.0(
177.0)ln(
)13.0(
619.0
)34.2(
607.3)ln( 1      (3.8)                    
 
where LDF  is the proportion (%) of severely wasted children averaged over the long 
dry season (June-September), LR  is the cumulative long rains (mm), 1−SR  is the 
immediate leading cumulative short rains (mm) of the preceding year, LDAID  
represents the basket weighted average of communities’ mean quantity food aid (kg) 
received per household per year calculated from October of the preceding year to 
September (the end of long dry period), and t  represents time in years. Similarly, the 
forecasting model for proportion of severely wasted children in the short dry period 
was 
 
 ttSDtttSD AIDSRLRF ε+−−−= −− )ln(
)15.0(
119.0)ln(
)52.0(
113.1)ln(
)247.0(
248.0
)60.2(
28.5)ln( 11    (3.9) 
 
where SDF  represents the proportion (%) of severely malnourished children averaged 
over short dry season (January-February), 1−LR  is the cumulative long rains (mm) of 
the preceding year, and SDAID  is the mean quantity food aid (kg) received per 
household per year calculated from March of the preceding year to February (the end 
of short dry period). The 2r  for these regressions are 0.753 for long dry model and 
0.563 for the short dry season.  
 These model specifications were used in this illustrative case for a variety of 
reasons. First, the basket weighted average covariates represent the weighted 
aggregate of the overall exposure to drought-induced famine risks in these 
                                                 
25 Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
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communities under study. Second, the coefficients are consistent with our priors about 
the relationship between rainfall and malnutrition. Third, the estimated parameters 
showed reasonable statistical significance, even though the number of observations 
was very low. Fourth, the model selected was the best of many models examined. 
Finally, although our data were obtained from a large number of monthly observations 
we were limited in time to annual counts of the proportion of wasted community 
children to six annual measures. This is a data limitation that will be overcome in 
time,26 but for the purely illustrative purposes of this paper and the FIWD concepts 
and pricing methods it introduces, there is no better measure to directly predict 
prevalence and degree of food insecurity and we would rather err on the side of 
precision.  
 We should also explain that food aid variables were included in these 
forecasting models purely to control for (i) non-weather effects (e.g., disease, conflict) 
that matter to the variability of the proportion of severely wasted community children, 
and (ii) preprogrammed food aid flows (e.g., school feeding and other non-emergency 
food aid as well as food aid resulting from prior years’ appeals).27 The predictive 
relationships between the two preceding seasonal rains and the prevalence of severely 
wasted children conditional on an ex-ante expectation of a food aid pipeline can now 
be used to develop a parametric famine index for FIWDs. 
 According to (3.8), a 1% increase in the basket weighed long rains will 
decrease the overall proportion of severely wasted children by 0.619%, whereas a 1% 
increase in short rains will decrease the malnutrition proportion by 0.177%. Clearly 
the influence of the long rains is more indicative of wasting in the long dry season 
                                                 
26 Phase two of the ALRMP project from 2005 onward continues to collect data from these 
communities. 
27 The weighted average yearly food aid variables used are not statistically determined by the 
prevalence of severely malnourished children in dry seasons. Thus reverse causality does not appear to 
be an issue in these data. 
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than the prior fall short rains. And as expected, (3.9) also suggests that the preceding 
short rains seem to have a more significant impact on malnutrition status in the short 
dry period compared to the preceding long rains. Nonetheless with significantly 
different impacts, two preceding seasonal rains are both critical predictors of short dry 
seasons’ prevalence of severely wasted children. The combination of these two rain 
events characterizes a joint weather-event trigger for derivative contracts.  
    
3.5.3 Designing Famine Index Weather Derivatives for Northern Kenya       
 
Using forecasted proportion of severely wasted children as an indicator of acute food 
insecurity, the famine index derived from the predictive relationship in (3.8) for the 
long dry season is thus 224.0177.0619.0
1
845.36 −−− −= LDLD AIDSRLRF . Holding the prevalence 
of child malnutrition constant at *LDF , and incorporating the food aid variable based on 
ex-ante expectation of LDAID  (40 kgs/household food aid in the pre-existing 
pipeline28) into the intercept, we use 
 
                     
619.0
1
*
177.0
1
224.0
*
1
* 845.36))(( ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡=
−
−
−
−
LD
LD
LD F
SRAIDFSRLR                  (3.10) 
 
to obtain the conditional trigger of cumulative long rains conditional upon the already 
observed outcome of the preceding cumulative short rains. Critically important is the 
inclusion of the famine index, in term of proportion of wasted children, *LDF , not as an 
outcome, but as a policy variable. Here (3.10) represents what we will refer to as an 
iso-food insecurity index curve, as depicted in Figure 3.4. This is similar to an 
isoquant in classical production economics. At a particular level of expected aid 
                                                 
28 The level of food aid at 40 kgs/household /year, used here for illustrative purpose, is approximately 
one standard deviation below the 2000-2005 means. 
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delivery, this curve shows the loci of strike or trigger long rain levels, 
))(( *1
*
LDFSRLR − , given an observed preceding 1−SR  that probabilistically leads to a 
level of prevalence of severely wasted children *LDF in the long dry season. It thus can 
serve as an early warning mechanism for slow onset food crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Iso-Food Insecurity Index Relations for Hedging Against Levels of 
Prevalence of Severely Wasted Children ( *F ) 
 
 
 The critical calculus is                                , and so as the chosen level of 
prevalence of severely wasted children to hedge against, *LDF , increases, the long rain 
trigger decreases. This is depicted in Figure 4 as a downward shift in the iso-food 
insecurity index curve. In addition,                                    indicates that as the observed 
preceding short rain increases, the long rain strike required to hedge against a given 
level of prevalence of severely wasted children *LDF  is lower. Thus the long rain strike 
))(( *1
*
LDFSRLR −  is determined jointly by the random outcome in the preceding short 
rains and the chosen level of *LDF .  
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 The meaning of *LDF  is critical. Like a deductible in conventional insurance, 
the choice of *LDF  represents the level of food insecurity for which the government or 
operational agencies can provide assistance using existing resources (food and cash) 
but above which will need additional resources. Thus if 3.0* =LDF , the iso-food 
insecurity index curve determines the boundary of short and long rain combinations, 
below which prevalence of wasted children 3.0* >LDF  could arise probabilistically. In 
other words, to ensure that cash for emergency food relief is available for early 
prevention of the predicted prevalence of severe child malnutrition beyond a pre-
specified level *LDF  in the long dry season, this model is equivalent to a random strike 
model with the indemnity payout at the end of the long rain established by 
]0),))((([ *1
* LRFSRLRCMax LD −=Π − . Here, )(⋅C  links the particular prevalence and 
severity of child wasting resulting from a long rain shortfall to the appropriate dollar 
amount of humanitarian assistance needs and the long rain strike ))(( *1
*
LDFSRLR −  
below which the contract triggers a payout. Importantly, its determination is based on 
the realization of the preceding cumulative short rain.29,30  
 For illustrative purposes, we consider a derivative contract written before the 
short rains period (e.g., in September) to hedge against the potential widespread food 
insecurity event in the short dry (e.g., during January-February of the following year) 
as well as long dry (June-September of the following year) seasons. The specific 
instruments we investigate first are index insurance contracts with 
 
                                 ( )mmSRtSD 65)( 1000,000,1$ ≤⋅=Π                           (3.11) 
 
                                                 
29 Random strike models are useful when there is a causal intertemporal relationship between one 
weather event and a subsequent event on a particular outcome. See Turvey et al. (2006) for an example 
of a random strike price in a different context. 
30 A similar procedure could be used to derive an indemnity structure for hedging against prevalence of 
widespread child wasting in the short dry season based on a random short rain strike conditional on the 
observed preceding long rain. However, our investigation indicates that prevalence is established 
relative to the short rains. 
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                 ( )0,)))(((000,000,1$ *1*)( xLDTLD LRFSRLRMax −⋅=Π −               (3.12) 
 
                                  )()()( TLDtSDtTrT e Π+Π⋅=Π −                           (3.13) 
 
where (3.11) is a binary option with an indemnity paid out at the end of short rain 
season (e.g., in January) if there is a severe shortfall in the cumulative short rain below 
65mm. This indemnity structure takes into account the need for an immediate cash 
payout to finance early intervention should weak short rains leads to a catastrophic 
food crisis in the short dry period.31 
 Equation (3.12) is the main indemnity structure and the primary vehicle for the 
famine insurance product for hedging widespread food crisis in the critical long dry 
season. It holds a tick $1,000,000 for every millimeter of long rain falling below the 
strike, ))(( *1
*
LDFSRLR − . The payoff may be raised to the power x, which increases this 
payoff fractionally as the long rain shortfall increases. The idea here is that there is a 
non-linear relationship between drought and prevalence of child malnutrition with the 
risk of famine increasing convexly in respect to decreases in rainfall. The total 
indemnity payoff at the end of the contract is thus provided in (3.13) by adding the 
value of the short dry indemnity paid immediately after short rain season adjusted for 
time value by discount factor r, and the long dry indemnity paid at the end of long rain 
season, which is assumed to be the end of the contract. A cap ( 0≥Π ) on the 
maximum indemnity payout can be applied in order to limit the insurer’s losses so that 
the total payout at the end of the contract (T) becomes 
                                                 
31 The short rain strike of 65mm is obtained in similar fashion to that of ))(( *1
*
LDFSRLR − . Specifically, 
the short rain strike conditional on the preceding long rain outcome observed before the start of the 
contract can be written as 
113.1
1
*
248.0
1
119.0
*
1
* 429.196))(( ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
=
−−
−
−
SD
SD
SD
F
LRAID
FLRSR .  
 The strike 65))(( *1
* =− SDFLRSR mm is based on the expectation of 75=SDAID kilograms per 
household per year, 3.0* =SDF  and an average long rain of 210 mm. 
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                           ( )ΠΠ+Π⋅=Π − ,)()()( TLDtSDtTrcapped eMin                  (3.14) 
 
 Second, we consider the simple one year, zero-coupon famine bond with 
principal P, rate of required return r and an indemnity payout structure cappedΠ  
described in (14) and capped at %δ of the principal. We then price this based on 
 
                       ][),0( cappedrT PeTB Π−⋅= −    where  Pδ=Π .                      (3.15) 
 
The famine bond is initially sold at a discount. The bondholder’s realized annual 
return if the insurance indemnity is not triggered is therefore the difference between 
the principal and the purchased bond price. The structure of these famine indexed 
weather derivative contracts are shown in Figure 3.3. The next section analyses the 
expected payoffs from contracts with various combinations of these factors. 
    
3.5.4 Pricing Famine Index Weather Derivatives       
 
We present the pricing results from the insurance product first and the famine bond 
second. As discussed previously, the two are related in that it is the indemnity 
structure of the weather insurance product that determines the discount on the famine 
bond.  
 Two methods are used as a matter of comparison. In the top panel of Tables 
3.2, 3.3 and 3.5, the results are derived using a burn rate approach, which is based on 
the actual historical outcomes from 46 years of rainfall data. The bottom panels are 
based on 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations using the best fit distributions for basket 
weighted cumulative short rain (gamma(8.0525,21.279)) and cumulative long rain 
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(lognormal(3357.6,68.56)).32 The long rain strike used throughout these results is 
based on a minimal level of food aid delivery of 40 kilograms per household per year, 
about 75% standard deviation below its 2000-2005 mean. The insurance indemnity 
payouts are based simply on the parameter 1=x , so payouts are linearly related to rain 
shortfall relative to the trigger level. The tables present the expected indemnity payoff 
for index insurance contracts in order to reflect the value of the products as determined 
by the distribution of short and then long precipitation risk. Actuarial fair premiums 
can thus be derived easily by discounting these expected payoffs with an appropriate 
discount rate.  
 For the insurance contracts for hedging against a given level of child wasting 
prevalence *F  defined from 0.2 to 0.5 for each column, the expected long rain strike 
decreases from 308.6 to 70.2 millimeters, reflecting the fact that as the level of 
malnutrition prevalence one want to hedge against is higher, the likelihood and 
magnitude of contract payout is thus lower. The expected payoffs in long dry season 
(contingent on conditional long rain strike) therefore decrease substantially as the level 
of *F increases. They range from about $97.2 million and $95.5 million for * 0.2F = , 
to $3,538 and $388,426 for the burn and Monte Carlo estimates at the higher level of 
* 0.5F =  with much rarer trigger probability. According to the 46-year historical data, 
contract covering * 0.5F =  made one payout in the year 2000, the worst drought in the 
past forty years of Kenya. On the contrary, the fact that the contract covering * 0.2F =  
triggered payouts in 39 out of 46 years is expected, as the average proportion of 
severely wasted community children in these particular districts of Kenya is already as 
high as 0.26 in the long dry season. Two payouts were made in 1997 and 2000 at 
45.0* =F  and 4.0* =F , implying a frequency of one in 23 years.  
                                                 
32 Distributions are written as Gamma ),( βα  - where 0>α determines shape or skewness and 0>β  
determines scale or width of the distribution, and Lognormal ),( σµ with parameters for mean and 
variance, respectively.  
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 The contingent claim on short rains failure occurs only under severe conditions 
(specifically in 1970, 1997 and 2005, coinciding with the historical record of 
devastating droughts due to short rains failure). The payoff of $65,217 based on 
historical measures compares to $102,780 using Monte Carlo, indicating that the best 
fit distribution is skewed more negatively than history might have recorded. The total 
expected payoffs from contingencies on both short and long rain range from $97.3 
millions to $70,929 using the burn approach and $95.7 millions to $494,634 using the 
Monte Carlo approach.  
 The range of payoffs is much higher using the Monte Carlo approach. The 
differences between the burn approach and the Monte Carlo approach are due to the 
sampling frame. The burn approach assumes that all possible outcomes are contained 
within the history of the sample while the Monte Carlo approach, driven by a defined 
distribution, assumes the existence of rarer events on the downside that were not 
realized during the historical period strata. Especially, at * 0.5F =  with only one 
payout triggered historically, the 50,000 iteration Monte Carlo approach would have 
sampled more possible severe outcomes, as rare as they might be. 
 The capped insurance results are provided in Table 3.3. The caps – ceiling of 
covering insurance payout that limits the insurer’s loss – used were approximately 
70% of the largest historical payoff. The capped products are remarkably similar with 
expected payoffs (and standard deviations) between the burn and Monte Carlo 
approaches very close. Under the Monte Carlo approach, the effects of the caps 
reduced total expected payoffs from $97.5 million to $94.2 million for * 0.2F = , and 
from $494,638 to $93,282 for * 0.5F = . More generally as the cap increases, so too 
would the range of payouts and hence the cost of the insurance.  
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Famine Trigger (F*) 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Strike SR* (mm) 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Historical Burn Rate
Expected Strike LR* (mm) 309 215 160 125 101 83 70
Expected SD Payoff ($) 65,217 65,217 65,217 65,217 65,217 65,217 65,217
Expected LD Payoff ($) 97,220,597 29,505,197 10,353,626 4,055,296 1,425,886 600,631 3,532
Expected Total Payoff ($) 97,287,994 29,572,594 10,421,023 4,122,693 1,493,283 668,028 70,929
S.D. Total Payoff ($) 81,419,233 49,554,422 27,145,007 13,906,329 6,969,875 3,023,025 272,219
Minimum Payoff ($) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Payoff ($) 374,106,609 205,193,020 113,205,263 69,259,487 39,104,762 17,402,449 1,195,889
SD Triggered Years 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
LD Triggered Years 39 23 10 5 2 2 1
Monte Carlo Simulation
Expected Strike LR* (mm) 308 215 160 125 101 83 70
Expected SD Payoff ($) 102,780 102,780 102,780 102,780 102,780 102,780 102,780
Expected LD Payoff ($) 95,571,430 28,752,950 8,916,012 3,218,886 1,350,931 690,477 388,426
Expected Total Payoff ($) 95,677,680 28,859,160 9,022,220 3,325,094 1,457,118 796,706 494,634
S.D. Total Payoff ($) 76,621,900 45,106,260 24,514,640 14,297,660 8,521,659 5,823,947 4,233,706
Minimum Payoff ($) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Payoff ($) 996,512,400 648,651,000 542,513,000 599,369,000 432,394,500 194,205,900 116,622,200
 
Table 3.2 Weather Index Insurance Expected Payoff Statistics, 1961-2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The expected total payoffs are calculated at the end of the contract, where the expected SD payoffs are brought forward using 8% rate of return. 
Actuarial fair premium can be calculated by discounting the expected total payoff with the appropriate discount rate. 
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  The one-year catastrophe bond discounts are provided in Table 3.4 for various 
combinations of caps as a percent of principal and various required rates of return – 
the difference of which from the risk-free rate represents risk premiums investors 
required. These rates are chosen such that they reasonably represent spreads required 
by investors in the existing cat bond markets (according to Froot 1999). The values in 
Table 3.4 indicate the retail price of a bond per dollar of principal. The total annual 
return realized by the bondholder will always be higher than the required rate of return 
if the triggering widespread acute food insecurity event does not occur. The difference 
between the two thus represents an additional premium required associated with the 
catastrophic famine risk. For example, a famine bond covering prevalence of severe 
wasting of 3.0* =F  with a required rate of return of 8% and cap at 30% is priced at 
$0.8787 and will pay $1 principal one year later should the famine condition not be 
triggered. Thus the total return realized by the investor if a critical drought event is not 
triggered33 is 12.13%, which can be interpreted as an additional 4.13% premium 
associated with the famine risk contingency and above the risk premium required for 
other sources of risk e.g., default risk, interest rate term structure risk, etc. However, if 
triggered, principal payment decreases to as little as $0.3 for a loss of 57.8%. 
 In general, for a given cap level and required rate of return, the famine bond 
prices decrease with the level of malnutrition prevalence to be insured against, since 
the lower *F  trigger means that the bond has higher probability to trigger payout and 
thus is more risky. Similarly, famine bond prices decrease as the cap level increases, 
as the smaller proportion of repaid principal if the bond triggers translates into the 
higher risk of loss. And finally, it is straightforward to see that the bond prices 
decrease as the required rates of return increase. 
                                                 
33 Equivalently, the total return of a famine bond can be interpreted as a 7.18% spread over one-year 
LIBOR rate of 5.12%. LIBOR rate is as of September 11, 2007. 
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Famine Trigger (F*) 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
Strike SR* (mm) 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Cap (70% of Historical Max.) 260,000,000 140,000,000 80,000,000 50,000,000 28,000,000 10,000,000 800,000
Historical Burn Rate
Expected Strike LR* (mm) 309 215 160 125 101 83 70
Expected Total Payoff ($) 93,989,039 27,253,505 9,070,036 3,701,586 1,251,876 479,714 52,174
S.D. Total Payoff ($) 72,109,066 42,354,305 22,431,866 12,060,865 5,718,127 2,063,170 199,710
Minimum Payoff ($) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Payoff ($) 260,000,000 140,000,000 80,000,000 50,000,000 28,000,000 10,000,000 800,000
Monte Carlo Simulation
Expected Strike LR* (mm) 308 215 160 125 101 83 70
Expected Total Payoff ($) 94,215,120 27,636,790 8,035,131 2,673,187 972,646 321,917 93,282
S.D. Total Payoff ($) 71,489,720 40,392,290 19,479,810 9,651,412 4,457,400 1,445,366 256,701
Minimum Payoff ($) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum Payoff ($) 260,000,000 140,000,000 80,000,000 50,000,000 28,000,000 10,000,000 800,000
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Capped Weather Index Insurance Expected Payoff Statistics, 1961-2006 
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Required Cap
Return (%Face) 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
6% 30% 0.708 0.826 0.896 0.922 0.933 0.937 0.938
50% 0.571 0.775 0.879 0.916 0.931 0.936 0.938
70% 0.450 0.739 0.870 0.913 0.930 0.935 0.937
8% 30% 0.696 0.812 0.879 0.904 0.914 0.918 0.920
50% 0.561 0.761 0.862 0.898 0.912 0.917 0.919
70% 0.443 0.724 0.853 0.895 0.911 0.917 0.919
10% 30% 0.682 0.796 0.861 0.886 0.896 0.900 0.901
50% 0.550 0.745 0.845 0.880 0.894 0.899 0.901
70% 0.434 0.709 0.836 0.878 0.893 0.898 0.901
12% 30% 0.668 0.780 0.844 0.869 0.878 0.882 0.883
50% 0.539 0.731 0.828 0.863 0.876 0.881 0.883
70% 0.425 0.695 0.819 0.860 0.875 0.881 0.883
Famine Trigger (F*)
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Zero-Coupon Famine Bond Prices for Different Bond Specifications* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Prices are based on 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations using best fit distributions 
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3.5.5 Using Famine Indexed Weather Derivatives to Improve Drought 
Emergency Response       
 
The risk-transferring potential of the FIWD contracts proposed here vary greatly with 
the frequency of the extreme events as well as their degree of catastrophe. For 
example, as shown in Table 3.3, capped weather index insurance covering severe 
wasting prevalence 2.0* =F  results in a prohibitive premium with expected payoff of 
$93.9 million. The contract triggers payout in 39 of 46 years due to the fact that the 
average proportion of severely wasting condition in northern Kenya is already as high 
as 0.26 in the long dry season. But the results in Table 3 further suggest that early 
intervention at 3.0* =F  or higher (with the frequency of 10 in 46 years) may feasibly 
be financed using famine index insurance. The insurance contract that covers up to 
$80 million requires a premium with expected payoff of approximately $8 million. 
Alternatively, intervention triggered by 4.0* =F  or more (occurring in 1-2 of 46 
years) may also feasibly be financed using famine bonds. At the required rate of return 
of 8% and with a 50% cap, famine bonds covering 4.0* =F , 0.45 or 0.5 can be issued 
at the total rate of return of 8.82%, 8.3% and 8.09% respectively.  
 While these derivative products can be used to finance emergency response to 
catastrophic drought risk, coordinating them with other sources of humanitarian 
funding and the country’s existing drought contingency resources may further enhance 
the potential and cost effectiveness of the early intervention. Integrated risk financing 
ideas proposed in Hess and Syroka (2005) and Hess et al. (2006) for Ethiopia and 
Malawi can be similarly illustrated in the context of drought emergency response 
financing for arid northern Kenya. Suppose that early emergency response is crucial if 
25.0* =F . The financial exposure associated with the emergency intervention costs 
can be first layered by their frequency and level of catastrophe. The instruments 
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Famine Trigger (F*) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Strike SR* (mm) 65 65 65 65
Layering Strike LR* LR* LR*-30 LR*-60 LR*-120
Cap for LR Payoff 30,000,000 30,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000
Historical Burn Rate
Expected Strike LR* (mm) 215 185 155 95
Expected Total Payoff ($) 11,671,814 7,146,556 7,301,997 3,519,623
S.D. Total Payoff ($) 13,576,351 12,150,113 18,278,614 15,399,052
Minimum Payoff ($) 0 0 0 0
Maximum Payoff ($) 30,000,000 30,000,000 60,000,000 85,193,020
Monte Carlo Simulation
Expected Strike LR* (mm) 215 185 155 95
Expected Total Payoff ($) 12,049,830 7,849,441 6,994,606 1,995,035
S.D. Total Payoff ($) 13,838,810 12,357,140 16,692,620 10,344,390
Minimum Payoff ($) 0 0 0 0
Maximum Payoff ($) 30,000,000 30,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000
covering various layers of these exposures, characterized by different conditional long 
rains strike and cap levels are derived and shown in Table 3.5.  
 
 
Table 3.5 Layering Financial Exposure in Providing Emergency Intervention to 
Drought Events Using Triggering Level of Prevalence of Child Malnutrition of 0.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For illustrative purposes, financial exposure can be disaggregated into four 
layers and can then be managed sequentially by (i) government reserves or pre-
established contingency funds, (ii) contingent debt/grants, (iii) famine indexed 
insurance and (iv) famine bonds – which now becomes feasible for the layer of a 4-in-
46 year loss event (or with approximately 8.7% probability of occurrence per year). 
The first layer covers the most frequent loss exposure (23 in 46 years event) and up to 
$30 million. This layer covers the operational costs on the most recurrent but 
relatively minor losses, e.g., local droughts occurring almost every two years, which 
lead to an expected loss of as high as $11.67 million. The second contract covers the 
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loss beyond the first contingency layer, up to another $30 million. Since this layer of 
loss still occurs with relatively high probability, it may be too costly for any 
commercial risk transfer products and thus may be appropriately financed by a 
contingent debt or grant from development facilities available from many international 
financial institutions (e.g., World Bank). The expected loss of $7.1 million will be 
financed in this layer.  
 The major catastrophic losses requiring an extensive emergency response can 
then be financed using index insurance or a famine (cat) bond. However, the 
probability of occurrence of the next layer of risk may still be too high (8 in 46 year 
event) to be appropriate for a cat bond. A weather index insurance contract may first 
be used to cover this immediate layer of losses up to $60 million, with a premium 
representing expected payoff of $7.3 million. Finally, a famine bond contract can then 
be designed for the last, low-probability-catastrophic-loss layer, up to $100 million in 
humanitarian budgetary needs. The donor appeals process can then resume for any 
remaining costs not covered by these financing mechanism, e.g., costs exceeding $100 
million or extra costs not fully captured in the derivative contracts. But with an initial, 
substantial funding layer in place and available for immediate payout, both the overall 
costs and the time pressures should be reduced, making the appeals process a viable 
vehicle for topping up pipelines begun through these other risk management 
instruments. 
 It is worth noting that the total drought risk financing costs will vary with the 
layering strategy as well as with the combinations of instruments used. The main idea, 
therefore, is that contracts based on forecasted prevalence and severity of food 
insecurity can be designed and used as a trigger mechanism to coordinate multiple 
prospective sources of emergency funding in order to increase cost effectiveness and 
timely response to drought-induced humanitarian disasters. 
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3.6   Discussion and Implications    
 
There is no general approach for the design and pricing of famine indexed weather 
derivative contracts. This paper presents the first attempt. The results from our 
illustrative case from northern Kenya are of course specific to the assumptions we 
made and replicable only over the equivalent distributions of climate and human 
ecology. It is therefore best to focus on the principles involved and not on the specific 
numerical estimates. These principles and their numerical illustrations are nonetheless 
both important and exciting. 
 Our objective was to develop a weather-based famine insurance product that 
could be used by governments, operational agencies or NGOs to enhance the 
timeliness and reliability of funding for emergency intervention to catastrophic but 
slow-onset droughts. We proposed a general structure for famine indexed weather 
derivatives, but emphasize two common yet critical characteristics. First, weather 
variables or event trigger(s) need to be indexed to a forecasted degree of prevalence 
and severity of food crisis so that it can serve as both an early warning to trigger early 
intervention and to provide the cash necessary for such intervention. Second, as 
delayed humanitarian assistance is costly, even deadly, contractual payouts need to be 
structured to cover potential emergency response over all possible vulnerable periods 
in the year. FIWDs with these two features can be integrated with existing 
humanitarian funding facilities. 
 Though using the best measures available given the problem identified, the 
FIWDs designed for northern Kenya should be taken as an illustrative case only and 
require further investigation if considered for real applications, for a variety of 
reasons. First, though derivative prices are based on 46 years of high-quality rainfall 
data, the predictive relationship between weather and food insecurity is derived from 
only six years’ available household data. It is therefore critical to re-estimate the 
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relationships with additional data in order to minimize potential basis risk. Second, the 
suitability of communities’ proportion of severely wasted children (measured by 
MUAC z-score <-2) as a proxy for severe human suffering relies on an accurate and 
continued data collection processes at the community level. The principles and results 
generated in this article emphasize the importance of and the need for improving data 
collection and standardization, which can strengthen the potential and feasibility of 
famine indexed weather derivatives in the near future.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DESIGNING INDEX BASED LIVESTOCK INSURANCE 
FOR MANAGING ASSET RISK IN                      
NORTHERN KENYA  
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
Uninsured risk has long been recognized as a serious obstacle to poverty reduction in 
poor agrarian nations. In order to limit risk exposure, risk averse poor households 
often select low-risk, low-return asset and activity portfolios that trade off growth 
potential and expected current income for a lower likelihood of catastrophic outcomes 
(Eswaran and Kotwal 1989, 1990; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Morduch 1995; 
Zimmerman and Carter 2003; Dercon 2005; Carter and Barrett 2006; Elbers et al. 
2007). Furthermore, because risk exposure leaves lenders vulnerable to default by 
borrowers, uninsured risk commonly limits access to credit, especially for the poor 
who lack collateral to guarantee loan repayment. And if an asset used to secure the 
loan is itself at risk, lack of insurance can even compromise the opportunities afforded 
through collateral. The combination of conservative portfolio choice induced by risk 
aversion and credit market exclusion due to uninsured default and asset risk helps to 
perpetuate poverty.  
 Rural populations in low-income countries commonly face much uninsured 
risk because covariate risk, asymmetric information, and high transaction costs 
preclude the emergence of formal insurance markets. Covariate risk is a major cause 
of insurance market failures in low-income countries as spatially-correlated 
catastrophic losses can easily exceed the reserves of an insurer, leaving policyholders 
unprotected (Besley 1995). Such covariate risk exposure explains why crop insurance 
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policies are generally available only where governments take on much of the 
catastrophic risk exposure faced by insurers (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; 
Miranda and Glauber 1997). Meanwhile, familiar asymmetric information problems – 
adverse selection and moral hazard – pose a serious challenge to commercial 
insurance provision. Finally, the transaction costs of contracting and claims 
verification are much higher in rural areas than in cities due to limited transportation, 
communications and legal infrastructure. While informal insurance through social 
networks can address many of the asymmetric information and transactions costs 
problems, these too are typically overwhelmed by covariate risk. The end result is 
widespread insurance market failure.  
Index insurance based on cumulative rainfall, cumulative temperature, area 
average yield, area livestock mortality, and related indices have recently been 
developed to try to address otherwise-uninsured losses caused by various natural perils 
in low-income countries (Recently reviewed by Alderman and Haque 2007; Skees and 
Collier 2008; Barrett et al. 2008). Unlike traditional insurance, which makes 
indemnity payments to compensate for individual losses, index insurance makes 
payments based on realizations of an underlying – transparent and objectively 
measured – index (e.g. amount of rainfall or cumulative temperature over a season, or 
area-average livestock mortality) that is strongly associated with insurable loss.  
An index insurance contract has three main components. First, it requires a 
well-defined index and an associated strike level that triggers an insurance payout.  
The index must be highly correlated with the aggregate loss being insured, and based 
on data sources not easily manipulated by either the insured or the insurer, and with 
adequate, reliable historical data to estimate the probability distribution of the index 
for proper pricing and risk exposure analysis. Second, it requires well-defined 
spatiotemporal coverage with premium pricing specific to that place and period. Third, 
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the contract requires a clear payout timing and structure to all covered clients 
conditional on the index reaching the contractually specified strike level.  
 The benefits to such a contract design are several and especially appropriate to 
rural areas of developing countries where covariate risk, asymmetric information and 
high transactions costs render conventional insurance commercially unviable. By 
construction, the index captures covariate risk since it reflects the average (e.g., yield, 
mortality) or shared (e.g., rainfall, temperature) experience of the insurable population. 
If this covariate risk can be reinsured or securitized, locally-covariate risk can be 
transferred into a broader (international) risk pool where it is weakly or uncorrelated 
with the returns to other financial assets (Hommel and Ritter 2005; Froot 1999). 
Furthermore, index insurance contracts avoid the twin asymmetric information 
problems of adverse selection (hidden information) and moral hazard (hidden 
behavior) because the indices are not individual-specific; they explicitly target – and 
transfer to insurers – covariate risk within the contract place and period. Finally, 
insurance companies and insured clients need only monitor the index to know when a 
claim is due and indemnity payments must be made. They do not need to verify claims 
of individual losses, which can substantially reduce the transactions costs of 
monitoring and verification of the insurance contracts. 
 These gains come at the cost of basis risk, which refers to the imperfect 
correlation between an insured’s potential loss experience and the behavior of the 
underlying index on which the index insurance payout is based. A contract holder may 
experience the type of losses insured against but fail to receive a payout if the overall 
index is not triggered. Conversely, while the aggregate experience may result in a 
triggered contract, some insured individuals may not have experienced losses yet still 
receive payouts. The tradeoff between basis risk and reductions in incentive problems 
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and costs is thus a critical determinant of the effectiveness of index insurance 
products.  
  Although the overwhelming majority of insurance worldwide covers asset 
risk, to date almost all retail-level IBRTPs in developing countries have been designed 
to insure stochastic income streams, primarily crop income plagued by weather risk. 
This paper demonstrates the potential of index-based insurance contracts to manage 
livestock asset risk among pastoral communities in northern Kenya, what we call 
Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI). Mongolia has the only current example of an 
IBLI product. Offered commercially to individual herders by private insurance 
companies, the Mongolian IBLI product is based on area average mortality collected 
by a national census; the insurers are then reinsured through a contingent debt facility 
with the national government and the World Bank Group (Mahul and Skees 2005, 
2006; Alderman and Haque 2007). Concerns exist, however, because of both the cost 
and timeliness of collecting accurate annual census data, and the capacity of 
government – an interested party to the contracts – to manipulate the livestock 
mortality data.  
 Mongolian-type IBLI is infeasible in our setting, as government does not 
routinely and reliably collect livestock mortality data. But advances in remote sensing 
make it possible to design index insurance based on increasingly precise, inexpensive, 
objectively verifiable, real-time estimates of key observable geographic variables.  
Because grazing systems ultimately revolve around forage availability, we use the 
increasingly popular remotely sensed Normalized Differential Vegetation Index 
(NDVI), an indicator of vegetative cover widely used in drought monitoring programs 
and early warning systems in Africa (Sung and Weng, 2008), to predict livestock 
mortality. NDVI-based index insurance contracts have recently emerged. The United 
States Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management Agency now issues pasture 
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insurance based on both rainfall and NDVI indices. The Millennium Villages Project 
(Earth Institute at Columbia University and UNDP) in partnership with Swiss Re has 
just developed a drought index insurance program in a number of rural African 
villages. Preliminary results show that NDVI reliably signals most major drought 
years in regions with high seasonal NDVI variance, such as the semi-arid Sahel region 
of Africa (Ward et al. 2008).  
 We make three important innovations in this paper. First, we explain the 
design of the first index insurance contract for developing countries designed based on 
household-level panel data measuring asset loss experiences. Second, we demonstrate 
how one can build index insurance contracts off explicit statistical predictions of the 
variable of intrinsic insurable interest – in our case, livestock mortality – rather than 
relying only on implicit relationships between that variable and measurable proxies 
(e.g., NDVI, rainfall, temperature). Third, our data permit unprecedented out-of-
sample performance testing of these contracts. The resulting contract has attracted 
significant financial sector interest in the region and will launch commercially in early 
2010.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the 
northern Kenya context. Section 4.3 explains the livestock mortality and remote 
sensing vegetation data available. Section 4.4 details the IBLI contract design, the 
construction of key variables and the estimation methods employed. Section 4.5 
reports and evaluates the performance of the estimated livestock mortality models that 
underpin the IBLI contract.  Section 4.6 discusses contract pricing and risk exposure. 
Section 4.7 concludes with a discussion of implementation challenges for this and 
similar index insurance products. 
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4.2   The Northern Kenya Context  
 
The more than three million people who occupy northern Kenya’s arid and semi arid 
lands (ASALs) depend overwhelmingly on livestock, which represent the vast 
majority of household wealth and account for more than two-thirds of average income.  
Livestock mortality is therefore perhaps the most serious economic risk these 
pastoralist households face. The importance of livestock mortality risk management 
for pastoralists is amplified by the apparent presence of poverty traps in east African 
pastoral systems, characterized by multiple herd size equilibria such that losses 
beyond a critical threshold – typically 8-16 tropical livestock units (TLUs) – tend to 
tip a household into collapse into destitution (McPeak and Barrett, 2001; Lybbert et 
al., 2004; Barrett et al., 2006). Indeed, uninsured risk appears a primary cause of the 
existence of poverty traps among east African pastoralists (Santos and Barrett 2008).  
Most livestock mortality is associated with severe drought. In the past 100 
years, northern Kenya recorded 28 major droughts, 4 of which occurred in the last 10 
years (Adow 2008). The climate is generally characterized by bimodal rainfall with 
short rains falling in October – December, followed by a short dry period from 
January-February. The long rain – long dry spell runs March-May and June-
September, respectively. Pastoralists commonly pair rainy and dry seasons, for 
example observing that failure of the long rains results in large herd losses at the end 
of the following dry season. 
Pastoralist households commonly manage livestock mortality risk ex ante, 
primarily through animal husbandry practices, in particular nomadic or transhumant 
migration in response to spatiotemporal variability in forage and water availability.  
When pastoralists suffer herd losses, there exist social insurance arrangements that 
provide informal interhousehold transfers of a breeding cow; but these schemes cover 
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less than ten percent of household losses, on average, do not include everyone and are 
generally perceived as in decline (Lybbert et al. 2004; Santos and Barrett 2008; 
Huysentruyt et al. 2009). Some households can draw on cash savings and/or informal 
credit from family or friends to purchase animals to restock a herd after losses. But the 
vast majority of intertemporal variability in herd sizes is biologically regulated, due to 
births and deaths (McPeak and Barrett 2001; Lybbert et al. 2004). Thus most livestock 
mortality risk remains uninsured at household level. 
Meanwhile, most herd losses occur in droughts as covariate shocks affecting 
many households at once, sparking a humanitarian emergency. The resulting large-
scale catastrophe induces emergency response by the government, donors and 
international agencies, commonly in the form of food aid. As the cost and frequency 
of emergency response in the region has grown, however, mounting dissatisfaction 
with food aid-based risk transfer has prompted exploration for more comprehensive 
and effective means of livestock mortality and drought risk management, including the 
development of viable financial risk transfer products. The most recent parliamentary 
campaign in Kenya included widespread, highly publicized promises by prominent 
politicians to develop livestock insurance for the northern Kenyan ASAL.  
 
4.3   Data Description   
 
The northern Kenya IBLI contract is designed using combination of household-level 
livestock mortality data collected monthly since 1996 in various locations by the 
Government of Kenya’s Arid Land Resource Management Project (ALRMP, 
http://www.aridland.go.ke/) and dekadal (every 10 days) NDVI data computed reliable 
at high spatial resolution (8 km2 grids) and consistent quality from satellite-based 
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Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) measurement since 1981.34 
We also employ household-level panel data collected quarterly by the USAID Global 
Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program Pastoral Risk Management 
(PARIMA) project (Barrett et al. 2008) to analyze the IBLI contract’s performance out 
of sample. The use of NDVI data is uncommon in index insurance design, especially 
in the developing world; the use of household-level panel data in contract design is, to 
the best of our knowledge, unique.  
We focus specifically on what was until recently Marsabit District, where the 
ALRMP data are most complete and reliable, offering monthly household survey data 
from January 2000 to January 2008 in 7 locations in Marsabit35 It is thus possible to 
construct location-specific seasonal herd mortality rate for each location for long rain-
long dry seasons (the period from March-September) and short rain-short dry seasons 
(from October-February), providing a minimally adequate sample size of 112 location-
and-season specific observations.   
As sample households vary by survey round, we rely on monthly location 
average herd mortality, mmortH , , to construct seasonal location average mortality 
rate, lsM , as according to  
 
                                                   lsM  ≡                                                                      (4.1) 
 
                                                 
34 The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration satellite-based Advanced Very 
High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) collects the data that are then processed by the Global 
Inventory Monitoring and Modeling Studies group at the National Aeronautical and Space 
Administration (http://gimms.gsfc.nasa.gov/) to produce NDVI data series. The scanning radiometer 
(comprised of five channels) is used primarily for weather forecasting. However, there are an increasing 
number of other applications, including drought monitoring. NDVI is calculated from two channels of 
the AVHRR sensor, the near-infrared (NIR) and visible (VIS) wavelengths, using the following 
algorithm: NDVI = (NIR - VIS)/(NIR + VIS). NDVI is a nonlinear function that varies between -1 and 
+1 (undefined when NIR and VIS are zero). Values of NDVI for vegetated land generally range from 
about 0.1 to 0.7, with values greater than 0.5 indicating dense vegetation. Further details about NDVI 
are available at http://earlywarning.usgs.gov/adds/readme.php?symbol=nd. 
35 In 2008 the District was broken into three new Districts: Chalbi, Laisaimis and Marsabit. 
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where mbegH ,  is monthly location average beginning herd size and season s represents 
either the LRLD (March-September) or SRSD (October-February) paired season. 
Because the livestock mortality data do not distinguish between mature and immature 
animals, mortality rates are inflated for any months in which newborn calves died in 
large number; hence our use of the maximum monthly beginning herd size in 
computing the seasonal average. Note that area average mortality rates are, by 
definition, measures of covariate livestock asset shocks within those locations. By 
insuring area average (predicted) mortality rates, IBLI addresses the covariate risk 
problem but leaves household-specific, idiosyncratic basis risk uninsured.  
There is considerable heterogeneity within the Marsabit region, as reflected in 
Table 4.1. We therefore performed statistical cluster analysis to identify locations with 
similar characteristics, generating two distinct clusters of three to four locations each 
(Figure 4.1). The Chalbi cluster is characterized by more arid climate, camel- and 
smallstock (i.e., goats and sheep) based pastoralism by the Gabra and Borana ethnic 
groups. The Laisamis cluster enjoys slightly higher (and more variable rainfall) and 
forage, hence its greater reliance on cattle and smallstock by the Samburu and 
Rendille peoples.  
Table 4.2 reports mortality rates by location.36 Locations in Chalbi (Laisamis) 
cluster experienced relatively higher and more variable mortality rate during the SRSD 
(LRLD) season. The differences are statistically significant between seasons within 
each cluster and between clusters within each season. Mortality rates are highly 
correlated within the same cluster (0.80-0.95), while correlations between clusters are 
less. As Figure 4.2 shows, the 2000 and 2005-06 years exhibited the highest mortality 
losses during this period. Mortality rates are low – uniformly less than 20%, typically 
                                                 
36 For the 7% of missing observations we interpolated monthly average livestock mortality rates using 
the other locations within the same cluster. 
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Survey Sites in Marsabit, Northern Kenya
Chalbi
Laisamis
less than 10% – outside of these severe drought periods. The frequency of area 
average mortality rates exceeding 10% is approximately 33% (a 1-in-3 year event) for 
both Chalbi and Laisamis. However, the probability of herd mortality exceeding 20% 
(30%) is approximately 15% (9%) for Chalbi in contrast to 19% (14%) for Laisamis, 
while the proportion of extreme herd mortality exceeding 50% is approximately 6% 
for Chalbi in contrast to only 2% for Laisamis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Clustered Sites in Marsabit, Northern Kenya 
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Cluster Location
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. % Camel % Cattle %Smallstock
Chalbi North Horr 237 105 131 72 75 73 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.86
Kalacha 236 105 132 85 80 72 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.85
Maikona 235 96 125 62 87 63 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.87
Laisamis Karare 367 159 206 106 133 81 0.34 0.11 0.00 0.74 0.26
Logologo 326 138 178 94 123 72 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.31 0.64
Ngurunit 255 135 147 88 88 75 0.26 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.74
Korr 255 125 146 92 89 63 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.92
Livestock Allocation (headcount)Annual rain (mm) Long rain (mm) Short rain (mm) NDVI
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics, by Cluster 
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Cluster/ No. of
Location Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Mean S.D. M>10% M>15% M>20% M>25% M>30% M>50%
Chalbi 48 10% 16% 0% 67% 7% 8% 13% 20% 0.33 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.06
North Horr 16 9% 15% 1% 59% 6% 9% 11% 20% 0.25 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.06
Kalacha 16 13% 22% 0% 67% 7% 10% 18% 29% 0.38 0.31 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.13
Maikona 16 10% 11% 0% 39% 8% 7% 13% 15% 0.38 0.31 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.00
Laisamis 64 10% 13% 0% 57% 13% 15% 8% 11% 0.33 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.02
Karare 16 15% 16% 0% 57% 17% 19% 12% 12% 0.44 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.06
Logologo 16 8% 14% 0% 42% 10% 16% 6% 12% 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.00
Ngurunit 16 8% 11% 0% 36% 11% 14% 5% 8% 0.31 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.00
Korr 16 11% 13% 1% 41% 13% 12% 9% 14% 0.38 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.00
Overall LRLD Season SRSD Season Proportion of 16 Seasons with
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Seasonal Herd Mortality Rates, 2000-2008 
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Figure 4.2 Seasonal TLU Mortality Rate by Clusters 
 
During the same period as the ALRMP data collection, the PARIMA project 
undertook an intensive household panel survey in northern Kenya and southern 
Ethiopia. Two locations – Logologo and North Horr – exist in both household data 
sets. Although the shorter duration (2000-2 only) of the PARIMA survey provides 
insufficient observations to estimate the IBLI contract model (described below), we 
can use the higher quality PARIMA data to verify the aggregate reliability of the 
ALRMP data and to evaluate the performance of the IBLI contract out-of-sample.  
Although there are very slight differences in herd data measurement, we can 
use the PARIMA data as a check on the ALRMP data by regressing season-and-
location-specific PARIMA herd mortality rates data (n=8) on ALRMP rates in a 
simple univariate linear model. We cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that the 
intercept equals zero and the slope equals one in that relation (F(2,6) = 0.01 and p-
value = 0.99). Thus the ALRMP data seem to capture area-average seasonal mortality 
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reasonably well and the PARIMA data appear suitable for out-of-sample evaluation of 
IBLI contracts based on the ALRMP herd mortality data and NDVI measures.  
We rely on NDVI data for two reasons. The first is conceptual. Catastrophic 
herd loss is a complex, unknown function of rainfall – which affects water and forage 
availability, as well as disease and predator pressure – and rangeland stocking rates – 
which affect competition for forage and water as well as disease transmission. 
Rangeland conditions manifest in vegetative cover reflect the joint state of these key 
drivers of herd dynamics. When forage is plentiful, disease and predator pressures are 
typically low and water and nutrients are adequate to prevent significant premature 
herd mortality. By contrast, when forage is scarce, whether due to overstocking, poor 
rainfall, excessive competition from wildlife, or other pressures, die-offs become 
frequent. Thus a vegetation index makes sense conceptually.   
The second reason is practical. Kenya does not have longstanding seasonal or 
annual livestock surveys of the sort used for computing area average mortality, the 
index used in the developing world’s other IBLI contract, in Mongolia. The ALRMP 
data we use in contract design are collected for the Government of Kenya, which 
might have a material interest in IBLI contract payouts, thereby rendering those data 
unsuitable as the basis for the index itself. Consistent weather data series at 
sufficiently high spatial resolution are likewise not available. The Kenya 
Meteorological Department station rainfall data for northern Kenya exhibit 
considerable discontinuities and inconsistent and unverifiable observations. Rainfall 
estimates based on satellite-based remote sensing remain controversial within climate 
science.37   
                                                 
37 Remotely sensed data capture precipitation emergent from cloud cover, not rain that lands on Earth.  
As a result, the validity of those measures remains subject to much dispute within the climate science 
community (de Goncalves et al. 2006; Kamarianakis et al. 2007).   
  85
NDVI is a satellite-derived indicator of the amount and vigor of vegetation, 
based on the observed level of photosynthetic activity (Tucker 2005). Images of NDVI 
are therefore sometimes referred to as “greenness maps.” Because pastoralists 
routinely graze animals beyond the 8 km2 resolution of the data, we average 
observations for each period within a grazing range defined as the rectangle that 
encompasses the residential locations and water points used by herders in each 
community, plus 0.02 degrees (about 10 kilometers) in each direction.38 In unobserved 
bad years, pastoralists may travel further still, but their need to do so should be 
reflected in pasture conditions within their normal grazing range. NDVI data are 
commonly used to compare the current state of vegetation with previous time periods 
in order to detect anomalous conditions and to anticipate drought (Peters et al. 2002; 
Bayarjargal et al. 2006) and have now been used by many studies that apply remote 
sensing data to drought management (Kogan 1990, 1995; Benedetti and Rossini 1993; 
Hayes and Decker 1996; Rasmussen 1997).  
 
4.4 Designing Vegetation Index Based Livestock Insurance for Northern     
Kenya    
 
Recent research finds that humanitarian emergencies in this region – indicated by 
widespread severe child malnutrition – can be predicted reasonably accurately several 
months in advance. Furthermore, the recent droughts with dire consequences – in 
1997, 2000 and 2005-06 – were all characterized not only by low rainfall, but also by 
                                                 
38 To define location boundary for the three locations with available GPS for water points, we first 
identified GPS bound on each side of the rectangular among all the available GPS points and extended 
0.02 degree (around 10 km.) to each side of the GPS bound. And thus, eastbound of the rectangular = 
max (the available GPS Y-coordinate) +0.02, westbound = min (the available GPS Y-coordinate) - 
0.02, northbound of the rectangular = max (the available GPS X-coordinate) +0.02 and southbound = 
min (the available GPS X-coordinate) - 0.02. The result for each location is a rectangle boundary 
containing all the common water points, GPS of representative households in the ALRMP survey and 
the current household-level survey in each location. 
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the spatial extent and duration of the low rainfall event and its effects on rangeland 
conditions (Chantarat et al. 2007; Mude et al. forthcoming). The apparent 
predictability of these episodes motivates our approach to IBLI design based on 
predicted livestock mortality.  
In order to confirm the appropriateness of our approach to IBLI contract 
design, from May-August 2008 we undertook extensive community discussions in 
five locations in Marsabit District, surveyed and performed field experiments with 210 
households in those same locations. Chantarat et al. (2009c) and Lybbert et al. (2009) 
describe those studies, which confirmed (i) pastoralists’ keen interest in an IBLI 
product, (ii) their comprehension of the basic features of the IBLI product we explain 
below, and (iii) significant willingness to pay for the product at commercially viable 
premium rates. Pastoralists in these communities worry about livestock loss, clearly 
associated this with pasture conditions, and readily accept the idea that greenness 
measures gathered from satellites (“the stars that move at night” in local dialectics) 
can reliably signal drought and significant livestock mortality. With demand for an 
IBLI product established, we proceed now with the specifics of contract design. 
 
4.4.1   Contract Design    
 
We design a seasonal contract covering the LRLD or SRSD season, each 
encompassing a rainy and dry season pair. Insurance contracts are sold (for 
approximately two months) just before the start of the rainy season and are assessed at 
the end of the dry period to determine whether indemnity payments are to be made. 
Contracts are specified per tropical livestock unit (TLU) at a pre-agreed value per 
TLU. Pastoralist clients choose the total livestock value to insure, pay the associated 
premium to the insurance broker and receive indemnity payments proportionate to 
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their IBLI coverage in the event of a payout. The contract is specific at the location 
level, based on the predicted mortality rate as a function of the vegetation index 
specific to the grazing range of that location. It is also possible to design a one-year 
contract covering two consecutive seasonal contracts, consisting of two potential 
trigger payments per year (at the end of each dry season), although we focus here on 
the seasonal contracts. Figure 4.3 depicts the temporal structure of the IBLI contract.   
The index on which the insurance contract is written is the predicted area 
average mortality rate, defined as a function of the NDVI-based vegetation index. 
Because NDVI data are available in real time, the predicted mortality index can be 
updated continuously over the course of the contract period. We express the index in 
terms of percentage predicted mortality instead of NDVI in order to expressly link the 
index to the insurable interest of contract holders.   
The livestock mortality index that underpins IBLI is designed as follows. Write 
the realized aggregate TLU mortality rate of pastoralist household i in location l over 
season s as  
                             ( ) ilsllsiilils MMMM εβ +−+=                            (4.2) 
 
where ilM  reflects household i’s long-term average mortality rate, lsM  is the area 
average mortality rate at location l over season s, lM  is the long-term mean rate in 
location l and ilsε  reflects the idiosyncratic component of household i’s herd losses 
(e.g., from conflict, accident, etc.) experienced during season s, i.e., the household-
specific basis risk. The parameter iβ  determines how closely household i’s livestock 
mortality losses track the area average. If 1=iβ  then household i’s livestock losses 
closely track the area average, while 0=iβ means i’s mortality losses are statistically 
independent of the area average. Over the whole location, the expected value of iβ  is 
necessary one.  
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Figure 4.3 Temporal Structure of IBLI Contract 
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IBLI insures only the covariate component of ilsM  that is associated with the 
observable vegetation index. The area average livestock mortality rate, lsM , can be 
orthogonally decomposed into the systematic risk associated with the vegetation index 
and the risk driven by other factors: 
 
                                 ( ) lslsls ndviXMM ε+= )(                            (4.3) 
 
where )( lsndviX  represents a transformation of the average NDVI observed over 
season s in location l, lsndvi  – which we discuss below – )(⋅M  represents the 
statistically predicted relationship between )( lsndviX  and lsM , and lsε  is the 
idiosyncratic components of area average mortality that is not explained by )( lsndviX  
– i.e., location-specific basis risk. We predict area average mortality from observations 
of lsndvi , specific to each location l and season s, as: 
 
                                       ( ))(ˆ lsls ndviXMM =                            (4.4) 
 
which serves as the underlying index for insurance contract. There are thus two 
sources of basis risk: (i) the household’s idiosyncratic losses that are uncorrelated with 
area average losses according to (4.2) and (ii) area average mortality losses that are not 
correlated with the vegetation index, according to (4.3).  
IBLI then functions like a put option on predicted area average mortality rate. 
The seasonal contract pays an indemnity beyond the contractually-specified strike 
mortality level, *lM , conditional on the realization of lsMˆ according to: 
 
             ( ) ( ) TLUllsTLUllsls PTLUMMMaxPTLUMM ××−=Π 0,ˆ,,|ˆ **          (4.5) 
 
where TLU is the total TLU insured and TLUP  is the pre-agreed value of 1 TLU, so 
their product reflecting the insured value. The expected insurance payout and hence 
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the actuarially fair premium for this contract insuring TLUPTLU ×  of totally livestock 
value can be written as  
 
            ( ) ( )( ) TLUllsTLUllsls PTLUMMMaxEPTLUMMP ××−= 0,ˆ,,|ˆ **          (4.6) 
 
where )(⋅E  is the expectation operator taken over the distribution of the vegetation 
index and so we can write ( ))0,ˆ()|ˆ( ** llsllsls MMMaxEMMp −=  as the actuarially fair 
premium rate quoted as percentage of total value of livestock insured.   
Similarly, total insurance payout at the end of year t for a one-year (two 
season) contract can be written as: 
 
         ( ) ( ) TLU
ts
llsTLUltlslt PTLUMMMaxPTLUMM ××−=Π ∑
∈
∈ 0,ˆ,,|ˆ
**          (4.7) 
 . 
We favor the seasonal contract payout – in contrast to a yearly payout – because 
pastoralists’ financial illiquidity typically means that catastrophic herd losses threaten 
human nutrition and health in the absence of prompt response. The rapid response 
capacity of seasonal insurance contracts is one of the great appeals of this approach to 
drought risk management as compared to reliance on food aid shipments, which 
typically involve lags of five months or more after the emergence of a disaster 
(Chantarat et al. 2007).  
  
4.4.2   Variable Construction and Estimation of the Predictive Models     
 
In order to specify the contract, we need to estimate the )(⋅X  and )(⋅M  functions. In 
estimating )(⋅X  we first must control for differences in geography (e.g., elevation, 
hydrology, soil types) across our locations. We thus use standardized NDVI, zndvi : 
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                            ( )( )idtd
idtdidt
idt ndvi
ndviEndvi
zndvi σ
−=                                (4.8) 
 
where idtndvi  is the NDVI for pixel i for dekad d of year t, )( idtd ndviE  is the long-
term mean of NDVI values for dekad d of pixel i taken over 1982-2008 and 
)( idtd ndviσ  is the long-term standard deviation of NDVI values for dekad d of pixel i 
taken over 1982-2008. Positive (negative) idtzndvi  represents relatively better (worse) 
vegetation conditions relative to the long-term mean. Figure 4.4 depicts the NDVI and 
zndvi  series for the Marsabit locations.  
We are now in the position to estimate the predictive relationship )(⋅M  that 
maps area-average seasonal livestock mortality onto zndvi. But unlike crop yields that 
respond only to current season climate variables, livestock mortality can be the result 
of several seasons’ cumulative effects (Chantarat et al. 2008). The lagged effects of 
exogenous variables raise a difficult tradeoff, however.  Price stability is appealing 
from a product marketing perspective. Yet seasonal variation in premium rates in 
response to changing initial conditions, enables insurers to guard against intertemporal 
adverse selection problems that may arise if prospective contract purchasers 
understand the state-dependence of livestock mortality probabilities.   
So as to minimize the tradeoff between price instability and intertemporal 
adverse selection, we model the predictive relationship using the shortest lag structure 
possible – including of only result from the preceding season – that still allows us to 
control for path-dependence. We estimate a regime-switching regression model with 
multiple regressors based on different functions of cumulative zndvi beginning during 
the paired season before the contract period begins. We now explain each of these 
variables in turn.  
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Figure 4.4  NDVI and zndvi  for Locations in Marsabit, by Clusters 
 
The cumulative variables we use are constructed as follows. All are depicted in 
Figure 4.5, which matches the seasonal IBLI contract structure with these cumulative 
vegetation index regressors. The first we discuss is the regime switching variable, 
which allows for there to exist different relationships between idtzndvi  and area 
average livestock mortality depending on whether it is a good or bad season. Because 
we want this variable to be unobserved by all parties when the contract is struck, we 
use the year-long cumulative dekadal zndvi from the beginning of the last rainy season 
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until the end of the contract season. Thus, for the LRLD (SRSD) contract season, 
stposCzndvi _  runs from the first dekad of October (March), until the end of the 
contract period season, i.e., the last dekad of September (February):  
 
                                ∑
∈
=
s
posTd
dss zndviposCzndvi _                            (4.9) 
 
where  sposT   = October – September (March – February) if s = LRLD (SRSD). When 
stposCzndvi _  is negative, this implies a worse than normal year, so we loosely term 
the regime 0_ <stposCzndvi  a “bad climate year,” although this could be due to 
stocking rate or other drivers, not just precipitation.  We observe that all past major 
droughts fell into this regime.  
Thus, we estimate the relationship in (4.3) for each cluster as: 
 
   ( ) lslsls ndviXMM 1111 )( ε+=    if γ≥lsposCzndvi _     (good climate regime)     (4.10) 
   ( ) lslsls ndviXMM 2222 )( ε+=   if γ<lsposCzndvi _     (bad climate regime) 
 
where lsposCzndvi _ determines the climate regime into which each season belongs: a 
good-climate regime ( 0_ >lsposCzndvi ) or a bad one ( 0_ <lsposCzndvi ). Here,γ  
is the critical threshold to be determined endogenously.39 Appendix A.1 displays 
descriptive statistics of the regressors and mortality data by regime.  
The second cumulative vegetation index variable captures the state of the 
rangeland at the commencement of the contract period. This variable, spreCzndvi _ , 
captures cumulative zndvi from the start of the preceding rainy season until the start of 
the contract season, i.e., for LRLD (SRSD) contracts based on cumulative zndvi from 
                                                 
39 We verified the intuition that γ =0 by solving for the threshold value γ that maximizes goodness of 
fit in estimating equation (11) and confirmed that it is indeed γ =0. 
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the first dekad of October (March) – the start of the preceding short (long) rains – until 
the first dekad of March (October), as follows: 
 
                                ∑
∈
=
s
preTd
dss zndvipreCzndvi _                             (4.11) 
 
where spreT  = October – March (March – October) if s = LRLD (SRSD). Since more 
degraded initial conditions drive up the likelihood of livestock mortality, this variable 
should negatively affect predicted area average seasonal mortality. Because the insurer 
must set the price before prospective IBLI purchasers make their insurance decisions, 
the latter may have superior information, leading to some level of intertemporal 
adverse selection. Because most of the observations are known ex ante to both parties, 
however, that effect should be minimal.  
The third and fourth variables build on the concept of cooling or heating 
degree days used in weather derivatives contracts. These capture the accumulation of 
negative (positive) zndvi over the period of the current season, e.g., March-September 
(October- February) for LRLD (SRSD) season, respectively. The negative cumulative 
measures variable is 
 
                               ∑
∈
=
sTd
dss zndviMinCNzndvi )0,(                           (4.12) 
 
while the positive cumulative effects analog variable is 
 
                                ∑
∈
=
sTd
dss zndviMaxCPzndvi )0,(                           (4.13) 
 
where   sT  = March – September (October – February) if s = LRLD (SRSD). These 
capture the cumulative intensity of adverse (favorable) dekads within the contract 
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period. Catastrophic drought seasons routinely exhibit a continuous downward trend in 
cumulative zndvi , leading to a large value for CNzndvi, which should have a 
significantly positive impact on mortality. Similarly, CPzndvi permits us to control for 
post-drought recovery, when stocking rates have fallen and thus rangelands recover 
quickly, a phenomenon typically reflected in upward trending cumulative zndvi . This 
was the pattern observed, for example, in the SRSD seasons of 2001 and 2006 
following catastrophic droughts the preceding LRLD seasons. Since these two 
variables capture only observations after the contract is struck, there is no information 
asymmetry with respect to these variables. Based on the Czndvi  path, it thus captures 
not only the adverse climate impact resulted from the preceding and current rain 
season, but also the intensity of adverse climate.  
These cumulative vegetation indices effectively capture the myriad, complex 
interactions between climate and stocking rates, reflected in rangeland conditions, and 
livestock mortality rates. We estimate simple linear regressions within each of the two 
regimes using the most parsimonious specification that fits the data well. With only 
eight years’ data available for each location, limited degrees of freedom preclude 
estimating location-specific predictive models. Insurance companies would be 
unlikely to implement contracts at such high spatial resolution anyway, so this is not a 
serious problem. We therefore pool locations within the same cluster – treating each 
location’s data as an iid draw from the same cluster-specific distribution – to estimate 
a cluster-specific predictive relationship, which we term a “response function”. We 
also pool data for both LRLD and SRSD seasons but include a seasonal dummy to 
control for the potential differences across the two seasons. 
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Figure 4.5 Temporal Structure of IBLI Contract and Vegetation Regressors 
 
 
4.5 Estimation Results and Out-of-sample Performance Evaluation   
 
The estimation results for equation (4.10) are reported in Table 4.3. These models 
explain area average mortality reasonably well, with an adjusted r2 of 52% and 61% 
for Chalbi and Laisamis clusters, respectively. Livestock mortality patterns in the good 
climate regime are very difficult to explain, with no statistically significant 
relationship between any regressor and livestock mortality. Of course, this makes 
intuitive sense as variation in good range conditions should not have a systematic 
effect on livestock survival.   
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Number of observations 48 Number of observations 64
R-squared 0.5689 R-squared 0.6554
Adj R-squared 0.5187 Adj R-squared 0.6062
Mortality Coeff. Std.Err Mortality Coeff. Std.Err
Czndvi_pos 0.0024 0.0018 Czndvi_pre -0.0003 0.0028
CNzndvi 0.0087 0.0081
CPzndvi 0.0013 0.0024
SRSD 0.0147 0.0402
Mortality Coeff. Std.Err Mortality Coeff. Std.Err
Czndvi_pre -0.0187*** 0.0051 Czndvi_pre -0.0093*** 0.0024
CNzndvi 0.0018 0.0033 CNzndvi 0.0117*** 0.0022
CPzndvi -0.0064 0.0087 CPzndvi -0.0111** 0.0049
SRSD 0.0354 0.0564 SRSD -0.0446* 0.0299
Bad-climate regime (Czndvi_pos<0)Bad-climate regime (Czndvi_pos<0)
Chalbi Model Laisamis Model
Good-climate regime (Czndvi_pos>=0) Good-climate regime (Czndvi_pos>=0)
In the bad climate regime, however, we see precisely the patterns anticipated.  
The initial state of the system, as reflected in preCzndvi _ , has a very strong, 
statistically significant negative effect on mortality rates; the “less bad” the recent 
rangeland conditions when the insurance contract period falls into the bad climate 
regime, the lower is observed herd mortality. Similarly, the greater the intensity of 
positive (negative) spells during the season, as reflected in CPzndvi (CNzndvi ), the 
lower (higher) herd mortality rates, although those coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant only in Laisamis cluster, where pastoralists are less migratory 
and thus brief spells of favorable conditions are less likely to attract transhumant herd 
movements to take advantage of transiently available forage and water.    
 
 
Table 4.3 Regime Switching Model Estimates of Area Average Livestock Mortality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *, **, *** for statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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The regression coefficient estimates are themselves of limited interest, 
however.  The real question is whether the predictions of livestock mortality prove 
sufficiently accurate to serve as a reasonable foundation for livestock insurance for the 
region. In addition to the basis risk portion of livestock mortality in the region that the 
model inherently cannot explain, there is also the possibility of specification error if 
the model specification and parameters chosen based on the ALRMP sample 
imperfectly reflect the true state of the system in explaining area average livestock 
mortality. One, therefore, wants to test how significant those errors are when new data 
are taken to the predictive model that generates the index on which IBLI is based.  
The limited size of the ALRMP sample precludes setting aside some of those 
data for out of sample performance evaluation. But we can use the PARIMA survey 
data, which cover four seasons (2000-2002) in four locations (Kargi and North Horr in 
Chalbi cluster, and Logologo and Dirib Gumbo in Laisamis cluster) in the same 
region, but were not used to estimate the predictive model,40 to test out of sample 
forecast accuracy. Predicted area average mortality rates for these locations were then 
constructed based on the established cluster-specific response functions and location-
specific NDVI data.  
Define forecast error as the difference between actual area average mortality 
rate less the predicted mortality rate. A positive forecast error thus implies 
underprediction of the mortality rate, which would favor insurers; a negative error 
indicates overprediction of mortality, which could benefit insurance holders. Table 4.4 
reports the distributions of out of sample forecast errors by cluster. In each case, 7/8 
(88%) of errors were less than 10% in absolute magnitude, with one single observation 
                                                 
40 Kargi and Dirib Gombo are also not the locations we studied in the forecasting model, though their 
common characteristics fit them in their respective cluster. 
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Error Magnitude
(absolute value) Chalbi Model Laisamis Model
Under prediction
< 5% 0.13 0.50
5-10% 0.25 0.25
10-15% 0.00 0.00
15-20% 0.00 0.00
20-25% 0.00 0.00
>25% 0.00 0.13
Over prediction
< 5% 0.38 0.13
5-10% 0.13 0.00
10-15% 0.00 0.00
15-20% 0.00 0.00
20-25% 0.00 0.00
>25% 0.13 0.00
Total 1.00 1.00
Proportion of Sample 
off by more than 25%, an under-(over-)prediction in Dirib Gumbo (North Horr) in the 
2000 SRSD season.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Out of Sample Forecast Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Out of sample errors are based on 2000-2002 PARIMA data for North Horr and Kargi in Chalbi 
cluster and Logologo and Dirib Gombo for Laisamis cluster. 
 
 
We also tested the performance of the IBLI contract in correctly triggering 
decision for insurance payouts at different strike levels. The errors of greatest concern 
are when the insured are paid when they should not be (type 1 error) or not paid when 
they should have been (type 2 error). Table 4.5 reports those results. The minimum 
frequency of correct decisions out of sample is 75%, with 94% overall accuracy 
(averaging Chalbi and Laisamis clusters) at a strike level of 15% mortality on the IBLI 
contract.  
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Cluster Strike
Correct decision
Type I error Type II error
Chalbi 10% 0.75 0.25 0.00
15% 0.88 0.00 0.13
20% 0.75 0.00 0.25
25% 0.88 0.00 0.13
30% 0.88 0.00 0.13
Laisamis 10% 1.00 0.00 0.00
15% 1.00 0.00 0.00
20% 0.75 0.25 0.00
25% 0.75 0.25 0.00
30% 0.75 0.25 0.00
Proportion of Sample
Incorrect decision
 
Table 4.5 Testing Indemnity Payment Errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Out of sample errors are based on 2000-2002 PARIMA data for North Horr and Kargi in Chalbi 
cluster and Logologo and Dirib Gombo for Laisamis cluster. 
 
 
As another diagnostic over a longer period, we compare well-known severe 
drought events reported by communities with the predicted area average mortality 
constructed using their available dekadal NDVI data from 1982-2008. We find the 
predicted mortality index time series quite accurately capture the regional drought 
events of 1984, 1991-92, 1994, 1996, 2000 and 2005-06, predicting average herd 
mortality rates of 20-40% during those seasons and never generating predictions 
beyond 10% in seasons when communities indicate no severe drought occurred.41 This 
is a more statistically casual approach to forecast evaluation, but encompasses a longer 
time period and we find it effective for communicating to local stakeholders the 
potential to use statistical models to accurately capture average livestock mortality 
experience for the purposes of writing IBLI contracts. 
                                                 
41 Figures depicting the time series of predicted mortality, by location, are available from the authors by 
request, so as related statistics of other locations considered in this paper. 
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4.6 Pricing and Risk Exposure Analysis   
 
The predicted mortality profiles just describe are a key input for determining the 
distribution of predicted area average herd mortality rates – a vegetation-based 
livestock index for IBLI – and thus the actuarially fair price of IBLI based on 
historical data. Summary statistics of the main locations are shown in Table 4.6. On 
average, predicted mortality is lower in Laisamis than in Chalbi, with higher predicted 
mortality and larger variability during the SRSD (LRLD) season in Chalbi (Laisamis) 
cluster and higher probability of indemnity payout for any strike level in Chalbi than 
in Laisamis.  
We can now price IBLI. There are two comparable approaches to pricing an 
insurance contract, based on different underlying distributions. The first is a simple 
historical burn rate approach, in which the contract is priced based purely on the 
available historical distribution of vegetation data. The second is the simulation 
approach, which involves first estimation parametrically or semi-parametrically the 
distributions of the underlying vegetation index ( zndvi ) and then pricing the contracts 
based on those estimated distributions. The second approach has the advantage of 
assigning non-zero probabilities to events that may not appear in the available 
historical data, but the disadvantage of assigning probabilities based on estimating 
probabilities without knowing the true data generating process.  
In this paper, we report the historical burn rate pricing based on 27 years of 
available NDVI data because (i) those data seem adequate to capture most of the 
relevant risk experience in the system, (ii) the insurance companies in the region 
primarily use the burn rate approach to pricing, and (iii) our preliminary attempts at 
estimating the underlying density function generate the observed NDVI data – which 
exhibit seemingly complex autoregressive and nonstationary properties – were 
unconvincing to us; so we leave parametric pricing of the contracts for future research.   
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Cluster/ No. of
Location Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Mean S.D. M>10% M>15% M>20% M>25% M>30%
Chalbi 162 10% 10% 0% 37% 8% 8% 13% 11% 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.04
North Horr 54 9% 11% 0% 37% 7% 8% 12% 13% 0.34 0.28 0.21 0.11 0.06
Kalacha 54 11% 10% 0% 36% 8% 9% 14% 11% 0.45 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.06
Maikona 54 10% 9% 0% 31% 7% 7% 12% 10% 0.42 0.30 0.19 0.06 0.02
Laisamis 216 8% 9% 0% 34% 10% 9% 7% 7% 0.29 0.21 0.12 0.06 0.02
Karare 54 8% 8% 0% 34% 9% 9% 6% 6% 0.28 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.02
Logologo 54 9% 8% 0% 30% 11% 10% 8% 7% 0.34 0.28 0.15 0.06 0.02
Ngurunit 54 8% 9% 0% 34% 10% 9% 6% 7% 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.04
Korr 54 9% 9% 0% 31% 11% 10% 6% 7% 0.32 0.25 0.13 0.06 0.02
Overall LRLD Season SRSD Season Proportion of 16 Seasons with
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 Predicted Seasonal Mortality Rates, 1982-2008 
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4.6.1   Unconditional Pricing    
 
We consider first a seasonal contract that makes indemnity payouts in either season 
(SRSD or LRLD). The actuarially fair premium rate per season quoted as percentage 
of insured herd value for location l in season s covering the difference between the 
(predicted area average herd mortality) index, lsMˆ , and the contractual strike level 
*
lM can be written as: 
 
                    ( ) ( )∑
=
−=
S
s
llslsllsls MzndviMMaxS
MMp
1
** 0,)(ˆ1|ˆ                  (4.14) 
 
where we average results over S = 54 seasons of available NDVI data. If one assumes 
that a proportional premium load 0>α  is applied to the actuarially fair premium to 
cover other risk and transaction costs, then the loaded premium simply becomes 
)|ˆ()1( *llsls MMpα+ .  
Table 4.7 reports the fair insurance premium rates (%), their standard 
deviations and US dollar equivalent premia per TLU insured42 for seasonal contracts 
with various strikes for locations. Because episodes of high die-offs are more frequent 
in Chalbi than in Laisamis (Table 4.6), fair premium rates are likewise higher there. 
But the rates are reasonable, only 2-5% of the insured livestock value for the coverage 
beyond 10% mortality per season and 1-2% of the insured livestock value for coverage 
beyond 20% mortality per season.  
 
 
 
                                                 
42 The dollar premium values are computed according to TLUllsls PMMp ⋅)|ˆ( *  at November 2008 
exchange rates (79.2KSh/US$) assuming an average value per TLU of KSh12,000, which is 
approximately US$150, per data we collected in these locations in summer 2008. 
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Cluster/
Location
p S.D.(p) p S.D.(p) p S.D.(p) p S.D.(p) p S.D.(p) 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Chalbi 
North Horr 4.3% 7.5% 2.8% 5.5% 1.5% 3.8% 0.7% 2.3% 0.3% 1.2% $6.5 $4.2 $2.3 $1.0 $0.4
Kalacha 4.9% 7.2% 2.9% 5.4% 1.5% 3.6% 0.6% 2.0% 0.2% 0.9% $7.4 $4.4 $2.3 $0.9 $0.3
Maikona 3.7% 5.9% 2.0% 4.1% 0.9% 2.4% 0.3% 1.1% 0.0% 0.2% $5.6 $3.0 $1.3 $0.4 $0.0
Laisamis
Karare 2.2% 4.9% 1.1% 3.3% 0.5% 2.1% 0.2% 1.3% 0.1% 0.6% $3.3 $1.7 $0.7 $0.3 $0.1
Logologo 3.4% 5.6% 1.8% 3.7% 0.7% 2.0% 0.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% $5.0 $2.7 $1.1 $0.2 $0.0
Ngurunit 2.6% 6.0% 1.6% 4.4% 0.9% 2.9% 0.4% 1.7% 0.1% 0.7% $3.9 $2.4 $1.3 $0.6 $0.2
Korr 3.1% 5.7% 1.7% 3.8% 0.7% 2.2% 0.2% 1.0% 0.0% 0.2% $4.7 $2.6 $1.1 $0.3 $0.0
% Premium Rate (p) US$ Premium/TLU 
At Strike (M*)M* = 30%M* = 10% M* = 15% M* = 20% M* = 25%
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 Unconditional Fair Seasonal Premium Rates at Various Strike Levels 
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We next consider a one-year contract comprised of two seasonal contracts (and 
thus two possible payouts per year). The actuarially fair premium rate (%) is:  
 
                 ( ) ( )∑∑
= ∈
−=
T
t ts
llslsllslt MzndviMMaxT
MMp
1
** 0,)(ˆ1|ˆ                  (4.15) 
 
where T covers the available 27 years of data. The fair premium rates (%), standard 
deviations and US dollar equivalent premia per TLU are reported in the top panel of 
Table 4.8. Intuitively, the annual premium is roughly twice as much as the seasonal 
premium. Fair annual premium rates decline as the strike mortality increases, e.g., 
from 5-9% at a strike of 15%, to 3-5% for strike mortality of 20%, to just 1-3% at a 
strike of 20%. By having pastoralists retain the layer of small risks, index insurance 
appears affordable even in the face of recurring severe droughts. Depending on the 
pastoralist’s location and chosen strike rate, a herder needs to sell one goat or sheep to 
pay for annual insurance on 1-10 camels or cattle, an expense they appear willing to 
incur (Chantarat et al. 2009b and 2009c).  
   
4.6.2   Conditional Pricing    
 
Because expected mortality depends on the state of the system, the probability of 
catastrophic herd loss increases with rangeland vegetation conditions observable prior 
to the contract purchase. In order to guard against intertemporal adverse selection, 
insurers might adjust insurance premia accordingly. The simplest way is to price the 
contract conditional on the observed cumulative zndvi  from the beginning of the last 
rainy season until the beginning of the sale period, lsbegCzndvi _ , covering the 
preceding October-December (March – July) for LRLD (SRSD) contracts, assuming a 
two month sales period in January-February (August-September).  
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Location
p S.D.(p ) p S.D.(p ) p S.D.(p ) p S.D.(p ) p S.D.(p ) 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Unconditional
North Horr 8.8% 11.7% 5.7% 8.2% 3.2% 5.2% 1.4% 3.2% 0.5% 1.6% $13.2 $8.6 $4.7 $2.1 $0.8
Kalacha 9.8% 11.2% 5.8% 8.0% 3.1% 5.0% 1.3% 2.8% 0.4% 1.3% $14.7 $8.6 $4.6 $1.9 $0.5
Maikona 7.5% 8.9% 4.1% 5.8% 1.8% 3.3% 0.5% 1.6% 0.1% 0.3% $11.3 $6.1 $2.7 $0.8 $0.1
Karare 4.2% 7.3% 2.2% 4.6% 0.9% 2.9% 0.4% 1.8% 0.2% 0.8% $6.4 $3.3 $1.4 $0.5 $0.2
Logologo 6.5% 8.6% 3.5% 5.5% 1.4% 2.8% 0.3% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% $9.8 $5.3 $2.1 $0.4 $0.0
Ngurunit 5.2% 10.1% 3.2% 7.5% 1.7% 5.2% 0.8% 3.1% 0.3% 1.2% $7.8 $4.9 $2.6 $1.3 $0.4
Korr 6.1% 9.2% 3.4% 6.2% 1.4% 3.8% 0.4% 1.6% 0.1% 0.3% $9.2 $5.1 $2.1 $0.7 $0.1
Conditional on observed Czndvi_beg>=0 before the sale period
North Horr 4.7% 8.4% 3.3% 6.4% 2.0% 4.5% 1.0% 2.9% 0.4% 1.5% $7.1 $4.9 $3.0 $1.5 $0.6
Kalacha 5.5% 7.6% 3.1% 5.6% 1.7% 3.7% 0.7% 1.9% 0.1% 0.6% $8.3 $4.7 $2.5 $1.1 $0.2
Maikona 5.0% 7.1% 2.9% 4.9% 1.3% 3.2% 0.5% 1.6% 0.1% 0.3% $7.5 $4.3 $1.9 $0.7 $0.1
Karare 1.2% 4.1% 0.6% 1.9% 0.2% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $1.8 $0.9 $0.2 $0.0 $0.0
Logologo 1.9% 4.0% 0.7% 1.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $2.8 $1.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Ngurunit 0.7% 2.3% 0.2% 1.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $1.1 $0.3 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Korr 1.4% 3.4% 0.3% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% $2.2 $0.5 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Conditional on observed Czndvi_beg<0 before the sale period
North Horr 12.0% 13.0% 7.6% 9.0% 4.1% 5.7% 1.7% 3.4% 0.6% 1.7% $18.0 $11.4 $6.1 $2.6 $0.9
Kalacha 12.5% 12.4% 7.4% 8.9% 4.0% 5.5% 1.6% 3.2% 0.5% 1.6% $18.7 $11.1 $6.0 $2.4 $0.7
Maikona 9.0% 9.6% 4.8% 6.2% 2.1% 3.4% 0.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.2% $13.5 $7.2 $3.1 $0.8 $0.1
Karare 6.8% 8.5% 3.6% 5.7% 1.6% 3.8% 0.7% 2.4% 0.3% 1.1% $10.2 $5.5 $2.4 $1.0 $0.4
Logologo 9.9% 9.5% 5.6% 6.3% 2.4% 3.4% 0.5% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% $14.9 $8.4 $3.7 $0.7 $0.0
Ngurunit 9.3% 12.6% 6.0% 9.6% 3.3% 6.9% 1.6% 4.1% 0.5% 1.6% $13.9 $9.0 $5.0 $2.4 $0.8
Korr 9.3% 10.6% 5.5% 7.4% 2.3% 4.7% 0.7% 2.1% 0.1% 0.4% $13.9 $8.2 $3.5 $1.1 $0.1
% Premium Rate (p ) US$ Premium/TLU 
At Strike (M*)M* = 10% M* = 15% M* = 20% M* = 25% M* = 30%
Table 4.8 Unconditional Vs. Conditional Fair Annual Premium Rates 
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( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ≥−=≥ ∑∈ 0_|)0,ˆ(0_,|ˆ ** lsts llslsllslt begCzndviMMMaxEbegCzndviMMp
( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ <−=< ∑∈ 0_|)0,ˆ(0_,|ˆ ** lsts llslsllslt begCzndviMMMaxEbegCzndviMMp
Using the regime threshold 0_ =lsbegCzndvi  analogous to that found in our 
earlier estimation, the two conditional annual premia based are simply: 
(4.16) 
     
 
    . 
 
As Table 4.8 shows, the two conditional premia vary markedly. When the ex ante 
rangeland state is favorable, premia are only 2-5% for contracts with a 10% strike. But 
when the state of nature is bad, those rates jump to 9-11%. Given marketing and 
political considerations, it is unclear whether insurers will be willing to vary IBLI 
premia in response to changing ex ante range conditions, leaving open a real 
possibility of intertemporal adverse selection issues.  
    
4.6.3   Risk Exposure of the Underwriter    
 
As we discussed in the introduction to this paper, covariate risk exposure is a major 
reason why private insurance fails to emerge in areas like northern Kenya, where 
climatic shocks like droughts lead to widespread catastrophic losses. IBLI to provide 
covariate asset risk insurance can effectively address the uninsured risk problem faced 
by pastoralists only if underwriters can manage the covariate risk effectively, perhaps 
through reinsurance markets or securitization of risk exposure (e.g., in catastrophe 
bonds). We now explore the potential underwriter risk exposure of the proposed IBLI 
contract.  
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We estimate underwriter risk exposure under the following assumptions. First, 
we assume equal insurance participation covering 500 TLU in each of ten locations43 
in Marsabit district for a total liability of $75,000/location. A standard insurance loss 
ratio ( )tL  for a portfolio in year t that consists of L locations’ coverage is 
 
∑
∑
∈
∈
Ρ
Π
=
Ll
lt
Ll
lt
tL                                    (4.17) 
 
where ltΠ represents the total indemnity payments in year t for the total liability in 
location l and ltΡ  is the total pure premium collected. The loss ratio thus provides a 
good estimate of the covariate risk that remains after pooling risk across locations. 
When 1>tL  the pure premiums would not have covered total indemnity payments 
that year.  
Appendix A.2 reports yearly loss ratios for various strike levels and under 
conditional and unconditional pricing. Over the full period, loss ratio exceeds one 
roughly one year in three, and sometimes for several years in a row (e.g., 2004-7 in 
Chalbi contracts) or by a very large margin (e.g., 2.5-6.4 in 2005). Pooling risk 
between the two clusters reduces variation in the loss ratio and thus underwriter risk 
exposure.  
Table 4.9 reports the probability distribution of the yearly loss ratios associated 
with underwriting contracts with different strikes and (conditional or unconditional) 
pricing for the full set of ten locations. The loss ratio over a τ - year time period of the 
insurance portfolio that covers L locations is calculated as44 
                                                 
43 These ten locations are the seven used for index construction plus three others in which we have 
gathered household and NDVI data; Kargi in Chalbi cluster and Dirib Gumbo in Laisamis cluster with 
PARIMA (also used in out-of-sample tests) and Balesa in Chalbi cluster with ALRMP’s phase II data 
available from January 2005. Value per TLU in each location is again assumed at $150.  
44 We abstract away from the need to discount the financial variables over time. 
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lt
t Ll
lt
L                                    (4.18) 
 
As Table 4.9 indicates, for the most exposed case of 10% strike contracts with 
unconditional premium pricing, the single year risk of a loss ratio greater than 2 is 
26%, but this falls to just 8% with two year pooling and to zero when risk is pooled 
over a five-year period. Of course, the reduced loss exposure risk necessarily comes at 
the cost of lower probability of large profits from the contract. Figure 4.6 presents a 
sample cumulative distribution of the loss ratios reported in Table 4.9, clearly showing 
how a state-conditional pricing – which allows insurers to collect more premium in the 
seasons with high probability of indemnity payout – and longer-term commitment – 
which allows insurers to average out extreme losses and gains over time – each reduce 
extreme outcomes sharply.45 Of course, with premium loadings, underwriter risk 
exposure would further be reduced further relative to these estimates based on pure 
premia.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Due to asymmetry in the distributions of loss ratio – skewness associated with low probability of 
extremely high loss ratio – the cumulative distribution functions in each panel of Figure 4.6, therefore, 
do not all intersect at 1 at 50% cumulative probability. 
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Probability
of Loss Ratio
1 2 5 1 2 5 1 2 5 1 2 5 1 2 5 1 2 5
Less than 0.5 0.52 0.38 0.13 0.59 0.42 0.30 0.63 0.38 0.26 0.44 0.31 0.13 0.63 0.42 0.13 0.63 0.46 0.26
Between 0.5 to 1 0.15 0.12 0.48 0.07 0.12 0.39 0.00 0.31 0.57 0.22 0.27 0.52 0.00 0.19 0.52 0.07 0.19 0.57
Between 1 to 2 0.07 0.42 0.39 0.11 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.04 0.16 0.35 0.36 0.15 0.31 0.45 0.11 0.14 0.04
Between 2 to 3 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.13
Greater than 3 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.00
Years of risk poolingYears of risk poolingYears of risk poolingYears of risk poolingYears of risk poolingYears of risk pooling
Unconditional Premium Conditional Premium
Strike = 10% Strike = 20% Strike = 25% Strike = 10% Strike = 20% Strike = 25%
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 Distribution of Estimated Loss Ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The shaded zone represents the scenario when underwriter experiences loss (loss ratio greater than 1). 
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Figure 4.6 Loss Ratio Cumulative Distributions, by Pricing, Strike and Number of Years Risk Pooled 
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Strike
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
10% 49% 83% 32% 53%
15% 53% 95% 35% 60%
20% 56% 108% 36% 66%
25% 59% 134% 42% 85%
30% 68% 162% 49% 115%
Stop-loss Reinsurance Coverage at 100% of Pure Premium
Unconditional Premium Conditional Premium
We now consider a simple reinsurance strategy where the loss beyond 100% of 
the pure premium is transferred to a reinsurer. For contracts with unconditional 
(conditional) premia, actuarially fair stoploss reinsurance rates quoted as percentage of 
IBLI premium would range from 49% (32%) for a 10% strike contract to 68% (49%) 
for a 30% strike contract (Table 4.10). Appendix A.3 shows the detail. These high 
estimated pure reinsurance rates only take into consideration the local drought risk 
profile, however, and should fall markedly as international reinsurers are better able to 
diversify these risks in international financial markets. Indeed, this diversification 
opportunity through international risk transfer is one of the key benefits of developing 
IBLI products. 
 
 
Table 4.10 Mean Reinsurance Rates for 100% Stop Loss Coverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 Conclusions and Some Implementation Challenges   
 
This paper has laid out why index based livestock insurance (IBLI) is attractive as a 
means to fill an important void in the risk management instruments available to 
pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid lands of east Africa, where insurance markets are 
effectively absent and uninsured risk exposure is a main cause of the existence of 
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poverty traps.  It has gone on to explain the design of an IBLI product to insure against 
livestock mortality in order to protect the main asset households in this region hold. 
We parameterize the index using longitudinal observations of household-level herd 
mortality, fit to high quality, objectively verifiable remotely sensed vegetation data not 
manipulable by either party to the contract and available at low cost and in near-real 
time. The resulting index performs very well out of sample, both when tested against 
other household-level herd mortality data from the same region and period and when 
compared qualitatively with community level drought experiences over the past 27 
years. Finally, we established that IBLI should be readily reinsurable on international 
markets.  
The development of the IBLI contract is promising because of the opportunity 
it opens up to bring insurance to many places where uninsured risk remains a main 
driver of poverty. Extended time series of remotely sensed data are available 
worldwide at high quality and low cost. Wherever there also exist longitudinal 
household-level data on an insurable interest (livestock, health status, crop yields, 
etc.), similar types of index insurance can be designed using the basic techniques 
outlined here.  
A range of implementation challenges nonetheless remain and are the subject 
of future research. First, the existence of household-level data permit direct 
exploration of basis risk, looking in particular for any systematic patterns so that 
prospective insurance purchasers can be fully informed as to how well suited (or not) 
the index-based contract might be for their individual case. Chantarat et al. (2009b) 
explores this issue for this IBLI product.  
Second, and relatedly, experience with other index-insurance pilots has shown 
that a carefully designed program of extension to appropriately educate potential 
clients is necessary for both initial uptake and continued engagement with insurance 
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(Gine et al., 2007; Sarris et al., 2006). Complex index insurance products can be 
difficult to understand, especially for populations with low levels of literacy and 
minimal previous experience with formal insurance products. Preliminary experiments 
with using simulation games in the field with prospective insurance purchasers shows 
significant promise as a means of both explaining how index insurance products work 
and generating demand for the product (Lybbert et al. 2009).  
Third, the infrastructure deficiencies that lead to high transactions costs in 
verifying individual claims in remote rural areas still feed high costs of product 
marketing and claims settlement. Development of cost-effective agent networks for 
reliable, low-cost product marketing and service is a challenge. In the northern Kenya 
IBLI case, our commercial partners are tapping into a network of local agents 
equipped with electronic, rechargeable point-of-sale (POS) devices being extended 
throughout northern Kenya by a commercial bank working with the central 
government and donors on a new cash transfer program. These POS devices can be 
easily configured to accept premium payments and to register indemnity payments for 
certain insurance contracts. Financial sector interests are attracted by the potential 
economies of scope involved in introducing another range of products for devices 
otherwise used purely for government payments and debit payments.  
Fourth, as already mentioned, IBLI underwriters and their commercial partners 
must make difficult choices in balancing the administrative simplicity and marketing 
appeal of offering IBLI contracts priced uniformly over space and time (which we 
termed “unconditional” pricing in the preceding analysis) versus more complex 
(“conditional”) pricing to guard against the possibility of spatial or intertemporal 
adverse selection. Harmonized pricing is a common practice of Kenyan insurance 
companies that have ventured into the agricultural sector, using the less risky areas to 
subsidize premiums for the more risky areas.  As indicated in our analysis, the 
 115 
potential intertemporal or spatial adverse selection issues could be greater with index-
based products and thus merit attention as this market develops.  
These implementation challenges notwithstanding, IBLI shows considerable 
promise as effective drought risk management strategies and widely acknowledged as 
essential components to effective poverty alleviation in the pastoral areas of east 
Africa. By addressing serious problems of covariate risk, asymmetric information and 
high transactions costs that have precluded the emergence of commercial insurance in 
these areas to date, IBLI offers a novel opportunity to use financial risk transfer 
mechanisms to address a key driver of persistent poverty. Hence the widespread 
interest shown in IBLI by government, donors and the commercial financial sector. 
The design detailed in this paper overcomes the significant challenges of a lack of 
reliable ground climate data (e.g., from location rainfall station) or seasonal or annual 
livestock census data, as well as the need to control for the path dependence of the 
effects of rangeland vegetation on livestock mortality. As the product goes into the 
field in the coming months, the true test of IBLI viability and impact will come from 
monitoring households in the test pilot areas and the financial performance of the 
institutions involved in offering these new index-based livestock insurance contracts.   
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CHAPTER 5 
BASIS RISK, EX ANTE WEALTH AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF INDEX BASED LIVESTOCK 
INSURANCE IN THE PRESENCE OF A                
POVERTY TRAP 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
In the past 100 years, northern Kenya recorded 28 major droughts, four of which 
occurred in the last ten years (Adow 2008). Among more than three million pastoralist 
majorities, whose livelihoods rely partially or solely on livestock, severe droughts 
always come with widespread livestock mortality that places a considerable strain on 
pastoralists’ livelihoods and welfare dynamics. With a dearth of alternative productive 
livelihood strategies to pursue in Kenya’s arid and semi-arid areas and failures in the 
formal insurance market and scant risk-management options to provide adequate 
safety nets in the event of shock, the link between exposures to covariate risk, 
vulnerability and poverty becomes significantly stronger in these areas. 
 The potential of index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) for managing livestock 
mortality risk in northern Kenya as a complement to broader and more comprehensive 
risk-management and social protection programs pursued by the Government and 
international organizations has been extensively identified in Chantarat et al. (2009a). 
Like typical insurance, IBLI compensates for livestock loss. But unlike traditional 
insurance, it only compensates for the covariate herd losses that are objectively and 
transparently observable. In the case of northern Kenya, the increasingly popular 
remotely sensed Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI), an indicator of 
vegetative cover widely used in drought monitoring programs in Africa, is used to 
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predict covariate herd mortality in a particular location. An objectively measured 
predicted herd mortality index constructed from such strong predictive relationship is 
then used to trigger IBLI’s indemnity payments for the insured in such coverage area.  
By design, IBLI thus has significant advantages over traditional insurance. 
Since the payment is no longer based on individual claims, insurance companies, as 
well as insured clients, only have to monitor the index to know when a claim is due 
and indemnity payments must be made. The transaction costs of monitoring and 
verification are considerably reduced. This is especially important in remote, 
infrastructure-deficient areas like northern Kenya where transaction costs have often 
been the limiting factor for traditional insurance markets. And since the index is 
objectively measured and can not be influenced by insurer or insuree, it avoids the 
twin asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that 
have long plagued conventional insurance products. IBLI thus offers great promise as 
a marketable risk management instruments in this targeted region. 
 The gains in reduction of transaction costs and incentive problems, however, 
come at the cost of “basis risk”, which refers to the imperfect correlation between an 
insured’s potential livestock loss experience and the behavior of the underlying index 
on which the index insurance payout is based. It is possible that a contract holder may 
experience livestock losses but fail to receive a payout if the overall index is not 
triggered. Similarly, while the aggregate experience may result in a triggered contract, 
there could be individuals who experience minimal losses but still receive payouts. 
This tradeoff between basis risk and reductions in incentive problems and insurance 
costs is thus a critical determinant of the risk management effectiveness of IBLI. 
 On the basis of a successfully designed IBLI contract (Chantarat et al. 2009a), 
this paper uses household level analysis to examine the effectiveness of IBLI contracts 
in managing asset risk and improving the welfare dynamics of the target community. 
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Our objective is to use two complementary household-level panel data sets46 to 
simulate representative households based on observed distributions of various relevant 
characteristics, and use these to analyze the performance of various IBLI contracts 
based on a stylized dynamic model that replicates the herd wealth dynamics of 
pastoralists in northern Kenya. This technique will also allow us to study patterns of 
potential demand for the particular product and to derive some implications for using 
IBLI as part of poverty alleviation program in the region. Given the innovative nature 
of the IBLI contract, the production dynamics of northern Kenya and the rich data 
sources we employ, our analysis adds to the current literatures in many interesting 
ways.   
 First, we emphasize the value of IBLI in managing asset risk, which is 
distinguishable from transitory income risk, widely analyzed in the current literatures 
that evaluate the potential of agricultural insurance in reducing farm income losses. 
Unlike income shocks, shocks on productive assets like livestock perturb the entire 
asset accumulation process, and so will potentially create intertemporal impacts on the 
future income and livelihoods relying on affected assets. The intertemporal impact of 
asset shocks is even stronger in an economic setting characterized by a bifurcation in 
asset accumulation dynamics evidenced in northern Kenya pastoral production, 
leading to the existence of poverty traps. Lybbert et al. (2004), Barrett et al. (2006), 
Santos and Barrett (2007), among others, have found evidence in the region of a 
critical herd accumulation threshold, below which the herds collapse into a 
                                                 
46 None of the two data sets was used in the design of IBLI. The more temporally rich repeated monthly 
livestock mortality data from 2000-2008 household survey collected by the Government of Kenya’s 
Arid Land Resource Management Project (ALRMP) was used in the designing process in Chantarat et 
al. (2009a). That data set, however, is not a panel data set and so they can, at best, provide inference on 
the location-level mortality dynamics.  
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decumulation trajectory toward some low-level poverty trap and above which it 
catches a growth trajectory toward a high level equilibrium.  
Where production dynamics are characterized by critical herd thresholds, 
shocks that push herd sizes below the threshold can irreversibly impact the herd 
accumulation process. Consequently, insurance that can protect households from 
slipping into the poverty trap can be of significant value. Aware of this bifurcation 
threshold, pastoralist’s valuation of insurance will also involve intertemporal 
expectation of asset accumulation dynamics. We thus evaluate IBLI’s performance 
using a dynamic model rather than the static one employed in the current literature. 
We elaborate that effectiveness of IBLI and so household’s insurance valuation will 
also depend on their herd level relative to the realized bifurcation threshold, in 
addition to their basis-risk-determining characteristics and risk preference. 
  Second, whereas the norm in the literature47 assumes a representative 
individual generated from community-level data, we evaluate IBLI performance based 
on observed household-level variations in characteristics such as individual-specific 
degrees of risk exposure, inherent basis-risk indicating characteristics, herd size and 
risk attitude. The contracts that perform well with a representative (area-averaged) 
household may not prove to be effective for the majority of the area if distributions of 
these key individual-specific characteristics are highly dispersed. Household-level 
analysis allows us to study patterns of such variations.  
Third, where much of the literature relies on risk preference assumptions, our 
analysis is based on observed risk preference estimates elicited using field 
experiments. Based on the distribution of observed risk preference, certainty 
equivalent herd growth rates are constructed to reflect certain growth rates that yield 
similar intertemporal utility as that obtained from household’s stochastic growth. 
                                                 
47 See for example, Skees et al. 2001; Turvey and Nayak 2003; Vedenov and Barnett 2004; Deng 2007. 
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Improvement in the certainty equivalent growth rate of the insured herd relative to the 
no-insurance case thus serves as our evaluation criterion for IBLI. This technique also 
enables us to explore variation of households’ willingness to pay and aggregate 
demand for the IBLI product, which provide critical insight regarding commercially 
targeting and identification of those likely to rely on the government or NGO for 
subsidization as part of the social program. 
 And so lastly, though our primary objective is to catalyze a commercially 
sustainable market to deliver the product, the genesis of our intent to design IBLI was 
our desire to manage the risks faced by vulnerable pastoral and agro-pastoral 
populations and provide them with a safety net that can be implemented as a 
government or donor-driven social protection program in the form of subsidizing IBLI 
premium. Household-level analysis allows us to compare dynamic poverty outcomes 
of various subsidization programs and targeting schemes. Our analysis shows that 
targeting IBLI subsidies toward vulnerable non-poor pastoralists offers a considerable 
productive safety net by helping protect many such households from slipping into a 
poverty trap stage after catastrophic drought hits. This supports assertions that 
interventions targeting the non-poor can, in such systems, be poverty reducing in the 
long run as they reduce the ranks of vulnerable individuals from falling into poverty in 
the event of a shock (Barrett et al. 2008).  
 The rest of the paper is organized as followings. Section 5.2 provides an 
overview of livestock economy of the study locations and describes the data we used. 
Section 5.3 briefly introduces IBLI. As a basis for simulations, Section 5.4 describes a 
dynamic model we used in characterizing the economic settings of poverty traps and 
asset risk in northern Kenya. It then discusses certainty equivalent herd growth rate 
used as a key evaluation criterion of IBLI performance, and elaborates the potential 
impacts of IBLI on pastoralist’s livestock asset accumulation and its performance 
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distinguishing the significance of household’s various sources of basis risks and other 
key characteristics. Section 5.5 estimates distributions of basis-risk-determining 
parameters, risk preference and other key household characteristics necessary for the 
simulations. Using the estimated distributions and 54 seasons from 1982-2008 of 
available vegetation index, we then discuss our simulation strategies and baseline 
results of the simulations. Section 5.6 presents the resulting IBLI performance and its 
variations from the overall simulation results. Based on these results, Section 5.7 then 
estimate households’ willingness to pay for the optimal contract in each location, 
constructs district-level aggregate demand for IBLI and studies its patterns and 
variations across wealth groups. Section 5.8 then discusses varying dynamic outcomes 
of various targeted subsidizing IBLI. And finally, Section 5.9 concludes. 
 
5.2   Overview of Pastoral Economy in the Study Areas and Data 
 
Northern Kenya’s climate is generally characterized by bimodal rainfall that 
disaggregates the agricultural calendar in this region into two seasons, each with a pair 
of rainy and dry periods. A year starts with long rain (falling March-May)-long dry 
(June-September) season, which we henceforth refer to as LRLD, and follows by short 
rain (falling October-December)-short dry (January-February) season, hereafter 
referred to as SRSD. Pastoralists rely on both rains for water and pasture for their 
animals. Pastoralism in the arid and semi-arid areas of northern Kenya is nomadic in 
nature, where herders commonly adapt to spatiotemporal variability in forage and 
water availability through herd migration.  
  Livestock represent the key source of livelihood across most households in this 
environment, but face considerable mortality risk largely related to drought, rendering 
pastoral households vulnerable to herd mortality shocks. As part of the IBLI pilot 
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Survey Sites in Marsabit, Northern Kenya
Chalbi
Laisamis
project in Marsabit District in northern Kenya, this study investigates the performance 
of IBLI in four locations in the district: Dirib Gombo, Logologo, Kargi and North 
Horr. These four study locations marked in Figure 5.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Study Areas in Northern Kenya 
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 These four locations are the overlapping survey locations of the two 
complementary household-level data sets. First is the household-level panel data 
collected quarterly by the USAID Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support 
Program (GL-CRSP) “Improving Pastoral Risk Management on East African 
Rangelands” (PARIMA) in these locations from 2000-2002 (Barrett et al. 2008). 
Thirty households were randomly selected in each of the survey location and the 
household heads were interviewed. In each location, a baseline survey was conducted 
in March 2000. Repeated surveys were conducted quarterly for an additional nine 
periods through June 2002. Data on household’s seasonal livestock losses, mortality, 
growth and offtake were then reconstructed to match the agricultural calendar by 
combining two quarters into the season system. And so these main variables are 
available for four seasons: LRLD 2000, SRSD 2000, LRLD 2001 and SRSD 2001, 
which also cover a major drought that affected much of the areas in 2000.  
 We complement the current set with the household surveys fielded specifically 
in these locations during May-August 2008. The main objectives of this survey were 
to gain insights of pastoralists risk experience, their historical herd dynamics, their risk 
appetite, their perceptions of climactic variability and also to gather household level 
information that is likely to be correlated to these variables.48 The sample was 
stratified by wealth class: low, medium and high, based on owned herd size classified 
by community standards.49 For the sample size of 42 households in each location, 
approximately 14 households were randomly drawn from these location-wealth strata. 
The survey was conducted in June-July 2008, though many key questions gathered 
                                                 
48 In addition we aimed to introduce potential clients to the concept of IBLI, and to investigate patterns 
and determinants of willingness to pay for IBLI. Chantarat et al. 2009c describes this data set in more 
detail). 
49 Wealth classification standards vary by location. The boundaries in TLU for (L,M,H) wealth class for 
the five locations are Dirib( <3,3-8,>8), Kargi(<15, 15-25,>25), Karare(<15,15-30,>30), Logologo( 
<10,10-25,>25) and North Horr( <15,15-35,>35). 
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recalled information over the season for the preceding year. This allows us to 
construct the main variables on seasonal mortality, growth and offtake for two 
seasons: LRLD 2007 and SRSD 2007. This data set also includes pastoralist’s risk 
perception estimates elicited from a simple 50-50 lottery game with real monetary 
payoff described in Section 5.5. 
  Table 5.1 summarizes the key characteristics50 of the pastoral economy in the 
four study locations representing diversity in ethnicity, pastoral production system, 
climate and geographical resources. They range from the least arid location of Dirib 
Gombo occupied mostly by cattle- and smallstock-based pastoralists, who also rely on 
town-based livelihood opportunities to complement there meager livestock resource; 
to Logologo with relatively more arid climate and relatively larger number of large-
scaled, cattle- and smallstock-based and migratory pastoralism; to the very arid 
locations at the opposite edge of the Chalbi dessert, Kargi and North Horr, with many 
large-scaled, camel- and smallstock-based pastoralists with extensive migratory 
patterns due to harsher spatiotemporal variability in forage and water availability. 
 Mean herd sizes range from the lowest of 2 TLU per household in Dirib 
Gombo to the highest of 25 TLU in North Horr. Livestock is considered the main 
component of pastoralist’s asset. Livestock also represents the key source of 
livelihood with households relying on livestock and livestock products for 44-87% of 
their income. The location with the lowest mean herd size, Dirib Gombo, exhibits the 
highest income poverty (with respect to $0.5/day poverty line) as well as asset poverty 
(with respect to 10 TLU livestock unit), while these poverty incidences are the lowest 
in the location with the highest mean herd size, North Horr. This evidence thus further 
emphasizes the significance of livestock as a component of livelihoods among 
pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in northern Kenya. 
                                                 
50 Note that all summary statistics are weighted by appropriate stratified sampling weights.  
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Variables/Location
Climate Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Annual Rainfall (mm) 366 173 297 137 270 115 227 86
NDVI 0.30 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.11 0.03
Livestock Composition Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
% Camel 0% 4% 3% 9% 10% 5% 9% 8%
% Cattle 28% 34% 26% 18% 2% 3% 2% 3%
% Small stock 72% 34% 71% 19% 88% 6% 89% 9%
% Migration 6% 21% 87% 21% 88% 16% 88% 17%
Asset (per household) Median S.D. Median S.D. Median S.D. Median S.D.
Livestock (TLU) 2 4 16 22 17 10 25 19
Nonlivestock (1,000 Ksh) 31 53 0 3,553 0 46 10 60
Income (per capita) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Annual income (1,000 KSh) 3 6 12 11 6 10 27 58
% Livestock share 29% 39% 70% 40% 90% 27% 77% 39%
% Salary/business 41% 43% 26% 40% 5% 21% 20% 39%
Seasonal livestock loss (%) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
In 2000-02 (drought in 2000) 21% 29% 15% 19% 11% 12% 7% 10%
Poverty Incedence
% Headcount (0.5$/day)
% Headcount (10 TLU) 97%
Dirib Gombo
52%
91%
30%
63%
18%
73%98%
Kargi North HorrLogologo
 Livestock mortality is considered the main threat to the livelihood of 
pastoralists in this environment. Households’ overall seasonal livestock loss 
experiences during 2000-2002 (covering bad drought in 2000) varied within and 
across locations range from the lowest averaged seasonal rate of 7% in North Horr to 
21% in Dirib Gombo. Extreme herd losses occurred in high frequency in these regions 
with greater-than-20% seasonal losses occurred with probability of around 20% (10-
15%) in Dirib Gombo and Logologo (in Kargi and North Horr). Strikingly, there were 
at least 10% probabilities of greater-than-50% seasonal losses in Dirib Gombo. 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Supportive Variables, 2007-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: % Migration represents percentage of herd that moves at least once over the year. An average 
value of 1 TLU is approximately 12,000 Ksh, an equivalent of $150 based on November 2008 exchange 
rates (79.2Ksh/US$). 
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 Investigating the composition of historical herd loss from 2000-02 and 2007-
08 in the observed data sets also implies that catastrophic herd losses tend to result 
from covariate shocks over the rangeland – e.g., water and forage availability – in 
contrast to the small-scaled herd losses, which tend to result from other seemingly 
idiosyncratic shocks, e.g., accident or conflict. This evidence thus naturally provides 
logic behind the design and development of vegetation index based insurance to 
provide cost-effective coverage for a specific (but major) component of livestock asset 
risk in this region. 
 
5.3   Index Based Livestock Insurance 
 
From the set of vegetation index )( ltndvi observed prior to and throughout the season t 
in each location l, Chantarat et al. (2009a) constructed predicted herd mortality index  
based on well-established seasonal forecasting relationships according to 
)(ˆˆ ltlt ndviMM = . The constructed index thus serves as the underlying index triggering 
indemnity from IBLI for that particular location relative to a pre-specified level, know 
as the “strike”.  
An IBLI contract ( ))(ˆ,* ltndviMM  with coverage season t and the spatial 
coverage l make indemnity payment rate (as percentage of the insured herd value) 
conditional on the realization of )(ˆ ltndviM  and the strike 
*M according to:  
 
                         ( ) ( )0,)(ˆ)(ˆ, ** MndviMMaxndviMM ltltlt −=π                  (5.1) 
 
For IBLI to sustain commercially, a premium loading 0≥a  over the actuarial 
fair rate – estimated based on the empirical distribution of NDVI – will be applied to 
take into account costs of administrative and un-known exposures.51 And so the loaded 
                                                 
51 The average premium loading for agricultural insurance contract is in the range of 30-50% (see for 
example the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA)’s or the Farmdoc’s Premium Estimator for 
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premium rate for coverage season t and location l quoted as a percentage of total value 
of insured herd, can be calculated as  
  
  ( ) ( )∫ −+=+= )(0,)(ˆ)1()1()(ˆ, ** ltltltltalt ndvidfMndviMMaxaEandviMM πρ     (5.2) 
 
Table 5.2 provides summary statistics of these predicted mortality index 
)(ˆ ltndviM  for each of the four study locations constructed using the full NDVI series 
available in real time from 1982-2008. The predicted herd mortality indices are 
averaged at 8-9%. Though North Horr was shown earlier to have the least mean and 
standard deviation of the overall household’s livestock losses during 2000-2002, it 
exhibits the highest magnitude and variation of the predicted seasonal herd mortality 
index in 1982-2008 with more than 20% probability of the index exceeding 20%. On 
the other hand, the long-term magnitude and variation of predicted herd mortality 
index is the lowest in Dirib Gombo despite the observed evidence of its highest 
morality experience during 2000-2002. This may reflect the fact that relatively large 
proportion of household’s overall livestock loss experienced in Dirib Gombo in such 
period are due to other factors not captured through vegetation index, which will not 
be covered under IBLI.52  
The right panel of Table 5.2 also shows the actuarial fair premium of IBLI, 
which vary across locations due to differences in the distributions of predicted herd 
mortality index. In what follows, we use 54 seasons of predicted area averaged herd 
mortality indices and the derived fair premium rates to evaluate the performance of 
IBLI among simulated households.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
available insurance policies for several states and important grain crops in the U.S. 
(http://www.rma.usda.gov/policies/2006policy.html ; http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/cropins/index.html). 
52 Moreover, since these indices are constructed out-of-sample, mismatching between the indices and 
actual experience may, to some extent, reflects the existence of forecasting errors. 
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Zone Location
Mean S.D. P(M>10%)P(M>20%) 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Laisamis Dirib Gombo 8% 8% 28% 9% 2.5% 1.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1%
Logologo 9% 8% 34% 15% 3.4% 1.8% 0.7% 0.1% 0.1%
Chalbi Kargi 9% 9% 38% 11% 3.3% 1.6% 0.9% 0.4% 0.2%
North Horr 9% 11% 34% 21% 4.3% 2.8% 1.5% 0.7% 0.3%
Contract Strike
Fair Premium Rate (% Herd Value) Predicted Mortality Index 
(M) (%)
Table 5.2 Summary of IBLI Contracts, Chantarat et al. 2009a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4   Analytical Framework 
 
We first elaborate a dynamic model with bifurcations in herd accumulation, highly 
stylized to household herd data in our northern Kenya setting. This model resembles 
other models of poverty traps53 in the sense that it creates multiple welfare equilibria – 
at least one of which is associated with low welfare. While a growing empirical 
literature has exposed several sources of such nonlinearities within the pastoral system 
in this region and identified critical herd size thresholds below which a decumulation 
of herds to a low-level poverty trap equilibrium ensues (Lybbert et al. 2004; McPeak 
2004; Barrett et al. 2006; Santos and Barrett 2007), in what follows we impose a 
realistic consumption requirement to elaborate such herd size threshold in our setting. 
As will be clear, the presence of this threshold, through its effect on herd dynamics, 
can change the valuation of IBLI conditional on the current herd size.  
 
5.4.1   A Stylized Model of Bifurcated Livestock Dynamics  
 
Livestock is considered the main productive asset among pastoralists, and since 
economic activities in this setting revolve around livestock asset, we use livestock as a 
                                                 
53 Banerjee and Duflo (2004), Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), Bowles et al. (2006), Carter and Barrett 
(2006) provide excellent summaries of that literature. 
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standard unit in our model. We denote the herd in the aggregate livestock unit (TLU) 
realized by household i in location l at the beginning of season t (and so at the end of 
season t-1, where seasons alternate within a year between LRLD and SRSD) as iltH . 
Herd dynamics are largely governed by various stochastic processes: the rate of 
biological reproduction, denoted by iltb
~ , the gross non-biological herd recruitment 
rate, ilti
~  (which includes purchases, borrowed animals, transfers in, etc.), the gross 
herd offtake rate, ilto~  (which includes slaughters, sales, transfers out, etc.) and the herd 
mortality rate, iltM
~ .  
Pastoralists rely on livestock as their main source of basic consumption – food 
from milk produced, slaughtered meat as well as income from sales of livestock and 
livestock product that can be used to purchase other consumable goods. And so the 
important determinant of herd dynamics reflecting the necessary seasonal offtake of 
livestock, is the subsistence consumption, denoted by cH , which covers fixed amount 
of the necessary consumption for every member of the household per season.  
Herd reproduction, mortality and the behavioral process that determines herd 
offtake and recruitment decisions are also dependent on the variability and risks 
inherent in the system. There are two main sources of risk and variability affecting 
livestock dynamics in this setting. The main covariate component in household’s asset 
risks, driven particularly by rangeland condition, and so is characterized by the 
constructed set of vegetation index ltndvi  observed prior to and throughout the season 
t in each location l with probability distribution )( ltndvif . This component of risk is 
thus covered by IBLI. Each household also faces other component of risks, iltε , 
uncorrelated with the former covariate component, characterized by a probability 
distribution )( ilth ε  and so uncovered by IBLI. This latter component includes mainly 
idiosyncratic component experienced by specific households – such as conflict, 
raiding, predation, accident, etc. – as well as other non-drought but covariate risk – 
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such as disease outbreaks – which is shown empirically to be relatively small 
comparing to the covariate component. Both sources of risks affect herd accumulation 
in this model directly through stochastic livestock mortality and reproduction, and 
indirectly through other livestock transaction in the form of risk response and coping.  
 Together these processes comprise the elements of the net stochastic herd 
growth rate in period t, which nets out herd offtake and mortality rates from the 
reproduction and herd recruitment rates so that the seasonal herd accumulation can be 
characterized by 
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where the stochastic herd 1
~
+iltH  is to be realized at the end of period t. And apart from 
the direct impact from shocks, the reproduction and net offtake rates are shown 
empirically to vary greatly by household’s beginning herd size, iltH . Note that we 
abstract here from modeling each of these seemingly complicated livestock 
reproduction and transaction choices, but we rather calibrate this growth function 
based on the choices observed in our household-specific dynamic data.  
This growth function is assumed to be continuous, equal to zero when the 
beginning herd size is zero and bounded from below at zero. Equation (5.3) thus imply 
nonlinearities in herd accumulation generated here by the consumption requirement 
cH , which imposes a regressive fixed cost rate – inversely proportionate to the 
beginning herd – on the rate of return on livestock asset. Given the fixed consumption 
required, households with smaller herd sizes must consume a larger portion of their 
herd with decumulation commencing where net herd growth falls below the minimum 
consumption required rate per season.  
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The resulting nonlinearity in net herd growth implies a bifurcation in herd 
accumulation characterized by at least one (subsistence-consumption driven) threshold 
)(* cHH  above which expected herd gradually evolves to a high-level equilibrium 
and below which expected herd steadily falls to a poverty trap equilibrium. Equation 
(5.3) can be re-written with some nonlinear net herd growth function )(⋅η  such that 
the expected net herd growth conditional on herd size is bifurcated around the critical 
herd threshold )(* cHH :  
 
          ( )iltiltltilt HndviH ,,~ 1 εη=+     where   0)( <⋅′ iltHEη   if  )(* cilt HHH <            (5.4) 
              0)( ≥⋅′
iltH
Eη   if  )(* cilt HHH ≥ .  
 
 Imposing the subsistence consumption at 0.5 TLU per season per household,54 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the nonlinear expected net herd growth estimated 
nonparametrically55 for this economy using observed household’s herd data (birth, 
mortality, purchase, exchange, sale, slaughter and transfer rates) in 2000-2002 and 
2007-2008. This pattern implies the bifurcated herd threshold at around 15-18 TLU 
per household, below which herds are expected to fall into negative growth trajectory 
and so collapse overtime at rates inversely proportionate to the herd size. In addition, 
there are potentially two stable equilibria of 0 TLU, where household slowly collapse 
out of pastoralism and at the high level of herd at 55-60 TLU, beyond which herds 
start to reduce again. These findings are in line with Lybbert et al. (2004), McPeak 
(2004), Barrett et al (2006) and Santos and Barrett (2006).56  
                                                 
54 Previous survey work (McPeak 2004) has shown that average livestock offtake for consumption for a 
household is averaged lightly less than one goat sale a month. According to FAO (1992), five goats 
(with 20 kilogram of meat equivalently to 5000 gram of protein) for an average family of three for a 6-
month season will provide 46 gram of protein per day per individual (comparing to the recommended 
daily intake (RDI) of 50 gram of protein per day per individual). 
55 The function is estimated using Epanechnikov kernel with rule-of-thumb optimal bandwidth. 
56 Lybbert et al. (2004) and Santos and Barrett (2007) found the bifurcate threshold in 15-20 TLU range 
and the high-level stable equilibrium at 40-75 herd range depending on the methodology used among 
Boran pastoralist in southern Ethiopia. Barrett et al (2006) found this pattern in some of PARIMA sites 
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Figure 5.2 Nonparametric Estimations of Expected Net Herd Growth Rate 
 
 
 Household i derives their intertemporal utility based on a simplified version of 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility defined over livestock wealth as 
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10 ≤< iR  is the Arrow Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion and ( )1,0∈δ  is the 
discounted factor. And for a stockless household, without restocking, they will have to 
                                                                                                                                            
with the critical threshold of 5-6 TLU per capita and a high stable herd level at around 10 TLU per 
capita. McPeak (2004) estimated net herd growth function using fixed effect dummy regression in the 
overlapping sites and found that the net herd growth would become negative beyond a herd threshold of 
35-40 TLU. 
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undeniably exit the pastoral livelihood and thus to enter into another livelihood 
yielding subsistent return that potentially traps them in irreversible chronic poverty.57 
Because livelihoods of pastoralists in this economy rely on livestock, there is a direct 
link between herd and welfare dynamics. And so using household utility framework 
defined over livestock wealth allows us to explore the welfare impact of asset shocks 
and IBLI, as well as, household’s insurance decision given their risk preferences.  
 A certainty equivalent growth rate of any stochastic herd dynamics is defined 
as a constant net herd growth rate with respect to the initial herd, iltH  , that yields the 
same intertemporal utility as the expected intertemporal utility obtained from the 
stochastic herd dynamics. Specifically, the certainty equivalent growth rate of the 
stochastic herd dynamics, { }T tilH 1~ +=ττ  can be denoted by  cilη   and characterized as58 
 
             ( ) ( ))(~),...,(~),(~,..., 21 iltilTiltiltiltiltiltcililtcil HHHHHHUHHU ++=ηη         (5.6) 
 
Therefore, an improvement in the certainty equivalent herd growth rate of the 
insured herd dynamics relative to that of the uninsured dynamics,  cNIil
cI
il ηη − , thus 
could represent a measure of IBLI performance in improving welfare dynamics of the 
insured household. And so household’s risk preference becomes one of the key 
determinants of IBLI performance.59  
 
 
                                                 
57 Evidence showed that those who dropped out of pastoral system tended to live their subsistence life 
in town relying on food aid, casual labor and small-scale petty trading. Those involved high-return non-
livestock livelihood still maintain livestock in their diversified livelihood portfolio (McPeak and Little 
2005; Doss et al. 2008).  
58 If 1=δ , (5.6) can be written in a general characterization as ))(~()( iltIiltiltcil HHEUHU τη += . 
59 An increase in certainty equivalent herd growth rate with respect to IBLI relative to without IBLI 
directly reflects a positive risk premium growth rate associated with IBLI, which can also serve as an 
indicator of household’s potential demand for such contract specification. By the same token, 
household’s maximum willingness to pay for a particular IBLI contract can be derived by searching for 
the altρ  that drives risk premium growth rate to zero. 
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5.4.2   Managing Mortality Risk with Index Based Livestock Insurance 
 
IBLI compensates for covariate livestock mortality loss based on the predicted herd 
mortality index in each location, )(ˆ ltndviM . For simplicity, we assume that the 
pastoral household insures either all or none of their entire beginning herd each 
season, which enables us to compare fully insured herds under several contract 
specifications against the case of no insurance. The insured herd sixe realization to be 
realized at the end of coverage season t for a household in location l can thus be 
written as. 
                                 
       ( ) iltaltltiltltiltciltiltltiltIilt HndviMHHndvigH ⋅−+−+=+ ρπεε ),(~)|,,(~1~ 1        (5.7) 
 
 IBLI thus reduces expected net herd growth in good seasons, when indemnity 
payments are not made but households have paid the premium. However, IBLI should 
at least partially compensate for losses during periods of substantial covariate herd 
mortality. For any contract ( ))(ˆ,* ltndviMM , one of the key determinants of the 
effectiveness in managing livestock mortality risk is thus the presence of basis risk, 
which reflects to the degree to which IBLI under – or over – compensates for the 
insured’s mortality loss. According to (5.1) and (5.7), basis risk depends on 
correlations between the predicted area-average mortality index, )(ˆ ltlt ndviM , and the 
individual-specific mortality rate, ),(~ iltltilt ndviM ε . More concretely, IBLI 
performance improves the larger is the proportion of predictable covariate loss in a 
household’s individual mortality loss, and the more closely the household’s loss 
experience co-moves with the predicted herd mortality index in its location. 
As the basis for further household-level analysis, we disaggregate the 
household-specific mortality rate into a beta representation form of the hedgable 
predicted mortality index. Specifically, household-specific herd mortality 
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),(~ iltltilt ndviM ε  is orthogonally projected onto the predicted area-average mortality 
index as60   
  
                     ( ) iltlltltiililtltilt ndviMndviM εµβµε +−+= ˆ)(ˆ),(~                  (5.8) 
 
where 0)( =iltE ε , 0)),(ˆ( =iltltlt ndviMCov ε  and IVar ililt 2)( σε = . Here ilµ  reflects 
household i’s long-term average mortality rate, which implicitly contains household-
specific characteristics that determine their livestock loss ( e.g., herding ability),  lµˆ  is 
the long-term mean of the predicted mortality index for location l and iltε , as always, 
reflects other losses that are not correlated with the covariate component captured by 
the index.  
This beta representation allows us to distinguish various distinctive but 
interrelated household-specific basis-risk determinants, { }ililti µεβ ,, . The coefficient 
iβ  measures the sensitivity of the household’s mortality experience to the predicted 
herd mortality index in their area. 1=iβ  represents the case in which household i’s 
deviations of livestock losses from its long-term average are, on average perfectly 
explained by those of the index, while 0=iβ  corresponds to the case, where these 
two series are independent. If the household-specific mean mortality ilµ  is relatively 
similar to the location-specific mean predicted mortality rate lµˆ , then the closer is iβ  
to one, the better will the predicted mortality index explain household’s losses, and so 
the lower is the basis risk. And so such pastoralists with iβ  lower (greater) than one 
will tend to over (under)- insure their herd mortality losses using IBLI. 
The risk component iltε  reflects the relative proportion of household’s overall 
losses that are not manageable by IBLI. The greater its dispersion around zero, the 
larger the basis risk. Other household-specific characteristics that affect long-term 
mean mortality, ilµ , also determine the degree of basis risk with respect to IBLI. 
                                                 
60 Miranda (1991) and Mahul (1999) also use variant of this specification. 
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Holding other things equal, IBLI will, on average, under (over) compensate 
households with high (lower) long-term mean mortality relative to the long-term mean 
predicted drought-related mortality in their area. Variation in these key basis risk 
determinants determine the risk management effectiveness of any IBLI contract 
specification ( )altltndviMM ρ),(ˆ,* .  
 
5.4.3   Evaluation of IBLI Performance  
 
The proposed expected utility criterion in the form of certainty equivalent growth rate 
of the insured herd dynamics relative to that of the uninsured herd thus allows us to 
evaluate the average impact of IBLI on the entire herd dynamics, in contrast to the 
current literature, which concentrates on static impact analysis.61 As IBLI performance 
in the initial insured seasons could determine the performance in the latter seasons 
through the reinforcing impact of herd dynamics,62 we evaluate IBLI over many sets 
of seasons (with different initial seasonal outcomes), which allows us to take into 
account different possible impacts on herd dynamics.  
 Given the current setting of bifurcated herd dynamics, IBLI’s performance will 
depend on a household herd size relative to critical herd threshold. To show this 
analytically, we simplify this dynamic setting by discretizing the nonlinear net herd 
growth in (5.4) into an additive form: 
 
                                                 
61 There are two parallel approaches that are widely used for evaluation of index insurance; another 
approach concentrates on measuring improvements in the distribution of the insured outcome based on 
mean-variance measures, e.g., coefficient of variation, value at risk and downside risk measures, (Skees 
et al. 2001; Turvey and Nayak 2003; Vedenov and Barnett 2004; among others). But since they 
disregard the insuree’s risk preferences, these measures may, however, overstate the benefit of 
insurance as the insuree’s decision is based on expected utility calculation (Fishburn 1977; Breustedt et 
al. 2008). 
62 For example, if IBLI fails to protect household from falling into the herd decumulation trajectory 
during the very first seasons, its performance in the latter seasons could also be low as household might 
already collapse deeply toward irreversible destitution.  
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       LiltHA η=)(   if *HH ilt <      and      iltGiltltndviB εηε +=),(   with probability P 
                    Hη=   if *HH ilt ≥                                    iltB εη +=  with probability 1-P  
 
where )(⋅A  represents the component of herd growth rate that is conditional on initial 
herd size relative to the critical threshold with 10 << Lη  and 1>Hη . )(⋅B  represents 
the stochastic component of herd growth written in an additive form of the covariate 
component captured by NDVI ( 0>Gη  in a good season – when *)(ˆ MndviM lt ≤ with 
probability                                      – and  0<Bη  in the bad season occurred  with 
probability P−1 ), and the uncovered, somewhat idiosyncratic, component with 
0)( =iltE ε . Assuming, for simplicity, that 0)1( =−+ BG PP ηη , this implies the 
expected herd dynamics: 
 
        iltiilt HHE η=+1~       where   Li ηη =   if *HH ilt <                    (5.10)  
    Hi ηη =   if *HH ilt ≥ . 
 
This simplifies setting allows us to derive recursively two stable intertemporal welfare 
levels:  
 
                                          where   Li ηη =   if *HH ilt <                 (5.11)     
       Hi ηη =   if *HH ilt ≥ . 
 
with 10 << Lη  eventually leading those with *HH ilt < into a long-run equilibrium 
herd size closed to zero. 
We consider the expected impact of IBLI on herd dynamics in a simple setting 
when pastoralists can insure all of their herds at period t with an IBLI contract priced 
at ltρ   that pays ltπ  in a bad season with probability P−1  and pays nothing during a 
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good season with probability P. Holding risk preferences and other basis risk 
determinants constant, the effect of an IBLI contract obtained at period t on 
pastoralist’s herd and welfare dynamics in the continuing periods Tt ,...,1+  can be 
shown to vary across pastoralists with different beginning herd sizes, which could 
determine how IBLI alters their livestock dynamics. Four distinct cohorts emerge.  
(1) The first cohort consists of pastoralists with beginning herd size too far 
beneath to grow past *H by the end of the season, even in a good season and without 
insurance, .)( *HH iltGL <+ηη  For this cohort, IBLI could not alter their herd 
dynamics. Thus IBLI only provides typical insurance in reducing the probability of 
herd loss during a bad season, while the premium payment speeds up their herd 
decumulation during good seasons. By (5.6), their IBLI valuation is the same relative 
to the standard case with no asset bifurcation:  
(5.12) 
No IBLI:  
 
W/ IBLI:  
  
Therefore: 
 
( ) 11111 ))(1()( −−− −++−+−+⋅=− iii RRltltBLRltGLcNIilcIil PP ρπηηρηηηη  
                     ( ) 111 ))(1()( −−− +−++⋅− iii RRBLRGL PP ηηηη . 
 
Household’s valuation and so potential demand for IBLI (represented by a positive 
risk premium growth rate) will depend on the extent to which IBLI, imperfectly, 
compensates for the insured’s losses. And since households this cohort end up 
converging to the low-level equilibrium with or without IBLI with very low Lη , IBLI 
performance in their herd dynamics is expected to be the low.   
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 (2) The second cohort consists of pastoralists expecting to grow their herds. 
Their beginning herd sizes are modestly above *H . These allows them to grow if the 
season is good and without insurance. However, paying the insurance premium 
without receiving indemnity payment in a good season will drop them beneath *H  so 
that 1
** )( iltltiltGL HHHH ρηη +<+< . Because IBLI shifts down their herd growth 
trajectory, the risk premium rate is therefore taxed by     ….            …  . The valuation 
of IBLI is lower than would be the case without bifurcation in herd dynamics. This 
slightly more risk-loving decision holds true regardless of risk preferences. And so 
(5.13) 
           ( ) 11122 ))(1()( −−− −++−+−+⋅=− iii RRltltBHRltGHcNIilcIil PP ρπηηρηηηη  
          
 
 
(3) The third cohort is an interesting one consisting of pastoralists with 
beginning herd sizes slightly above but still vulnerable to the risk of falling below *H . 
For this cohort, IBLI protects them from falling below *H  and their herd after paying 
insurance premium still allows them to sit at above *H . Their beginning herds are thus 
conditioned by                                                ,  
Since IBLI preserves their growth trajectory, the factor                            increases their 
IBLI valuation relative to the case without bifurcation dynamics. The willingness to 
pay for IBLI from this cohort is among the highest of the four cohorts according to  
(5.14) 
 ( ) 11133 ))(1()( −−− −++−+−+⋅=− iii RRltltBHRltGHcNIilcIil PP ρπηηρηηηη  
          
                                                                                                                               . 
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( ) 111 )()1()( −−− +⋅−++⋅− iii RRGHRGH PP ηηηη
 (4) The last cohort consists of large-scaled pastoralists with large herd sizes 
that even without insurance are not expected to fall below the critical herd threshold 
after covariate shocks; .)( *HH iltBH ≥+ηη  IBLI thus would not alter their herd 
dynamics, just like the first cohort (with the smallest herds). As these larger herd sizes 
have expected net herd growth, Hη , their valuation of IBLI should be significantly 
more than those in the first cohort according to  
(5.15) 
 ( ) 11144 ))(1()( −−− −++−+−+⋅=− iii RRltltBHRltGHcNIilcIil PP ρπηηρηηηη  
         
 
The expected threshold-based performance of IBLI under the presence of bifurcations 
in wealth dynamics are also found in Lybbert and Barrett (Forthcoming) in a different 
poverty trap model. The above illustration thus implies that if herd threshold is well 
perceived by households in this system, variation in IBLI valuation conditional on 
beginning herd size relative to the bifurcated threshold should emerge. And so cohort 
three and four are therefore expected to represent the main source of demand for IBLI 
in this setting. 
In what follows, we simulate households’ herd dynamics and these key 
performance determinants in order to explore the effectiveness of IBLI contracts. 
 
5.5   Empirical Estimations and Simulations 
 
The main component in estimating and simulating herd dynamics is the net herd 
growth rate in (5.3). We estimate the non-mortality component separately from the 
mortality component as we are particularly interested in estimating the key basis risk 
determinants directly from the correlations between individual household’s livestock 
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mortality and the location-specific predicted herd loss index that triggers IBLI payout 
expressed in (5.8).  
 We first estimate non-mortality component of the seasonal livestock growth 
function in (5.3) by imposing subsistence consumption at 0.5 TLU per household per 
season. Four seasons of dynamic herd growth and transactions in PARIMA in 2000-
2002 and two seasons of 2007-2008, calculated from the mid-2008 household survey 
data, are pooled in the estimation to increase temporal variability with working 
assumption that the expected growth function is stable across 2000-2008. Kernel-
weighted local polynomial regression63 is used to estimate two nonparametric 
relationships between the non-mortality herd growth rates64 and household’s 
beginning TLU herd sizes conditional on whether a season is a good season or a bad 
one based on observed seasonal NDVI data according to Chantarat et al (2009a). The 
two estimated non-mortality growth functions conditional on the vegetation condition 
will be used in the simulation of herd dynamics. They are plotted in Appendix B.1.  
Next, we concentrate on livestock mortality rate and so estimate the 
relationship between household-specific mortality rates and the location-average 
predicted mortality index described in (5.8). We pool four seasons of household-
specific mortality rates across the four locations in PARIMA during 2000-2002. A 
linear relationship between deviations of the two from their long-term means is then 
estimated using a random coefficient model with random effects at the slope 
coefficient. This model thus allows us to take into account variations of slope 
coefficients across households and is estimated using maximum likelihood.65  
                                                 
63 Epanechnikov kernel function is used and the optimal bandwidth is chosen according to Silverman’s 
Rule of Thumb. 
64 Livestock accounting variables used in these estimations are birth, purchase, borrow, exchange, sale, 
slaughter, lend and transfer. 
65 Generally, estimations of models of beta-representation, e.g., in CAPM model, in financial 
econometrics rely on the seemingly unrelated regression model for sector (i)-specific equations, which 
allows for unrestricted structures of disturbance (e.g., due to potentially cross-sectional correlations). In 
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The estimated beta coefficient thus represents the degree of sensitivity of 
household’s mortality loss to the predicted covariate mortality index for their location. 
It is, however, reasonable to assume that there may still be other covariate but 
unpredicted components in addition to the idiosyncratic component in the model’s 
disturbances, which can potentially result in cross-sectional correlations. In an attempt 
to disaggregate these two components in the disturbances, the predicted seasonal 
household-specific residual iltεˆ  is projected onto its location-specific mean each 
season ltε .66 And so the model we estimate can be summarized as 
 
                     ( )( ) iltlltltiililtltilt ndviMndviM εµβµε +−=− ˆˆ),(~                  (5.16) 
   
                           iltltilt e+= εβε ε  
 
where ltεβ ε  represents the covariate component in the unpredicted mortality loss with 
degree of co-variation measured by εβ , and ilte  represents household’s idiosyncratic 
mortality loss with ( ) 0=ilteE , ( ) 0=jltilt eeE  if ji ≠ , and ( ) IeVar ililt 2σ= . The 
estimation results, which allow us to estimate household’s basis-risk-determining 
parameters and other key characteristics in { }iltiiltililti eH ,,,,, εβµεβ , are reported in 
Appendix B.2.  
Disaggregating the estimated parameters by location, we show in Figure 5.3 
the significant variations in location-specific distributions of household betas, as well 
as, the unpredicted component of mortality losses iltε . The two distributions are most 
dispersed in Dirib Gombo relative to other locations implying the potentially great 
variations in basis risk experience and so in performance of IBLI among households in 
this location. The beta distributions seem to nicely center around one in Dirib Gombo, 
                                                                                                                                            
our case, we do not have enough longitudinal observations of individual households to apply that 
model. 
66 The intercept for this model is zero by construction. 
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slightly above one at 1.1 in Logologo, slightly lower at 0.7 in Kargi but a lot lower at 
around 0.4 in North Horr despite its lower dispersion. This implies that households in 
the relatively more arid locations, e.g., Kargi and especially North Horr, will tend to 
over-insure their herd losses using full coverage IBLI, on average. 
 And in sharp contrast to Dirib Gombo, the particularly low dispersion in the 
distributions of unpredicted mortality loss, especially in North Horr, indicates that 
covariate losses captured by the index are a key determinant for variation in livestock 
mortality in these areas and speaks to the potential of IBLI to protect the insured 
against asset loss. 
For the purpose of simulations, we then estimate parametrically the best fit 
joint distributions of the estimated household-specific characteristics 
{ }iltiiltililti eH ,,,,, εβµεβ  by location. Estimations were done using best fit functions in 
@Risk program, which allows us to specify correlation matrix that captures pairwise 
relationships between these variables, and the upper or lower limits of the 
distributions. The best-fit distributions – range from normal, logistic, lognormal, 
loglogistic and extreme value distributions – are then chosen based on the chi-square 
goodness of fit criterion. The estimation results are reported in Appendix B.2.  
From the estimated distributions, we then proceed to simulate herd dynamics 
of 500 representative households in each location as follows. For each location, we 
randomly draw 500 combinations of household-specific { }iltilii H,,, µββ ε  from the 
joint distributions – each of which represents a simulated representative household. 
For each simulated household, we then randomly draw 54 seasons of idiosyncratic 
components of mortality loss, ilte , from the location-specific distributions.
67 We also 
randomly draw 54 seasons of location-average unpredicted mortality losses, ltε ,
                                                 
67 We use location-specific distribution of ilte  since we do not have enough individual data to simulate 
the individual-specific distribution.  
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Figure 5.3 Estimated Household-Specific Beta and Non-Drought-Related Mortality Rate, Random Coefficient Model (2000-2002) 
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from one of the four estimated values from (5.16) based on the four seasons of 
observed data for each location. With { }ltilti e εβ ε ,, , we can then derive 54 seasons of 
unpredicted mortality losses, iltε , for each simulated household. Fifty four seasons of 
location-specific predicted mortality index, )(ˆ ltndviM , and the associated long-term 
mean, ltµˆ  are then assigned to each simulated household. So according to (5.8), we 
can construct 54 consecutive seasons of household-specific mortality rates using 
{ }illtililti ndviM µµεβ ˆ),(ˆ,,, . Appendix B.3 summarize these simulated parameters.  
Using the simulated household’s beginning herd size, iltH , and fifty four 
seasons of vegetation index we can then simulate the household-specific non-mortality 
component of seasonal herd growth function in (5.3) based on the nonparametric 
function estimated earlier. Finally, we then use household-specific beginning herd 
size, non-mortality and mortality components of seasonal growth rates to construct 
household-specific seasonal herd dynamics based on (5.3)-(5.4). Overall, fifty four 
consecutive seasons of simulated herd dynamics for 500 representative households in 
each of the four locations thus serves as the baseline case for evaluation of IBLI.  
Figure 5.4 presents the cumulative distributions of baseline household herds 
(without insurance) during various years for each location. More than 80% of herds 
collapse toward destitution over time in Dirib Gombo, comparing to less than 10% in 
North Horr, reflecting the relatively low beginning herd sizes and high seasonal 
mortality experience in Dirib Gombo relative to others. The bifurcation in livestock 
accumulation in the simulated herd dynamics can be shown by simply estimating the 
autoregression in (5.4) for 10-season (5-year) lags. Figure 5.5 plots the results with 
bifurcated herd threshold around 15-18 TLU. As we pool the observed herd dynamics 
data across all the study locations in this empirical estimation and simulation, this 
stylized result thus holds true with the working assumption of uniform herd dynamics 
across households in these locations.  
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Figure 5.4 Cumulative Distributions of Simulated Herds by Location and Key Years 
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Figure 5.5 Simulated Bifurcated Herd Accumulation Dynamics, 1982-2008 
 
 We also simulate dynamics for 15 stylized pastoralist households with key 
characteristics, e.g., five different beginning TLU herd sizes { }30,20,15,10,5  and three 
levels of beta coefficients { }5.1,1,5.0  for each of the herd size. Each is assumed to have 
a long-term mortality rate that resembles the location-specific long-term mean 
predicted mortality index, and a location-specific uncovered risk component. These 
stylized households allow us to better study the impact of basis risk determinants and 
herd sizes on IBLI’s effect on herd dynamics.  
We are now ready to analyze the effectiveness of IBLI by simply comparing 
herd dynamics with and without IBLI. We construct 54 pseudo sets of 54 consecutive 
seasons from the existing vegetation data letting each observation serve as an initial 
period once in a revolving 54-season sequence with the working assumption that these 
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54 seasons repeat themselves. This allows us to evaluate performance of IBLI taking 
into account different possible initial realizations of stochastic range conditions. Note 
that we choose to construct these pseudo sets of 54-seasons by using the observed 
historical distribution rather than to randomly simulate them due to infeasibility of 
estimating empirical distribution of NDVI that can appropriately capture the complex 
autoregressive structure of the observed series. 
 Five IBLI contracts with five strike levels of five percent increments from 10-
30% are considered. Households are assumed to insure their entire herd. For each 
contract, we simulate the resulting insured herd dynamics based on (5.7) using the 
distribution of location-specific seasonal predicted mortality index )(ˆ ltndviM  and the 
location-specific premium rate shown in Table 5.2.  
 As we compute the value of insurance based on the expected utility approach, 
the certainty equivalent herd growth depends on household discount rates and risk 
preferences. For simplicity, we assume 1=δ . Household-specific CRRA are simulated 
based on a simple experimental lottery game run among the households in the June-
July 2008 survey. Our risk elicitation game follows the simple method used in 
Binswanger (1980, 1981); Eckel and Grossman (2002); Barr (2003) and Dave et al. 
(2007). Households were first given 100 Ksh for participating. Then we introduced 
five lotteries, which vary by risk and expected return. Respondents were asked if they 
would use 100 Ksh to play one of the five lotteries for a real prize. If they decided to 
pay 100 Ksh to play, they were then asked to choose their most preferred lottery to 
play. A fair coin was then tossed to determine their prize. 
Six categorizations of risk aversion associated with six coefficients of relative 
risk aversion,{0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 0.7, 1}, were derived based on households’ choices 
(Chantarat et al. 2009c). Appendix B.4 summarizes the settings and results of this risk 
preference elicitation. For each location, we then randomly assign each simulated 
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household with one of the six CRRA based on the observed distributions of CRRA 
associated with each of the three livestock wealth groups of low, medium and high 
defined based on the local standards used in the survey sample stratification.  
 
5.6   Effectiveness of IBLI for Managing Livestock Asset Risk 
 
As IBLI performance is earlier elaborated to depend on how it could affect the 
insured’s herd dynamics, we first explore the key patterns of varying IBLI 
performance conditional on beginning herd sizes that emerge in our simulations. 
Figure 5.6 depicts some key patterns using Kargi and 1=β  as an example setting. 
Panel (a) to (e) each reflect cumulative distributions of uninsured and insured herd 
sizes for a single household realized over a set of 54 seasons. 
 Panel (a) shows that performance of IBLI should be minimal for pastoralist 
with low beginning herd size (e.g., of 5 TLU). IBLI cannot prevent these households 
from falling into destitution given how far they are beneath the critical herd growth 
threshold (of roughly 18 TLU). On the other hand, paying an insurance premium each 
season accelerates herd collapses.68  
Interestingly, varying patterns of IBLI performance emerge for pastoralists 
with herd sizes around the critical herd threshold – and so whose herd dynamics are 
very sensitive to shocks. Panel (b) represents pastoralist with herd size of 15 TLU – 
immediately at or slightly below the critical threshold – who was hit by big covariate 
shocks that disrupt his asset accumulation and so place him in the de-cumulating 
growth path without insurance. But IBLI could imperfectly compensate for such losses 
and so stabilize the pathway toward growth trajectory. And so because IBLI shifts his 
                                                 
68 Our model assumes away possible indirect benefits of IBLI, such as its potential to crowd-in finance 
for ancillary investment and growth. If IBLI crowds in credit access, it may alter the growth trajectory 
of the least well-off pastoralists as well. 
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herd dynamics, the improvement of certainty equivalent herd growth associated with 
IBLI for such pastoralist should, therefore, be relatively higher than under the setting 
without bifurcation in herd dynamics, holding other things constant.  
Panel (c) presents the opposite case commonly emerge in some sets of 54 
seasons of pastoralist with the same growing herd size of 15 TLU. For this pastoralist, 
who may slowly climb toward herd growth trajectory during good vegetative seasons, 
paying an IBLI premium each season without the occurrence of severe shocks may 
involve costly suppressing their asset necessary for herd accumulation, which tends to 
decrease the chance of achieving their expected herd accumulation trajectory (which 
otherwise could have reached without IBLI). Low IBLI performance should be well 
expected for this case. 
Some IBLI contracts are shown to have significant impacts on those 
pastoralists with herd sizes modestly above the critical threshold but are still 
vulnerable to falling into decumulation trajectory due to asset shock. Panel (d) 
presents a pastoralist with 20 TLU with some specifications of actuarial fair IBLI 
(e.g., 10% strike contract) that could protect his herd from falling into destitution due 
to covariate shock. This role of IBLI in stemming the downward spiral of vulnerable 
pastoralists into destitution should thus result in relatively significant improvement in 
certainty equivalent herd growth. Therefore, panel (b) to (d) imply that for pastoralists 
with beginning herd around critical threshold, performance of IBLI can vary a whole 
lot depending on how IBLI alters the insured’s herd growth dynamics.  
Panel (e) depicts the common pattern of IBLI performance for pastoralists with 
beginning herd size relatively far above the critical threshold – e.g. of 30 TLU – even 
with not much danger of falling into destitution in the absence of a major shock. IBLI 
contracts provide a typical insurance role by reducing probability of herd falling below 
the critically low level, while paying for seasonal premium payments out of their herds 
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may as well reduce the chance of reaching extremely large herd. And so the pattern of 
second-order stochastic dominance of the insured herd sizes relative to the uninsured 
is uniformly observed among those with large herds. This implies that demand for at 
least fair IBLI should be highly expected among the risk averse wealthier herders, 
holding other things equal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 IBLI Performance Conditional on Beginning Herd Size, 
Pastoralists in Kargi, 54 Seasons  
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The ex ante wealth impacts on IBLI performance shown in Figure 5.6, 
however, do not imply a specific herd threshold that determine IBLI’s impact on herd 
dynamics, as we still hold constant other household- and location-specific 
characteristics that determine exposures to basis risks associated with IBLI.69 Holding 
other things equal, pastoralists with low (high) beta will tend to over (under) insure 
their herd losses with IBLI, and so they end up paying higher (lower) price for IBLI 
that offer unnecessarily over-(insufficiently under-) compensations for their losses on 
average. On one hand, the former case of over-insuring with IBLI may lead to adverse 
impact as paying high premium costs ex ante may suppress resources necessarily for 
asset accumulation. This is in contrast to the case of under-insuring, where the benefit 
of lower – but fair – price for partial insurance compensation comes at the cost of 
potential inadequate protection for their herd losses. These comparable impacts are to 
be explored in the simulations. 
 IBLI performance should also vary across locations conditional on the 
location-specific distributions of uncovered asset risks and the distributions of 
covariate shock. On average, IBLI performance will be higher in the locations with 
lower dispersion of uncovered risk. In addition, as we show earlier that paying an IBLI 
premium for rare – but fair – chance of indemnity payout especially in the early 
seasons could lead to adverse impact by impeding asset accumulation for some 
pastoralists with growing herd. IBLI performance is also expected to be higher in the 
locations with higher probability of insurable covariate losses. 
We now consider performance of actuarially fair IBLI contracts conditional on 
contract specifications and household characteristics. The improvement in certainty 
equivalent herd growth rate (e.g., equivalently termed as a positive risk premium 
                                                 
69 And so it is possible for some pastoralists with as high as 40 TLU to still be vulnerable to shock, and 
so can benefit greatly from IBLI in preserving their growth trajectory. 
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growth rate) associated with IBLI for 15 stylized households (with individual mean 
mortality fixed at the location-averaged mean predicted mortality index) in each of the 
four locations are reported in Table 5.3.70 Various interesting results emerge.  
First, we can observe that IBLI performance varies with beginning herd sizes, 
the result of which confirms the emerging common patterns shown in Figure 5.6. The 
performance is minimal for pastoralists with lowest herd sizes (e.g. of 5 TLU) and the 
highest for those with the herd sizes around critical herd threshold (e.g., 15-20 TLU). 
These results thus imply that IBLI is not well suited for the poorest in this setting, 
which are already trapped far beneath the critical herd threshold. 
Second, IBLI performance tends to improve as beta increases, holding other 
things equal. This implies that over-insuring tends to have far larger adverse impact to 
herd dynamics. Third, IBLI performance is lowest in Dirib Gombo and highest in 
North Horr, reflecting differences in dispersions of unpredicted asset risk experience 
and in the distributions of covariate risk covered by IBLI. And lastly, IBLI contract 
with 10% strike out-performs others, on average, even though the 10% strike contract 
is more costly than the others. This may reflect the fact that the 10% strike contract 
could provide greater necessary protection for the household’s asset risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 For simplicity, Table 5.3 only reports certainty equivalent results calculated with respect to the value 
of constant relative risk aversion of 0.7. Results for other degrees of CRRA are largely similar and can 
be requested from the authors.  
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Strike
DG LG KA NH DG LG KA NH DG LG KA NH
Beginning herd = 5 TLU
10 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
30 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Beginning herd = 10 TLU
10 10% 1% -35% -8% 14% 2% -14% 13% 12% -3% 8% 28%
20 8% 1% -17% 5% 7% 1% 2% 17% 5% 0% 10% 22%
30 0% -7% -5% 1% 2% -4% 1% -2% 1% -2% 0% 1%
Beginning herd = 15 TLU
10 11% 8% 13% 39% 15% 22% 18% 42% 26% 35% 46% 53%
20 8% 2% 8% 15% 9% 10% 17% 19% 19% 9% 35% 29%
30 1% -4% 0% 2% 5% -5% 4% 1% 8% -5% 10% 5%
Beginning herd = 20 TLU
10 8% 2% 8% 17% 17% 17% 37% 46% 10% 28% 53% 56%
20 5% 7% 9% 11% 17% 7% 26% 24% 9% 9% 42% 22%
30 0% -3% 3% 0% 5% -4% 6% 1% 4% -3% 12% 0%
Beginning herd = 30 TLU
10 6% -1% -3% 6% 12% 7% 16% 23% 4% 18% 54% 41%
20 6% 1% -3% 2% 11% 3% 14% 15% 5% 4% 40% 19%
30 0% -1% -1% 0% 1% -3% 4% 0% 4% -1% 11% -1%
Beta = 0.5 Beta = 1 Beta = 1.5
Table 5.3 Increase in Certainty Equivalent Growth Rate, Selected Pastoralists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: An increase in certainty equivalent growth rate is the certainty equivalent growth rate (%) of the 
insured herd dynamics minus that of the uninsured herd dynamics. 
 
 
We already observe how variations in household- and location-specific 
characteristics could individually determine IBLI performance. Next, we explore how 
variations of these characteristics based on their observed distributions could 
determine variations of IBLI performance across pastoral populations in these study 
locations. Table 5.4 first reports the overall averaged performance of actuarially fair 
IBLI contracts among 500 simulated pastoralists in each of the four studied locations 
simulated based on the observed heterogeneous distributions.  
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Case
Strike Beta Beginning L-T Mean Fair Increase Decrease
Herd Herd Premium L-T Mean SV(mean) r = 0.9 r = 0.7 r = 0.4 r = 0.1 Simulated 
(TLU) (TLU) (%) Herd (%) (%) CRRA
Dirib Gombo
10 1.1 14.4 6.1 2.5% 15.8% 5.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.3% 2.1% 2.6%
20 1.1 14.4 6.1 0.6% 7.0% 3.5% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 1.4%
30 1.1 14.4 6.1 0.1% 1.4% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
Logologo
10 1.1 17.1 14.0 3.4% 14.7% 10.0% 3.9% 3.9% 3.9% 3.7% 3.9%
20 1.1 17.1 14.0 0.7% 4.0% 5.3% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.6%
30 1.1 17.1 14.0 0.1% -1.6% -3.4% -1.4% -1.4% -1.5% -1.5% -1.4%
Kargi
10 0.7 32.7 37.9 3.3% 21.3% 13.4% 6.2% 5.9% 5.4% 5.0% 6.0%
20 0.7 32.7 37.9 0.9% 10.4% 11.7% 4.3% 4.0% 3.6% 3.2% 4.1%
30 0.7 32.7 37.9 0.2% 1.0% 5.1% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4%
North Horr
10 0.4 31.3 66.5 4.3% 17.8% 17.9% 12.9% 12.7% 12.2% 11.9% 12.1%
20 0.4 31.3 66.5 1.5% 5.5% 10.8% 3.4% 3.2% 2.9% 2.6% 2.9%
30 0.4 31.3 66.5 0.3% -0.2% -1.2% -0.8% -0.9% -1.0% -1.1% -0.9%
Increase in CER Growth Rate (%)
With IBLIWithout IBLI
Table 5.4 IBLI Performance for Overall Locations, 2000 Simulated Pastoralists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main results vary across locations as expected. On average, adopting fair 
IBLI contracts with a 10% strike level results in a 15-21% increase in the long-term 
mean herd size, and a reduction in downside risk of 6-18%.71 On average, 
improvement in certainty equivalent herd growth increases only modestly with the 
assumed degrees of CRRA as expected. Using the simulated CRRA, it is shown that in 
general, effective demand for IBLI exists for all locations for IBLI contracts with less 
than 30% strike with the highest demand being for the 10% strike contract. 
                                                 
71 These two measures are used widely in the mean-variance evaluation approach of agricultural 
insurance. Downside risk reduction is measured by semi-variance reduction of the insured herd 
dynamics with IBLI relative to the uninsured herd.  Specifically, semi-variance of the insured herd 
dynamics over a set of consecutive seasons Tt,...,  , denoted by { }T tIilH 1~ +=ττ  ,  relative to some 
threshold, for example, household’s long-term mean herd size ilH   , can be well written as 
2)0,~()~( Iilil
I
ilH HHEMaxHSV il ττ −= . 
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The performance and valuation of IBLI varies markedly across locations, 
partly due to variation in how well the predicted mortality index captures individual 
herd losses and partly because of differences in location-specific herd size 
distributions. More specifically, relative performance across locations can be 
positively ranked with the location-specific mean beginning herd size (and proportion 
of large-scaled pastoralists). And though this ranking is also inversely associated with 
the dispersion of unpredicted asset risk, it is not monotonically associated to the 
location-specific mean beta. For example, the highest IBLI performance is found in 
North Horr with the lowest mean beta. This may imply that beginning herd sizes serve 
as the dominating factor in determining IBLI performance relative to other 
characteristics. 
How will the performance of these actuarially fair IBLI contracts vary across 
pastoralists in these locations? Figure 5.7 presents the cumulative distributions of the 
improvement in certainty equivalent growth rates with respect to IBLI contracts 
calculated with respect to the simulated CRRA among 2000 simulated pastoralists in 
these four locations. This shows that at least 50% of households in these four locations 
benefit from IBLI contract with 10% strike (and slightly less proportions for other 
strike levels) with the positive risk premium growth rates associated with the contract 
range from almost 0% to 100%. It is clear that the distribution of valuations for 10% 
contract dominates all other contracts in these locations implying that the 10% strike 
contract is optimal across the four studied locations. Improvement in certainty 
equivalent herd growth rate associated with IBLI also conveys important information 
regarding potential demand for the contracts – e.g., with the existence of potential 
demand for actuarial fair IBLI with 10% strike thus expected among at least 50% of 
households. 
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Figure 5.7 Cumulative Distributions of Change in Certainty Equivalent Growth Rate  
 
 
5.7   Willingness to Pay and Potential Demand for IBLI 
 
So far, we have explored the performance of IBLI contracts sold at actuarially fair 
premium rates. As premium rates change to reflect commercial loading, impacts of 
IBLI on herd dynamics will also likely change. How will valuation of IBLI contracts 
vary by the insurance price? And how will demand sensitivity to changing prices vary 
across different groups of pastoralists? In this section, we explore these issues for the 
10% strike contract shown to have the greatest potential for pilot sales. 
 We first estimate the maximum willingness to pay for IBLI of each simulated 
pastoralist by searching for the maximum premium loading )(a  according to (5.2) that 
still yields a positive risk premium growth rate associated with IBLI. The expected 
maximum willingness to pay conditional on household’s beginning herd size is then 
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estimated nonparametrically across 2000 simulated pastoralists and shown in Figure 
5.8. 
As shown in Figure 5.8, maximum willingness to pay for IBLI above the fair 
rate is only attained at a herd size of at least 15 TLU – just around the bifurcated herd 
threshold. Since most households’ herds are below the threshold level, this implies 
very limited potential demand for even actuarial fair priced IBLI. The expected 
willingness to pay increases at an increasing rate for the those with herd sizes between 
15-20 TLU and then continues to increase toward its peaks at an average of around 
18% loading at the herd sizes around 40 TLU – just below the high-level herd size 
equilibrium – before it decreases again for the higher herd sizes. The expected 
maximum willingness to pay may not be high enough for a commercially viable IBLI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Willingness to Pay for One-Season IBLI by Beginning Herd Size 
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contract, which may require at least 20-30% premium loading. However, the 
willingness to pay of at least 30% premium loading emerges only among the smallest 
group of pastoralists, those with at least 100 TLU.    
Based on the estimated distributions of households’ maximum willingness to 
pay for IBLI in each location, we now study potential aggregate demand. Specifically, 
we proceed to construct a district-level aggregate demand curve for Marsabit district 
as follows. With a working assumption that the 2000 simulated households in 4 
locations are randomly drawn from the total population of 27,780 households in 28 
locations in Marsabit district of northern Kenya (Administrative Census of Marsabit 
district (1999) produced by Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and International 
Livestock Research Institute), we first scale up the existing simulations to reflect the 
district population by allowing each simulated household to represent approximately 
14 households in the population. We then rank the estimated maximum willingness to 
pay across all population and plot premium loadings (a) against the cumulative 
number of beginning herd sizes of the population, whose maximum willingness to pay 
exceeds each and every loading level. 
Figure 5.9 thus first presents the constructed aggregate demand for Marsabit 
district and disaggregates it for each of the three threshold-based herd groups: (i) the 
low herd group (with less than 10 TLU herd) – 26% of population occupying 7% of 
overall district herds – who deemed to be on a de-cumulating trajectory, (ii) vulnerable 
pastoralists (with between 10-30 TLU herd) – 47% of population occupying 38% of 
aggregate herds – who teeters on the edge of the critical herd threshold and (iii) the 
better off pastoralists (with greater than 30 TLU herd) – 27% of population occupying 
the majority of district herd, who, in the absence of a major shock, should be securely 
on a growth path.  
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Figure 5.9 District-level Aggregate Demand for One-Season IBLI  
 
 
Overall, the district-level aggregate demand for IBLI seems very price elastic 
with reduction in quantity demanded by 55% as the fair premium rate is loaded by 
20%, and a further 26% reduction with an additional 20% premium loading. If the 
commercially viable IBLI contract rate is set at 20% loading, these highly elastic 
aggregate demand patterns show potential aggregate demand of approximately 210 
thousand TLU in Marsabit District. These observed patterns of potential demand 
highlight several points. First, large herd owners will be the key drivers of a 
commercially sustainable IBLI product. Second, the observed price elasticity of 
demand in these locations could also imply that a small premium reduction (e.g., 
through subsidization) can potentially induce large increases in quantity demanded. As 
Figure 5.9 shows, a decrease in premium loading from 40% to 20% could potentially 
induce more than a doubling of aggregate demand.  
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Third, while IBLI is valuable for the most vulnerable pastoralists (e.g., with 
herd sizes around 10-30 TLU) as it could preserve their herd dynamics from 
catastrophic shock, the maximum willingness to pay of majority of them are still 
below the commercially loaded IBLI premium (e.g., of at least 20% loading). This, as 
we show earlier in panel (c) of Figure 5.6, is due to the possibility that high premium 
payment could impede herd accumulation toward growth trajectory. Consequently to 
preserve the growth-preserving benefit from IBLI among such vulnerable populations, 
premium subsidization may be critical. This point thus provides a natural link to one 
potentially important application of IBLI in northern Kenya as subsidizing insurance 
premiums for target pastoralists may serve as a cost-effective and productive safety 
net in broader social protection programs sponsored by governments or donors.  
 
5.8   Enhancing Productive Safety Net Using IBLI 
 
To explore how effective IBLI may be as a productive safety net for pastoralists in 
northern Kenya, we first explore herd and poverty dynamic outcomes (with asset 
poverty line of 10 TLU) of these 2000 simulated pastoralists in the four locations 
under the scenarios (i) without insurance, (ii) with commercially loaded IBLI 
(assuming 20% premium loading that can be met at least by the majority of large-
scaled pastoralists), (iii) with the optimal targeted premium subsidization scheme that 
maximizes asset poverty reduction outcomes and (iv) with comparable need-based 
subsidization targeted to the poorest and most vulnerable (with herd size less than 20 
TLU).  
The targeted premium subsidization scheme is optimized by searching for the 
combination of subsidized premium rates targeted to different herd groups – (a) the 
poorest (with herd sizes less than 10 TLU), (b) the non-poor deemed to fall into 
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poverty in long run (10-20 TLU), (c) the vulnerable non poor (20-30 TLU), (d) the 
moderate-scaled pastoralists (30-50 TLU) and (e) the large-scaled pastoralists with 
great than 50 TLU herd sizes – that yields the lowest poverty outcomes. Results imply 
that the optimal subsidized premium rates are at the free provision for group (b) and 
fair premium rate for the vulnerable non-poor groups (c) and (d), while premium 
subsidization to the poorest and obviously to the large-scaled groups do not change 
poverty outcomes so no subsidization to (a) and (e). 
We then compare this with two need-based subsidization schemes: subsidized 
to the fair rate %)0( =a  and free provision targeted to the less well off pastoralists 
with herd sizes less than 20 TLU. At the asset poverty line at 10 TLU, the targeted 
pastoralists for subsidized IBLI thus include both the initial poor and non poor, who 
are deemed to fall into poverty according to the threshold-based livestock dynamics.  
In each of these scenarios, individual herd at the end of each season reflects the 
herd associated with household’s insurance choice – e.g., insure if maximum 
willingness to pay exceeds the premium rate or do not insure otherwise. Therefore, the 
herd outcomes for the case of commercial IBLI, for example, represent the outcomes 
of the insured herds among the majority of the well off pastoralists with potential 
demand and the uninsured herd of the rest of the population. Similarly, the outcomes 
for the case of targeted subsidizing IBLI at various rates thus represent the outcomes 
of the insured herd of the well off with potential demand at the non-subsidized rate 
and of the targeted pastoralists with induced demand at subsidized rate, and again the 
uninsured herd of the rest. Figure 5.10 depicts these herd dynamic outcomes in the 
form of mean household herd size and asset poverty headcount with respect to asset 
poverty line of 10 TLU constructed across 2000 simulated household over the 54 
seasons of available NDVI data from the long rain – long dry season of 1982 to that of 
2008. 
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The commercially loaded IBLI without subsidization, which can only attract 
the majority of the well-off pastoralists whose probability of falling into poverty is 
low, has a very limited role in poverty reduction. Average herd sizes under this 
scenario are shown to track the no-insurance case with modest increases largely 
among insured, well-off pastoralists whom were partially protected from shocks by 
IBLI. Under the optimal scheme, we observe increasing mean herd dynamics at an 
increasing rate with averaged increases of 10 TLU per season and the maximum 
increases reach 20 TLU in 2008. Poverty headcount dynamics also decreases slightly 
overtime and stabilize at about 10% lower than the case without insurance at the end 
of 2008. Such observations reflect the fact that induced demanded due to subsidized 
IBLI serves to preserve some targeted pastoralists’ position on the growth trajectory 
from drought-related shocks that may otherwise collapse them into a de-cumulating 
path toward destitution.  
This is in contrast to the need-based schemes, which achieve less than half of 
these optimal outcomes. Nonetheless, herd (and poverty) outcomes under the need-
based subsidizing programs still follow similar trends as that under no subsidization 
with modest increases (decreases) as subsidization increases toward free provision. 
We still observe increasing poverty headcounts (though with less magnitudes) even in 
the free provision of IBLI. These imply that, first since IBLI contract does not 
perfectly provide compensation for livestock losses due to shock, the induced 
demanded (even the freely provided) IBLI may not be able to provide an adequate 
buffer to shock for some targeted pastoralists with low herd sizes or with some 
inherent basis risk characteristics. And second, there are still some better-off (non-
targeted) but, to some extent, vulnerable pastoralists, who do not have potential 
demand for unsubsidized IBLI but could collapses into poverty in the occurrence of 
major asset shocks occurred mainly during 1984-1986, the early 1990s and 2005-06 in 
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this region. And since herd and poverty outcomes will not change by subsidizing the 
poorest, whose herd sizes are far beneath the critical threshold, allocating more 
resources to expand premium subsidization to those not too far above the critical 
threshold could improve poverty reduction outcomes according to the optimal scheme. 
The total cost of the optimal targeted subsidization scheme, which reaches 
20%-50% of the population over 54 historical seasons, stands at an average of $50 per 
beneficiary per six-month season.72 By shifting the full IBLI provision to the poorest 
with less than 10 TLU to the partial subsidization at the fair rate to the vulnerable non 
poor, this optimal scheme is thus relatively cheaper than the need-based scheme that 
reaches the range of 20-70% of population over the historical seasons at an average 
cost of $70.25 per beneficiary per season. Moreover, using percentage of poverty 
reduction relative to the case without subsidization, per capital cost per one percent 
reduction of poverty is therefore a lot cheaper for the optimal scheme at $20 per capita 
per 1% poverty reduction, in contrast to $38 for the need-based scheme.  
This illustration supports the idea that targeting subsidized IBLI to the 
vulnerable non poor thus could, to some extent, provide productive safety net in the 
sense that it can protect some targeted populations from unnecessarily slipping into a 
poverty trap that they may find hard to escape (Barrett et al. 2008). Therefore, safety 
net in the form of subsidizing IBLI – properly targeted based on easily observed 
characteristics such as herd size – can prove appropriate as a cost effective poverty 
reduction program.  
                                                 
72 One TLU is valued at 12,000 Ksh, approximately $150 based on November 2008 exchange rates 
(79.2 Ksh/US$). 
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Figure 5.10 Dynamic Outcomes of Targeted IBLI Subsidization 
 
 
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
T
L
U
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Year
No insurance Commercial IBLI (a=20%)
Optimal targeted subsidization Subsidization (a=0%) 
Free provision of IBLI to herd<20 TLU to herd<20 TLU
Mean Household Herd Size
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Year
No insurance Commercial IBLI (a=20%)
Optimal targeted subsidization Subsid ization (a=0%) 
Free provision of IBLI to herd<20 TLU to herd<20 TLU
Asset Poverty Headcount
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
T
L
U
    166 
5.9   Conclusions 
 
Covariate livestock mortality is a key source of vulnerability among pastoralists in 
northern Kenya and can often drives households into extreme poverty, making it 
difficult for them to escape once they are destitute.  Effectively managing risk should 
help alter these dynamics. Index based livestock insurance is designed in Chantarat et 
al. (2009a) as a commercially viable risk management instrument offers the promise of 
protecting pastoralists from the impacts of covariate herd losses and is scheduled for 
pilot sale in early 2010 in northern Kenya. This paper uses household-level panel data 
sets collected in targeted communities to provide a complete analysis of the 
effectiveness of IBLI in managing livestock mortality risk and improving herd and 
welfare dynamics of the vulnerable populations. Results and implications from this 
paper could provide useful information for finalizing the pilot plan.  
 Our analysis adds to the current literature because of our focus on asset risks – 
rather than income risk commonly considered – and the pastoral production system of 
northern Kenya characterized by the existence of bifurcation in herd accumulation, 
both of which combine to require a unique application of analytical tools. A dynamic 
model is therefore used as a basis for a suite of simulation exercises along with a 
modified expected utility based evaluation criterion in order to take into account the 
potential dynamic impact of IBLI. We use  household-level variables, including 
household-specific risk preferences elicited from field experiment in the target areas to 
provide provides critical information regarding the variations and distributions of IBLI 
performance across households and locations needed to generate realistic simulations 
and  explore variations in willingness to pay and aggregate demand for IBLI. 
 Our model and simulations show that performance of a particular IBLI contract 
varies greatly across households and locations with different natures of livestock asset 
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exposures and basis-risk factors, which determines the extent to which IBLI can 
provide compensations for household’s livestock losses. More strikingly, we show that 
IBLI’s performance is also significantly influenced by household’s herd size relative 
to the critical herd threshold, which potentially determines the significance of IBLI in 
altering herd growth dynamics under the presence of bifurcations in herd 
accumulation. IBLI is shown to be most valuable where it helps stem collapses into 
poverty of vulnerable but non-poor pastoralists following a drought shock. 
In contrast to available theoretical and empirical evidence of high risk premia 
among the poor (Rosenzweg and Binswanger 1993, Morduch 1995, Dercon 1996, 
among others), IBLI performance is shown to be minimal among pastoralists with 
very small herds far below the critical threshold despite our elicited risk preference 
that also exhibits the widely evidenced inverse relationship between risk preference 
and wealth. In our model, IBLI is not well suited for the poorest, who already slowly 
collapse toward destitution over time, as the premium payment tends to further speed 
up such herd de-cumulation during good seasons. 
This implication, however, holds true in our setting as we abstract away from 
other potential behavioral responses to IBLI that may lead to improved welfare 
outcomes. The extent to which the poor can reduce their costly risk management 
strategies may lead to slightly different outcomes. We also ignore the possibility that 
IBLI can crowd-in much needed credit for the insured pastoralists including the least 
well-off ones in order for them to expand their herd to achieve high-growth trajectory 
over time. With such possibility, the value of IBLI should be more significant. 
The joint impact of ex ante herd sizes and household-specific basis-risk 
determinants thus results in location-averaged performances that can be ranked 
positively with mean beginning herd size and negatively with dispersion of 
unpredicted asset risk. IBLI Performance is high in the main pastoral locations of 
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North Horr and Kargi relative to Dirib Gombo with the lowest performance of IBLI 
due to smallest proportion of large-scaled pastoralists and the largest dispersion of 
uncovered livestock asset risk. This result holds despite the evidence that predicted 
mortality index, on average, over-predicts the actual location-averaged mortality 
losses in North Horr relative to others. Therefore, our results imply that though the 
out-of-sample forecasting performance of the predicted mortality index serves to 
determine effectiveness of IBLI, the variations and distribution of beginning herd sizes 
and other household-specific factors seem to play a larger role in determining overall 
performance of IBLI in each particular area. As such, studies that ignore household-
level variations may fall short of accurately capturing the performance of similar 
insurance contracts. 
Our result shows that 10% strike contract with the highest coverage of 
covariate risk out-performs others for each household and location, and is there chosen 
for the optimal contract used in the ensuing simulations. The district-level aggregated 
demand is shown to be high price elastic with evidence of potentially low demand for 
commercially viable contract. Willingness to pay among the most vulnerable 
pastoralists is very sensitive to premium loadings and lower than the commercially 
viable rates, on average, despite its potentially high dynamic value. We therefore 
illustrate that safety nets in the form of subsidizing IBLI, properly targeted based on 
easily observed characteristics such as herd size, can prove appropriate as a cost 
effective poverty reduction program. Our future empirical research to be implemented 
in parallel to the pilot sale of IBLI early next year will provide greater insight for the 
most effective way to implement IBLI as a productive safety net in northern Kenya.  
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Cluster/ Variable % Bad-
Location Climate
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Regime
Chalbi Mortality rate 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
(Pooled) Czndvi_pos -1.5 15.9 -26.3 25.9 15.8 7.4 -12.9 7.3 60%
Czndvi_pre -0.7 9.9 -19.6 21.8 8.6 7.4 -6.8 5.7
CNzndvi 6.4 4.6 0.1 18.6 2.5 1.6 8.9 4.1
CPzndvi 5.5 6.0 0.0 21.4 9.9 7.0 2.6 2.7
North Horr Mortality rate 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Czndvi_pos -4.8 14.3 -26.2 17.4 9.0 5.7 -15.5 7.9 56%
Czndvi_pre -2.5 9.5 -19.6 18.3 5.0 6.7 -8.4 7.0
CNzndvi 6.9 5.0 1.6 18.6 3.3 1.3 9.7 5.1
CPzndvi 4.4 5.3 0.0 20.7 7.3 6.6 2.2 2.7
Kalacha Mortality rate 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Czndvi_pos -1.5 17.9 -26.3 25.9 19.3 5.9 -14.0 7.4 63%
Czndvi_pre -0.6 10.9 -16.5 21.8 10.2 8.4 -7.1 5.9
CNzndvi 6.6 5.0 0.6 16.3 2.1 1.5 9.4 4.2
CPzndvi 5.6 6.7 0.0 21.4 11.3 7.9 2.2 2.4
Maikona Mortality rate 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Czndvi_pos 1.8 15.7 -17.4 24.4 20.3 4.5 -9.3 5.8 63%
Czndvi_pre 1.0 9.5 -10.8 18.7 11.2 6.7 -5.1 4.0
CNzndvi 5.6 4.0 0.1 11.1 1.9 2.0 7.8 3.1
CPzndvi 6.3 6.1 0.0 19.9 11.4 6.8 3.3 3.0
Laisamis Mortality rate 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
(Pooled) Czndvi_pos -3.5 16.5 -35.3 34.9 12.9 9.0 -14.7 9.7 59%
Czndvi_pre -1.9 10.1 -20.3 23.0 6.0 7.9 -7.4 7.7
CNzndvi 6.7 5.1 0.0 19.6 2.5 2.1 9.6 4.6
CPzndvi 4.8 5.8 0.0 24.1 9.3 5.7 1.8 3.6
Overall Bad Year
Czndvi_pos<0
Good Year
Czndvi_pos>=0
APPENDIX A  
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
 
 
A.1   Descriptive Statistics of Vegetation Index and Livestock Mortality 
 
 
Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics for Vegetation Index Regressors and Area-Average 
Seasonal Mortality, by Location and Regime (2000-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued on next page… 
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Cluster/ Variable % Bad-
Location Climate
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Regime
Karare Mortality rate 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2
Czndvi_pos -5.8 12.7 -26.8 19.1 7.3 7.4 -13.6 7.5 63%
Czndvi_pre -3.1 7.8 -16.0 12.3 2.5 6.2 -6.4 6.9
CNzndvi 6.5 4.4 0.3 16.3 2.4 1.2 8.9 3.8
CPzndvi 3.4 3.7 0.0 13.4 6.8 4.1 1.3 1.2
Logologo Mortality rate 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Czndvi_pos -2.5 17.4 -26.3 26.5 13.1 7.5 -18.1 5.6 50%
Czndvi_pre -1.4 10.5 -14.9 17.2 6.1 8.7 -8.9 5.7
CNzndvi 6.2 4.9 0.2 14.6 2.3 1.4 10.1 3.9
CPzndvi 4.8 6.3 0.0 18.7 9.3 6.3 0.4 0.5
Ngurunit Mortality rate 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Czndvi_pos -4.3 16.8 -35.3 22.8 11.8 7.7 -14.0 12.6 63%
Czndvi_pre -2.3 10.2 -20.3 16.1 5.4 6.2 -7.0 9.5
CNzndvi 7.0 6.0 0.2 19.6 2.5 2.5 9.7 5.8
CPzndvi 4.6 5.0 0.0 17.1 8.7 4.6 2.2 3.6
Korr Mortality rate 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Czndvi_pos -1.4 19.8 -30.1 34.9 19.2 11.4 -13.7 11.4 63%
Czndvi_pre -1.0 12.3 -17.7 23.0 9.9 9.5 -7.5 8.8
CNzndvi 7.2 5.5 0.0 17.2 2.9 3.4 9.8 4.9
CPzndvi 6.5 7.7 0.0 24.1 12.2 7.0 3.0 6.0
Overall Good Year Bad Year
Czndvi_pos>=0 Czndvi_pos<0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…Table A.1 (continued) 
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Year
Chalbi Laisamis All Chalbi Laisamis All Chalbi Laisamis All Chalbi Laisamis All
1982 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1983 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.1
1984 2.3 3.2 2.7 2.5 5.6 3.5 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.8 3.2 2.3
1985 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1986 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.4
1987 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
1988 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1989 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1990 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1991 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.9 0.1 1.3 1.6 5.4 2.2 2.1 1.4 2.1
1992 2.7 1.6 2.2 2.1 1.4 1.9 2.0 1.0 1.6 1.5 0.8 1.3
1993 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1994 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.7 4.2 2.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.5 3.3 2.1
1995 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.4
1996 2.5 3.8 3.0 2.0 2.7 2.2 1.9 2.8 2.2 1.5 1.7 1.6
1997 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1998 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
1999 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
2000 2.3 2.8 2.5 3.2 0.9 2.5 2.0 2.6 2.2 2.8 0.9 2.3
2001 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2003 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2004 1.1 0.5 0.8 1.4 0.0 0.9 1.5 0.4 1.0 1.9 0.0 1.1
2005 3.3 4.8 3.9 4.6 6.4 5.2 2.5 3.0 2.7 3.4 3.6 3.5
2006 3.3 2.4 2.9 3.9 3.8 3.9 2.5 1.5 2.1 2.9 2.1 2.6
2007 1.2 0.0 0.7 1.6 0.0 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.7 1.2 0.0 1.0
2008 0.8 1.8 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.5
Mean 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8
S.D. 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.4 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0
Unconditional Premium Conditional Premium
Strike = 10% Strike = 20% Strike = 10% Strike = 20%
A.2   Estimated Annual Loss Ratios 
 
 
 
Table A.2 Estimated Annual Loss Ratios under Pure Premia, 1982-2008 
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Year
Total Total 100% Total Total 100% Total Total 100%
Pure Indemnities Stop-loss Pure Indemnities Stop-loss Pure Indemnities Stop-loss
Premium Coverage Premium Coverage Premium Coverage
($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($)
1982 32,354 0 0 20,351 3,227 0 52,706 3,227 0
1983 32,354 15,498 0 20,351 3,800 0 52,706 19,297 0
1984 32,354 75,926 43,572 20,351 66,058 45,707 52,706 141,984 89,278
1985 32,354 0 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 0 0
1986 32,354 23,630 0 20,351 23,805 3,453 52,706 47,434 0
1987 32,354 7,543 0 20,351 859 0 52,706 8,402 0
1988 32,354 3,050 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 3,050 0
1989 32,354 9,548 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 9,548 0
1990 32,354 0 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 0 0
1991 32,354 51,333 18,979 20,351 30,481 10,129 52,706 81,814 29,108
1992 32,354 85,930 53,576 20,351 32,082 11,731 52,706 118,012 65,306
1993 32,354 5,595 0 20,351 2,326 0 52,706 7,921 0
1994 32,354 61,748 29,394 20,351 51,463 31,112 52,706 113,211 60,506
1995 32,354 10,475 0 20,351 4,060 0 52,706 14,535 0
1996 32,354 80,366 48,012 20,351 77,762 57,411 52,706 158,128 105,422
1997 32,354 6,783 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 6,783 0
1998 32,354 26,475 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 26,475 0
1999 32,354 3,516 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 3,516 0
2000 32,354 73,615 41,261 20,351 57,035 36,684 52,706 130,650 77,944
2001 32,354 0 0 20,351 3,216 0 52,706 3,216 0
2002 32,354 909 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 909 0
2003 32,354 0 0 20,351 0 0 52,706 0 0
2004 32,354 34,627 2,273 20,351 9,408 0 52,706 44,035 0
2005 32,354 105,796 73,442 20,351 97,943 77,592 52,706 203,739 151,034
2006 32,354 106,484 74,130 20,351 48,798 28,446 52,706 155,282 102,576
2007 32,354 39,098 6,744 20,351 0 0 52,706 39,098 0
2008 32,354 26,527 0 20,351 36,855 16,504 52,706 63,382 10,677
Mean 32,354 32,354 14,496 20,351 20,351 11,806 52,706 52,706 25,624
% Premium 100% 100% 45% 100% 100% 58% 100% 100% 49%
Chalbi Locations Laisamis Locations All Locations
 (Total liabilities = $375,000) (Total liabilities = $375,000) (Total liabilities = $750,000)
A.3   Annual Premia, Indemnities and Reinsurance 
 
 
Table A.3 Annual Unconditional Premia, Indemnities and Reinsurance for 
Hypothetical IBLI Contracts at 10% Strike (1982-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Total premia ($) and indemnities ($) are calculated based on hypothetical liability of $75,000 
(500 TLU×150$/TLU) per location. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5 
 
B.1   Non-mortality Component of Herd Growth Function  
 
Chantarat at al. (2009a) defines good seasons as those with positive cumulative 
deviation of NDVI observed at the end of the season. The two nonparametrically 
estimated non-mortality component of growth functions conditional on vegetation 
conditions, which will be used as the basis for the simulations, are plotted below. The 
conditional herd mortality rates are also plotted here to illustrate that during the good 
seasons, more households can enjoy positive net growth rates, while those above the 
bifurcated threshold maintains just slightly above zero growth during the bad seasons. 
Similar finding appeared in Santos and Barrett (2007). 
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Figure B.1 Non-mortality Component of Herd Growth Function, 2000-02, 2007-08 
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Location Variable Obs. Variable
(Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Household-specific βi Household-specific non-drought related loss εilt (%)
Dirib ExtValue(0.7,0.6) 20 1.08 0.66 1.05 0.60 (Based on the model estimations) -0.02 0.20 -0.01 0.18
Kargi Logistic(0.7,0.2) 25 0.71 0.39 0.70 0.34 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08
Logologo Normal(1.1,0.4) 27 1.13 0.38 1.13 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.13
North Horr Logistic(0.3,0.1) 22 0.37 0.18 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07
Estimated SimulatedEstimated Simulated
Location Variable Obs. Variable
(Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. (Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Household-specific βεi Idiosyncratic loss eilt (%)
Dirib ExtValue(0.6,0.7) 20 1.01 0.77 1.02 0.80 LogLogistic(-1,1,17.7) 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.14
Kargi Normal(1,0.3) 25 1.00 0.27 1.01 0.26 LogLogistic(-0.3,0.3,6.9) 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06
Logologo Logistic(1,0.1) 27 1.00 0.26 1.00 0.26 LogLogistic(-1.4,1.4,27.1) 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.11
North Horr ExtValue(0.9,0.2) 22 1.01 0.32 1.00 0.29 Lognorm(0.4,0.04,RiskShift(-0.4)) 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
Estimated SimulatedEstimated Simulated
B.2   Summary of Estimated and Simulated Household Characteristics 
 
Table B.2 Summary of Estimated and Simulated Household Characteristics 
 
Regression of individual mortality on predicted mortality index* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression of predicted residual on location averaged residual** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * Estimated using pooled data, n = 93×4 = 372, log likelihood = 167.5.  ** Estimated using pooled data,  n = 93×4 = 372, log likelihood = 303.17. 
 
Continued on next page… 
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Location Variable Obs. Variable
(Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. (Best-fit distn) Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Household-specific long-term mean mortality rate µil (%) Houehold's beginning herd size Hilt (TLU)
Dirib Logistic(0.2,0.1) 20 0.22 0.14 0.23 0.11 Lognorm(30.2,9.6,RiskShift(-15.3) 12 10 12 8
Kargi Logistic(0.1,0.02) 25 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.05 InvGauss(37.5,60.8,RiskShift(-4.3) 33 31 34 29
Logologo Logistic(0.1,0.04) 27 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.06 InvGauss(19.8,33.7,RiskShift(-2)) 18 15 17 14
North Horr Logistic(0.06,0.03) 22 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 Normal(29.6,15.1) 26 17 30 15
Estimated Simulated Estimated Simulated
…Table B.2 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other key household characteristics 
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Household-specific mortality rate (%) Milt
Location
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Dirib 0.21 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.20 0.00 1.00
Kargi 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.50 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.95
Logologo 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.74 0.14 0.15 0.00 1.00
North Horr 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.54
Household-specific growth rate in (%) gilt
Location
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Dirib -0.05 0.12 -0.22 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.84 0.38
Kargi 0.05 0.07 -0.22 0.22 0.04 0.12 -0.23 0.38
Logologo 0.02 0.10 -0.22 0.30 0.01 0.14 -0.23 0.38
North Horr 0.07 0.11 -0.22 0.22 0.08 0.07 -0.23 0.38
Household-specific herd size Hils
Location
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Mean Sd
Dirib 5 8 0 30 6 10 6 16
Kargi 21 39 0 224 20 43 43 38
Logologo 15 17 1 64 16 21 14 23
North Horr 24 32 0 53 24 33 68 37
Simulated (1982-2008)
Simulated 
Observed in PARIMA (2000-2002) Simulated (1982-2008)
Estimated (2000-2002, 2007-2008)
Observed (2000-2002, 2007-2008)
Beginning 1982-2008
B.3   Summary of Baseline Simulation Results  
 
 
 
 
Table B.3 Summary of Baseline Simulation Results 
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B.4   Summary of Risk Preference Elicitation 
 
The left panel of Table B.4 presents the gambling choice set with 50% probability of 
yielding either a low or high payoff. The first gamble choice reflects the situation if 
the pastoralist chooses instead not to play the game and so to keep 100 Ksh 
compensation. For gamble choice 2-5, expected return73 increases by 5 Ksh and also 
the risk (standard deviation) increase by 25. Gamble choice 6, however, involves only 
an increase in risk with the same expected return as gamble choice 5. Extreme risk 
averse pastoralists would sacrifice expected return to avoid risk and choose the sure 
bet (Gamble 1). A moderate risk averse household would choose an intermediate bet 
(Gamble 2-4). Risk neutral pastoralist would choose gamble choice 5-6, which have 
the highest expected return. And the risk seeker would choose gamble choice 6 to 
speculate for the higher payoff. This experiment was designed to be as simple as 
possible, while retaining reasonable ranges of risk choices.  
Though this simple elicitation method produces, seemingly coarser, six 
categorization of degree of risk aversion, risk decisions are expected to be 
substantially less noisy while maintaining equal predictive accuracy comparing to 
other complicated methods, especially among the low literate subjects (Dave et al. 
2007; Dohmen et al. 2007; Anderson and Mellor 2008, among others). These studies 
found that different cognitive ability was found to hamper subject’s ability to reveal 
their true preference. Moreover, our experimental setting that required subjects to use 
their earned money to play for real monetary payoff is expected to further encourage 
the extraction of household’s true preference comparing to other hypothetical 
                                                 
73 For gamble 2-5, the sample numbers are linearly related to the properties of the gamble in term of 
expected return and variance. The relationship between expected return and variance can be 
summarized by ( ) .2.0100 SDRE +=  The gamble number (G) can be written as ( ) 192.0 −= REG . The 
gamble number is therefore a reasonable parametric summary index of risk preference. 
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methods) Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Holts and Laury 2002; Anderson and Mellor 
2008).74  
We estimate the range of coefficients of relative risk aversion implied by each 
possible choice of gambles under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) according to: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ∑∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−==
−
k
r
k
kk kk r
PPUPUE
1
1
ππ     , ,0)( >′ PU  10 ≤≤ π  and k=1,2. 
 
π  represents probability of each possible payoff P and r is the CRRA coefficient. In 
each case, the upper (lower) bound of r can be calculated as the value of r that 
generates same utility level for the payoffs associated with the preferred gamble and 
the less (more) risky adjacent. The value of r between 0 to 1 represents the level of 
preference of risk averse household.75 The r = 0 is associated with the risk neutral 
household and r<0 is for the risk seeker. Following Binswanger (1980), we assign a 
mean CRRA measures to each of the ranges using the geometric mean of the two end 
points.76 In the case of gamble 6, a value of zero is given to the CRRA measure to 
represent a class of risk neutral or risk seeker. The value of one is then assigned to the 
case of gamble 1 to represent the extremely risk averse class. Six risk aversion 
classifications (extreme, severe, intermediate, moderate, low/neutral and neutral/risk 
seeker), slightly similar to Binswanger (1980), are further assigned to each of the case. 
 
                                                 
74 There are, of course, some tradeoff benefits of the hypothetical experiment setting that better reflects 
pastoralist’s real risk decision making – e.g., about pastoral choice –  which seems to lead the subject to 
critically think and response in a way that reflects how they would behave un actual situations of 
choices. Nevertheless, the potential costs for these hypothetical surveys are found to be very unstable 
and subjected to serious interview bias (Binswanger 1980, among others). We think that these costs 
outweigh the potential benefits.  
75 In our setting, we truncated r at the maximum value of 1 as we only consider CRRA class utility 
function that is increasing. Value of r greater than 1 will yield negative value of utility. 
76 For the case of gamble 5 with one of the end point at zero, arithmetic mean was chosen in this case. 
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Cumulative Distribution of CRRA
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Gamble High Low Expected S.D. CRRA ranges Geometric mean Risk aversion class
Choice Payoff Payoff Payoff Payoff CRRA
1 100 100 100 0 r>0.99* 1.0 Extreme
2 130 80 105 25 0.55<r<0.99* 0.7 Severe
3 160 60 110 50 0.32<r<0.55 0.4 Intermediate
4 190 40 115 75 0.21<r<0.32 0.3 Moderate
5 220 20 120 100 0<r<0.21 0.1 Low/Neutral
6 240 0 120 120 r<0 0.0 Neutral/risk seeking
Table B.4 Summary of Setting of Risk Preference Elicitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *Without assumption of 1≤r , the actual value of r is 1.67. 
 
 
  Figure B.4 plots cumulative distributions of CRRA associated with each of the 
three livestock wealth groups defined based on the local standards used in the survey 
sample stratification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.4 Cumulative Probably Distribution of CRRA by Livestock Wealth Class 
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